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VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT

Framing Immigration and Integration

Facts, Parliament, Media and Anti-Immigrant Party Support in the Netherlands

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

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de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam,
op gezag van de rector magnificus
prof.dr. L.M. Bouter,
in het openbaar te verdedigen
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door

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geboren te Oudewater

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Voorwoord/Foreword

Vaak wordt beweerd dat het werk als promovendus een eenzame aangelegenheid is. Natuurlijk heb ik de afgelopen jaren vele uren in afzondering achter mijn computer gezeten, maar ik heb toch ook vreselijk plezierig gewerkt met een grote groep verschillende mensen, waarvan ik er een aantal in dit voorwoord wil noemen.

Een eerste woord van dank gaat uit naar mijn begeleiders Bert Klandermans en Dirk Oegema, die beiden op een verschillende manier zeer betrokken zijn geweest bij mijn promotietraject. Bert bedank ik in het bijzonder voor de ruimte en vrijheid die hij mij gegeven heeft zonder daarbij niet thuis te geven als ik hulp nodig had. Dirk was een geweldig dagelijks begeleider en zijn enthousiasme en luisterend oor zijn onmisbaar geweest. Ten tweede bedank ik Conny Roggeband en Hajo Boomgaarden. Een groot deel van dit proefschrift komt voort uit twee onderzoeksprojecten die ik met elk van hen afzonderlijk ben begonnen. Conny heeft me daarbij enthousiast gemaakt voor het integratieonderwerp en ondanks het feit dat onze onderzoekstradities zeer sterk verschillen is de samenwerking meer dan succesvol en plezierig te noemen. Hajo heeft zich gedurende de afgelopen jaren ontwikkeld tot een echte ‘partner in crime’, waarbij een paperidee voor een congres in Oxford is uitgegroeid tot hechte samenwerking en een goed persoonlijk contact. Ik vind het geweldig dat we nu ‘echt’ collega’s zijn.

De afdeling Sociologie en in het bijzonder de ‘Social Conflict and Change’ groep heeft een inspirerende werkomgeving gevormd. Ik wil in het bijzonder Ruud Koopmans bedanken voor zijn betrokkenheid bij het project en zijn nooit ontbrekende kritische blik. Mijn kamergenoten van Z-403, Evelyn Ersanilli, Heike Schröder, Inger Plaisier en Robert Braun, verdienen het ook om genoemd te worden: zij boden een omgeving waarin wetenschappelijke discussies nooit ver weg waren en spontane samenwerkingen ontstonden, maar waar het toch vooral ook erg gezellig was. Ook David Hollanders was daar deelgenoot van. Wij waren slechts korte tijd collega’s, maar hij heeft mij gedurende het hele traject (statistisch) bijgestaan en veel van mijn kennis over econometrische tijdreeksanalyses is te danken aan zijn directe nabijheid. Ook van de afdeling Communicatiewetenschap zijn er een aantal mensen van grote waarden geweest. Waarschijnlijk had ik de afgelopen jaren het grootste deel van mijn tijd besteed aan het handmatig coderen van krantenartikelen als Wouter van Atteveldt niet de omgeving had gecreëerd waarin de mogelijkheden van de computer echt goed benut worden. Zijn technische kennis, maar ook zijn niet-aflatende hulpvaardigheid, zijn echt onmisbaar gebleken. Met Lonneke van Noije deelde ik frustratie als de techniek ons in de steek liet en euforie als het allemaal wel werkte. Mijn wetenschappelijke carrière is eigenlijk begonnen

onder de vleugels van Jan Kleinnijenhuis en hij heeft mij nooit uit het oog verloren, waarvan akte! De ASCoR PhD-club op de UvA, waar ik mij altijd zeer welkom heb gevoeld, vormde een ideale plek om onderzoeksideeën en eerste versies van papers te presenteren. Jochen Peter leidde deze groep met niet aflatend enthousiasme en wist als geen ander duidelijk te maken dat wetenschap een mix van principe en pragmatisme is.

The department of Sociology at the University of California, Irvine hosted me for six months during the fall of 2005 and spring of 2006. Dave Snow offered everything one could wish for when entering an unknown scientific environment: hospitality and intellectual inspiration. Catherine Corrigan-Brown, Steve Boucher and Kelsy Kretschmer, among others, made these six months probably the best of the past years.

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Ondanks de betrokkenheid van al deze mensen bij dit proefschrift blijft de inhoud en ook eventuele fouten geheel mijn eigen verantwoordelijkheid.

Rens Vliegenthart
Amsterdam/Hilversum
Augustus 2007

Note: All data used in this dissertation are available at my personal website www.rensvliegenthart.com.

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List of Abbreviations

ACF	Autocorrelation Function
ADF	Augmented Dickey-Fuller (test)
AIC	Akaike Information Criterion
AR	Autoregressive
ARCH	Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
ARIMA	Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average
BIC	Bayesian Information Criterion
CBS	Dutch Statistical Office (Governmental organization)
CCF	Cross-correlation Function
CD	Centrumdemocraten (Dutch Extreme-Right Party)
CDA	Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Dutch Christian-Democratic Party)
CP	Centrumpartij (Dutch Extreme-Right Party)
CU	Christen-Unie (Dutch Christian Party)
D66	Democraten '66 (Dutch Progressive Liberal Party)
Eq	Equation
EU	European Union
FPÖ	Freiheitlich Partei Österreich (Austrian Extreme-Right Party)
GARCH	Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
GL	GroenLinks (Dutch Greens)
HTK	Handelingen Tweede Kamer / Proceedings of the Second Chamber
LN	Leefbaar Nederland (Dutch Traditionalist Moderate-Right Party)
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Party founded by Pim Fortuyn)
MA	Moving Average
MAR	Moving Average Representation
MP	Member of Parliament
MRG	Manifesto Research Group
PACF	Partial Autocorrelations Function
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid (Dutch Social-Democratic Party)
PVV	Partij Voor de Vrijheid (Dutch Anti-Immigrant Party)
RMS	Residuals Means Square
SEM	Simultaneous Equation Modelling
SGP	Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Dutch Conservative Christian Party)
SP	Socialistische Partij (Dutch Socialist Party)
VAR	Vector Autoregression
VECM	Vector Error Correction Models
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (Dutch Conservative-Liberal Party)

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Setting the scene

Over the past few years, the integration of ethnic minorities has been high on the political and public agenda in almost all Western countries. Especially since 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terrorism’, the position in society of immigrants in general and Islamic immigrants in specific has been the issue of intensive political debate (see also Norris *et al.*, 2003).

In the Netherlands, an extra dimension was added to the debate on immigrants and their position in society (‘integration’), because the debate has been sparked – apart from international events such as 9/11 – by several domestic events; first and foremost the rise of new-politician Pim Fortuyn in 2001-2002, the assassination of Theo van Gogh and the controversy around politician and Somalian refugee Ayaan Hirsi Ali, which also attracted considerable international attention (Koopmans and Vliegthart, 2006). This highly sensitive political situation makes it likely that debates in the Netherlands about the issue of immigration and integration are magnifications of trends found in other Western countries. From a policy point of view, the Netherlands is described as one of the clearest examples of an actual paradigm shift, where multicultural policy goals have been abandoned for a more restrictive, assimilationist approach towards immigrants (Modood, 2003; Joppke, 2004; Kofman, 2005).

All these circumstances and the alleged change in paradigm in debates and policy make the Netherlands an interesting case to study and indeed, the possible causes of these changes are heavily debated, both in society and among social science scholars (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005; Ghorashi, 2003). Numerous explanations are offered, but three –by no means mutually exclusive – of these seem to be dominant. First, changes are foremost interpreted as a consequence of the changed (inter)national situation after 9/11 and other terrorist attacks. These events are said to have caused changes in the intensity and content of debates in politics, media and society and have resulted in a more hostile approach towards the Islamic part of the population.

Second, a mediation of feelings that have already been present in society by political entrepreneurs (mainly Pim Fortuyn) is argued to be at the heart of these changes. These entrepreneurs were able to place an issue on the political and societal agenda that had previously been neglected (consciously or unconsciously) by the political elite, while cherishing the ideal of the ‘multicultural society’ (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005). Multicultural policies led, to paraphrase Koopmans and colleagues (2005: 245): ‘to the fragmentation of migrant communities along ever smaller ethnic and religious group lines, resulting in an institutionalization of inequality’. Their empirical analyses demonstrate the negative consequences of the multicultural policy paradigm for the integration of minorities. Pim Fortuyn made this issue debatable and his anti-immigrant rhetoric resulted in new

opportunities for all kind of political actors to use racist and anti-immigrant sentiments to obtain political support. In the past few years, several new far-right political parties have capitalized these opportunities and gained seats in Dutch national and local elections.

Third, the paradigm shift is argued to be merely a media phenomenon; the problem is constructed within the media realm and picked up by both politicians and public. According to this thesis the Dutch society is to be regarded as a *mediacracy*. This explanation has been especially popular among politicians, who in several cases have pointed to the media, which they hold responsible for creating a tense and negative context around immigrants and the issue of immigration and integration. This media-criticism has not been limited to the specific issue of immigration and integration. In 2003, two governmental advisory committees published reports on the relation between the media and politics (RMO, 2003; ROB, 2003), both having a general critical attitude towards politicians, but especially towards journalists. Recently, a former Dutch reporter in the Middle East, Joris Luyendijk, published the book 'Het zijn net mensen' [They are like ordinary people] (Luyendijk, 2006), in which he discusses the journalistic practices leading to a one-sided image of Arabic people in Western media. In short, there seems to be a lot of 'debate about the debate'ⁱ on the issue of integration of minorities in the Netherlands (see also Koopmans and Vliegenthart, 2006). It is perfectly clear that the debate on the issue has not been limited to a purely political and policy-related matter, but has led to discussions in many other parts of the society as well, most visibly in the mass media. A lot of media attention has been devoted to questions such as whether Muslims were provoked, and whether freedom of speech is incompatible with religious' sensitivity towards harsh criticism.ⁱⁱ In general, immigration and integration of minorities is the center of attention and subject of intense discussions. In other words, it is a *contested* issue. Among the actors participating in these debates are politicians, journalists, prominent opinion makers, civil organizations, social movements, but also individual citizens that express their attitudes, opinions and feelings. Although dramatic changes in the tone and intensity of the debate have been widely recognized (Entzinger, 2003; Luedtke, 2005), the causes of these changes have not been investigated thoroughly.

In sum, in these three explanations mentioned above, four possible sources of change can be identified: *politics, media, public* and *real world developments* (both national and international). Exactly the relationships between these factors are the main concern of this dissertation. The research presented in this dissertation finds its roots in the desire to describe the changes that have occurred and to shed light on the controversy that exists about how to explain these dramatic changes in the immigration debate.

1.2 This research

Research questions

The central research questions that this dissertation seeks to answer are what changes have occurred in the presentation of the immigration and minorities' integration issue in the

political and media realm, how did these realms influence each other, how they are influenced by real world developments and the public – i.e. anti-immigrant party support – and how politics and media influenced the public on their own right.

To outline the variation in political and media debates, first a set of more specific *descriptive* questions needs to be answered. How prominent has this issue been in the various realms over the past few years? Has the debate been as negative as some politicians suggest? How prominent were various actors? How did these actors ‘frame’ the issue? Are there indeed large differences between the presentation of the issue in politics and in the media and if so, what are these differences composed of?

Second, to understand the causes and consequences of these variations, a set of *explanatory* questions arises. To what extent do changes in the intensity and presentation of the issue in parliament alter intensity and presentation in the media and vice versa? To what extent have all kind of key-events (e.g. 9/11, the murder on Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh) influenced characteristics of the debates in both arenas? Do media and politics exert a strong influence on the public with respect to this issue? Does the public in return affect politicians and media as well?

Research design

The relevance of focusing on the Netherlands, lies not only in the sequence of events mentioned in the first paragraph, but also in the large variation in all factors (real world cues, politics, media and public) can be expected. This makes the Netherlands descriptively and explanatory an interesting case. The focus is on a single country and thus it is not comparative in the strict sense of the word (Peters, 1998). However, comparison does play an important role, since this dissertation looks at debates in various realms, making a very explicit comparison between them. Furthermore, cross-time comparisons are central in all the studies. This approach can be regarded as complementary to many cross-national comparisons (e.g. Koopmans et al., 2005) that are well able to explain differences across units, but largely fail to grasp changes within one unit. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of one country needs to precede a similar over-time analysis of several countries. The various chapters and especially the conclusion pay ample attention to the possibilities for generalization and for extending the research cross-nationally.

In the various empirical studies included in this dissertation, I will look at the period between 1990 and 2004. Computer-assisted content analysis is used to describe the presentation of the issue in the political and media realm. The outcomes of these analyses are related to available data regarding real world developments and public (i.e. anti-immigrant party support). Causal relationships between the four factors are analyzed using advanced econometric time series techniques.

Relevance

This dissertation provides specific answers that help to understand the current political and societal situation in the Netherlands and therefore has a clear societal relevance. Moreover, in several ways it seeks to advance our more general (social-) scientific knowledge of relations between media, parliament, public and the larger social-economic context. Overall, a detailed picture of these relations is offered.

For my theoretical framework, I base myself upon insights from communication science (mainly agenda setting and framing literature), sociology (mainly social movements: framing and claims-making) and political science (on explaining shifts in party support and effectiveness of government policies). Using this combination of theoretical approaches contributes to an integral understanding of the interaction between real world developments, politics, media and public.

The various studies presented in this dissertation extend our knowledge of the specific relationships between these four factors. First, when considering relationships between media and politics, research has been limited to agenda building processes, dealing with the level of attention for issues. This research also takes into account how the issue is presented (framed). Second, media-effects on support for anti-immigration parties have never been assessed in a time series design controlling for a whole range of other possible explanations. Nevertheless, in this dissertation some recent findings (mainly issue-voting hypothesis, see Walgrave and De Swert, 2004) can be put to a rigid empirical test. Third, a typology of context-effects on media attention for issues is developed, which enhances the broader understanding of how media coverage comes about.


Methodologically, this dissertation sets out to demonstrate the usefulness of both computer-assisted content analysis to analyze written texts and more advanced econometric time series techniques to statistically analyze relationships between social phenomena at a macro level. Computer-assisted content analysis offers opportunities to analyze large amounts of texts consistently, which would be an immense task when manual coding was used. The use of econometric time series techniques helps to assess the causal relationships between the variables in a reliable manner.

1.3 Theoretical framework

Public debate is carried out in different forums: in the mass media, in parliament, in public gatherings, in the streets and other places. Each forum has its own distinct characteristics and differs in terms of participating actors and ‘rules of the game’. In this dissertation, two of these forums will play a central role: the political forum and the media forum. However, it does not limit itself to these two and also takes into account general public’s reactions by considering anti-immigrant party support. Furthermore, it relates the forums to the larger socio-economic and international political context by taking into account trends like the level of immigration and events like 9/11. Figure 1.1 summarizes the main concepts and

their relations (see Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995 for a study that takes into account equivalent relationships).

Figure 1.1 Theoretical framework



Identifying the main concepts

POLITICAL ARENA: OFFICIAL PARLIAMENTARY DOCUMENTS

Talking about ‘the’ political arena can be problematic, since it simplifies too much the political institutional context. Politics in Western countries consist of various levels of government and authority (e.g. local, regional, national). Furthermore, in recent decades we have witnessed the coming into existence of another level of authority with increasing policy capabilities: the European Community and later the European Union. This has resulted in a multi-level governance structure with a variety decision capabilities and relations between the levels (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). Whether the main authority lies at the sub-national, national or supra-national (EU) level differs significantly across issues. The immigration issue has remained a strongly nationally determined issue: the regulation of immigration and integration is still the territory of the state and is even argued to reinforce nation-statism (Kofman, 2005).

So, if we position the main authority regarding this issue at the national level, it makes sense to look at the parliament (in the Netherlands the Second Chamber) as the most prominent political arena. This is the place where parliamentarians, who have been directly elected by the people, interact with government and where most decision-making takes place. Moreover, it is a forum that is documented consistently and therefore it is most accessible for analysis. Consequently, in this dissertation, I will focus on proposals by

parliamentarians and members of the cabinet that are discussed in parliament and questions posed by parliamentarians to government officials.

MEDIA ARENA: NEWSPAPER COVERAGE

The broader societal debate largely takes place in the mass media. To reach a broader audience or to be heard by (other) politicians, it is almost a necessary condition to receive media attention. But merely receiving attention is not enough; the way actors and their opinions are covered makes a huge difference. As Koopmans (2004: 368) puts it with regard to social protest: 'Authorities will not react to – and will often not even know about – protests that are not reported in the media and if they are reported, they will not react to the protests as they “really” were, but as they appeared in the media'. Theoretically, one might expect the mass media to be a more open place compared to the political realm, allowing all different kinds of actors to participate in discussions and offering a wide range of problem definitions to gain ground and prevail. Though scholars have argued - both normatively and empirically - for mass media (or a Habermasian 'public sphere') to have strong pluralistic characteristics (e.g. Norris, 2000), many others have convincingly shown that this realm is largely institutionalized as well and that selection processes (e.g. based on news values, Galtung and Ruge, 1965) and gate keeping processes make it far less diverse than often presumed (see also Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Koopmans, 2004 for more encompassing frameworks to understand dynamics in the public sphere). Only certain (elite) actors and certain opinions are likely to receive considerable attention and resonance in the mass media (Koopmans, 2004). Due to these selection processes and the limited space available, the 'ordinary' citizen is not likely to participate intensively in the debate via the mass media.

PUBLIC: ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUPPORT

If one wants to gain a complete overview of the discussion around an issue, one can not limit oneself to studying the political and media realm, both highly elitist, although in different ways. Additional insight can be gained by looking at the general public opinion about minorities but also about which political solutions to existing problems are favored. This last opinion is all the more relevant since in certain situations it can become an important factor when deciding which political party to vote for, especially when this issue is highly salient in the mass media (issue-voting hypothesis, see Walgrave and De Swert, 2004). Therefore, changes in public opinion can directly alter the political landscape by shifting party support but can do so indirectly as well by prospective vote-seeking behavior by politicians.

The public agenda is most straightforwardly measured when regarding the question as to what the public considers being the most important problems the country faces. However, this measure does not tell us much about *how* the overall public thinks about the problem and what the preferred solutions might be. Furthermore, for the Netherlands these data are not available throughout the whole research period. Therefore, I regard support for

anti-immigrant parties as being the crucial variable when looking at the public. Next to the pragmatic reason of data availability, there are two substantial reasons to use this measure. First, anti-immigrant party support is directly relevant on its own and an important object of study in political science. Second, derived from the issue-voting hypothesis (Walgrave and De Swert, 2004), it indirectly tells us something about whether the public regard immigration as an important issue and in fact, whether indeed it intends to act politically in accordance with this importance as well. Extreme-right populist political parties provide one way of channeling anti-immigrant sentiments (Koopmans, 1996b), with social movements and non-institutional action like violence being the other. For the Netherlands, Koopmans et al. (2005) demonstrate that both extreme-right party support and violence take moderate overall values compared to other European countries, where either party support or violence reach consistently higher levels. The past few years, however, witness an increase in anti-immigrant party support in the Netherlands, while extreme-right violence has decreased (Van Donselaar and Rodrigues, 2006).

REAL WORLD: DEVELOPMENTS AND KEY-EVENTS

Debates in various forums and public opinion formation do not take place in a vacuum. All kind of larger societal developments are relevant and are likely to affect debates and public opinion. These should be taken into account to get a complete picture of the debate. Regarding this larger ‘real world’ (Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995), I make a distinction between developments and key-events, which can be both expected and unexpected, such as elections, disasters or terrorism attacks.

For real world developments, the selection is pretty straightforward: first and foremost, directly related tendencies should be considered. With regard to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities, these include immigration figures and number of asylum applicants (Lubbers *et al.*, 1998). Second, economic developments like unemployment and economic growth are argued to influence political preferences in general and anti-immigrant party support in particular (Golder, 2003a, 2003b).

The selection of key-events is less straightforward. After all, the question as to which events are crucial in understanding changes in the parliamentary, media and public agendas and in framing of issues is a difficult one to answer *ex ante*. One seems to be inclined to ‘sample on the dependent variable’, meaning that one looks at changes in the ‘outcome’ (e.g. changes in media coverage) and tries to find events that ‘fit’ the data and are co-occurring with significant shifts in this outcome over-time. To avoid this, I base myself upon existing literature in which crucial events are distinguished (see for a more elaborate discussion Chapters 4 and 5). In most cases, they intuitively make a lot of sense (especially those related to the ‘war on terrorism’), in other cases, an outsider might be less aware of their impact.

Issue attention and framing in parliament and media

To be able to systematically compare the political and media arena, one needs to identify the characteristics along which they are to be compared. Furthermore, to be able to identify similarities and differences in these characteristics, it is necessary to measure them similarly for both arenas. To describe the characteristics of parliamentary documents and newspaper articles, I make a distinction between the *attention* (how often and how prominent is it presented?) and the *framing* of the issue (on which aspects does the presentation focus?) (see also Rein and Schön, 1996; Snow and Benford, 1988).

Attention for issues has been regarded as extremely important in the study of media coverage. At least since McCombs and Shaw's agenda setting hypothesis (1972) it has been one of the central concepts in media research and the crucial element of one of the theoretical paradigms that has dominated media research and more specifically political communication during the past decade (for an overview, see Dearing and Rogers, 1996). It is probably the theory most frequently employed to investigate the effects of media on public opinion. Attention can also be used to study political debates and compare various agendas (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006).

The concept of framing is often employed in the study of policy documents (Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003) and a wide variety of approaches exist. Alike, framing has gained ground in media-research over the past years (see for overviews De Vreese, 2005; Scheufele, 1999) and also in this field numerous ways of defining and conceptualizing frames exist. In this dissertation, I largely follow Snow and Benford's (1988) approach. Though developed in the context of social movements' communication towards potential participants, their analytical distinction turns out also to be of use in the analysis of more general media content (see also Snow *et al.*, 2007). Their approach is suitable for analyzing parliamentary documents in a similar vein, allowing a systematic comparison between media and parliament. Different representations of the problem are articulated in these parliamentary and media documents. These representations include a *diagnosis* (what is the problem, where is it located and what/who causes this problem?), connected to a *prognosis* (how should the problem be resolved, what ends and means should be used and who is responsible for the solution?) and a *motivation*, a rationale or call to action (what courses of action are recommended, and who is responsible for this action?) (Snow and Benford, 1988). Theoretically, one can argue that a frame can exist of each possible combination of existing diagnoses, prognoses and motivations, resulting in huge amounts of possible frames. However, qualitative analyses, as reported in Chapter 3, suggest that only a limited number of logically connected diagnoses and prognoses are indeed more than sporadically present, while motivational elements are typically part of social movement communication and are hardly present at all in especially media coverage.

Thus, based on Snow and Benford's classification, issue-specific frames are identified that are more suitable for comparing framing in media and parliament than more generic news frames proposed by many communication scientists, which are strongly based upon characteristics of news media (e.g. Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000; Iyengar, 1991; Price *et*

al., 1997). The approach followed here differs in another way from that of many communication scientists. While social movement scholars pay a lot of attention to the sources of framing, communication scientists regard framing rather as a media characteristic and are to a large extent ‘actor-blind’ (see for a more general argument about the neglect of power in framing research: Carragee and Roefs, 2004). However, frames are not actor-independent and involved actors often propagate their unique and largely diverging views of the issue (Snow et al., 2007; Terkildsen *et al.*, 1998). Therefore, taking into account the actor that is given the right to speak and that is actually using a certain frame (being a politician in parliament or basically any actor in the media) helps to understand the characteristics of the coverage. Here, I distinguish the source of framing as well, though the possibilities to do so are bounded by the use of computer assisted content analysis tools (see also Chapter 2). These limitations result in the use of the framing-concept mainly as a tool to understand the origins, content and consequences of parliamentary and media debates, that do not necessarily correspond with the intentions of sources or predispositions of recipients.

Relationships between the variables

After having introduced the four main concepts of my theoretical framework, I now turn to the relationships between these concepts, represented by the arrows in Figure 1.1 in this introduction. I do not strive for a complete overview, since each chapter includes a more elaborate discussion of the relationships that are part of the empirical research presented in that chapter. Therefore, I limit myself here to highlighting some main points on each of the investigated relationships and indicate which elements are parts of the following chapters.

PARLIAMENT AND MEDIA

The relation between the political and media realm has been subject of several studies. The main focus has almost solely been on the issue attention, rather than the way the issue is presented (i.e. issue-framing). Extending the classical agenda setting thesis (McCombs and Shaw, 1972), the primary focus has been on the agenda building process, in which the arenas affect each other in terms of the attention for issues. The results of studies investigating this relationship do not give a conclusive answer to the question ‘who influences whom?’ Whether media influence politics is largely dependent upon the context in which the study takes place. Researchers find significant media-effects when regarding ‘symbolic’ politics (interviews, speeches) rather than substantial (laws) policies and routine politics rather than election times (see Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006 for an overview). Research on the reverse relationship does not find consistent results either: in some cases rather strong effects from politics on media are found, especially in the Dutch context (Kleinnijenhuis, 2003; Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995; see for the United Kingdom Brandenburg, 2002), while in other cases, this effect is non-present (Wood and Peake, 1998) or dependent upon issues’ characteristics (Soroka, 2002). My focus is on substantial, middle- and long-term relationships between media and parliament and therefore I mainly

focus on official parliamentary documents discussed in parliament (laws, policy proposals and written parliamentary questions to members of government). Additionally, in Chapter 7 I look at transcripts of parliamentary debates, for which Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) argue that it is more heavily influenced by media coverage.

Furthermore, I do not only test the agenda building hypothesis, but also regard the way the issue is presented (framing) as an object of study, something that has not been done until now. In Chapter 3, I hypothesize about the substantial difference in framing between the two arenas, looking at which frames are used, how fast changes over-time occur and how much variation we find in the two arenas. In Chapter 4, I develop a theoretical argument that conceives for certain frames an influence from politics on media and for other frames an influence from media and politics, depending upon the previous use of the frame in both arenas.

MEDIA AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUPPORT

The relation between media and public is explored in Chapter 6, which looks into media-effects of issue attention on anti-immigration party support. Relying on the issue-voting hypothesis, I expect more media attention to result in more anti-immigrant support, even when controlling for real world developments. This hypothesis combines the ideas of agenda setting and issue ownership. The basic idea of the agenda setting hypothesis is that issues that are high on the media agenda will become high on the public agenda as well. In other words, the media do not so much determine *what* people think, but *where* they think *about* (Cohen, 1963; Dearing and Rogers, 1996; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Issues high on the media agenda are then likely to be the issues the public takes into account when deciding which political party to vote for. The issue ownership hypothesis assumes that for every political issue there is a certain political party that people feel drawn to and from which they believe that it can deal with the issue at stake more effectively than other parties (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik *et al.*, 2002). Walgrave and De Swert (2004) find considerable support for their issue-voting hypothesis in the case of the Flemish extreme-right party Vlaams Blok. In Chapter 7, I extend the analysis and also look into framing-effects. I expect framing that is more congruent with positions of anti-immigrant parties to have a positive impact on support for these parties (for a similar argument, see 'valenced news frames', De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2003).

Most empirical studies regard the causal relation between media and public to go from media to public and scholars tend to focus on media-effects on the public. However, one can also investigate whether the public's perceptions have an effect on media coverage as well. From a more normative point of view, those supporting the idea of 'public journalism' emphasize the importance of this relationship. In public journalism, the *expression* function of media is crucial (Eksterowicz *et al.*, 1998). According to this idea, the main task of the journalist is to represent feelings and ideas among the population. If journalists take this function seriously, one would expect that the overall coverage reflect (at least partly) issues and feelings that are present among the population. Then, through media coverage

politicians get information about what citizens think. On the one hand, empirical research has found little evidence for news media working in correspondence with this function (but see Oegema *et al.*, 2007; Soroka, 2002). On the other hand, one could argue that the issue of immigration and integration of minorities has some 'populist' characteristics that might make journalists more sensible to changes in public opinion. In Chapter 7, I will investigate whether the public's influence on media coverage is present in the case of the issue of immigration and integration.

PARLIAMENT AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUPPORT

Combining the expectations for Chapters 4 and 6 suggests an indirect relation from politics via media to public. However, there might also exist a direct interaction between the two that is not mediated by the media (see Kleinnijenhuis, 2003). Does the public react upon what politicians do or express or is it the other way around? The latter is referred to as the 'bottom-up' agenda setting process (Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995). According to Page and Shapiro (1983), this influence indeed exists and more recent work also points to the presence of this relationship as well (see Wlezien, 2004 for an overview). Geer (1996) argues that nowadays this influence is even stronger than it used to be, since the increased possibilities of polling public opinion can give politicians and policy makers direct and plentiful information about the public's preferences. The direct influence of politics on public is not as often investigated as the influence of the public on politics, which is probably due to the fact that political information reaches citizens first and foremost via media coverage (Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995). In Chapter 7, I will test for the presence of these relations in the case under study.

REAL WORLD AND PARLIAMENT, MEDIA AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUPPORT

Including real world developments as explanatory variables is worthwhile for two reasons. First, they function as control variables, decreasing the chances for spurious correlations between parliament, media and public. Second, from a substantive point of view, the larger social-economic context might also have an impact on all three arenas and this impact can be theoretically interpreted as well. In times of high levels of immigration, for example, there might be a higher awareness of the problems associated with immigration among politicians, media and public (see for example Lubbers *et al.*, 1998). In Chapter 5, I especially pay attention to the question as to what determines media attention for the issue. Are real world developments or key-events important factors in determining media attention and how do they affect this attention? In Chapter 6, when trying to explain anti-immigrant party support I consider several real world indicators, which previous research has found to be of importance. In Chapter 4 and 7, I take into account these real world developments when looking at relations between media, parliament and public. In Chapter 5, I investigate in more detail their impact on issue attention in the media.

Finally, is there a relation to be expected from any of the arenas to larger social-economic trends? Though it is not the main focus of this dissertation, I do control for these

relationships and one might indeed expect some influence – be it moderately – to be present. For example, if one regards action in parliament to be more than ‘speech acts’ and assumes that policy making is to a certain extent effective, changes in the political realm, both in terms of changes in attention for an issue and in the way the issue is discussed should be reflected in social-economic trends. So, on the one hand in the long run a decrease in immigration levels can be expected when this topic is discussed intensively and negatively in parliament and policy is made accordingly. On the other hand, as we know from the study of policy, the effectiveness can be rather limited, due to all kind of long-term, institutional constraints (Czada *et al.*, 1998), other factors that are not easy to control (Green and Green, 1995) or unanticipated negative consequences of proposed measures (Enders and Sandler, 1993). Similarly, a negative nationwide public or media attitude might, over-time and again probably only to a limited extent, affect the image a country has for possible immigrants and thereby decrease the level of immigrants. This hypothesis is presuming the existence of strong transnational links between diaspora and their home country and a certain level of integration of these diaspora in the host country, since some knowledge about media and public attitudes has to be obtained and transmitted. These relationships are not taken into account very often (see the neglect of this relationship by Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995), but are considered in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

1.4 Outline of the dissertation

The remainder of the dissertation includes a methodological chapter, five empirical studies and a conclusion. In the methodological chapter (Chapter 2) I elaborate on several crucial points regarding data collection and data analysis.

The first study (Chapter 3), *Divergent Framing: The Public Debate on Migration in the Dutch Parliament and Media* gives an overview of the framing of immigration and integration in both parliament and media and systematically compares their characteristics.

The second study (Chapter 4), *Press and Parliament: Relationships Between the Debate in Media and Politics* looks into the causal relationships between the two arenas in more detail: do changes in one arena lead to changes in the other arena?

In the third study (Chapter 5), *Attention in the Media: Facts and Issue-Coverage in Dutch Newspapers*, issue attention is the dependent variable and different socio-economic trends and key-events are used to explain this attention. *Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigrant Parties: The Role of News Media Content* (Chapter 6) looks at the consequences of media attention for anti-immigration party support, while also taking into account other possible explanations (immigration, unemployment).

In the final study (Chapter 7), *Fitting the Pieces Together: An Anatomy of a Political Process*, I link the four factors that are central in this dissertation and establish their relationships.

In the concluding chapter (Chapter 8), I will highlight the main findings, formulate an answer to the central research question and discuss the practical and scientific implications of this dissertation, as well as its limitations.

Chapter 2. Methodological Considerations

The nature of the research as described in the introduction requires certain methodological choices to be made. In each of the next chapters the specific data sources, operationalizations and analyses are explained. In this chapter, I will discuss two issues that recur in all the studies. First, I will introduce the method to analyze newspaper articles and parliamentary documents. Second, the statistical techniques that are employed are discussed. The nature of the data (aggregated level time series) and the research questions (the interest in causality) require sophisticated statistical techniques.

2.1 Measuring the concepts

For my data on the public I rely on existing sources and use monthly (aggregated) level data on anti-immigrant party support as has been measured in existing public opinion polls. Similarly, for real world cues I use available data from statistical offices to establish monthly figures on immigration, asylum seekers and unemployment.

The real challenge lies in assessing the political and media debates. Here I use quantitative content analysis. To quote Shapiro and Markoff (1998), it can be defined as a technique of measurement, trying to ‘capture text and meaning in numbers and figures’. It differs from qualitative content analysis (or discourse analysis, see for example Wester, 1995), in that it tries to reduce complexity and makes data suitable for statistical inferences (Krippendorff, 2003). Since I am dealing with a large time scale and have numerous parliamentary documents and newspaper articles to analyze, I use computer-assisted content analysis, which makes it possible to analyze large amounts of texts with relative ease. Here, numerous strategies exist, varying from simple document count to all kind of more complicated analyses (e.g. Latent Semantic Analysis) or even full grammatical parsing (Collins, 2003), yielding very rich data structures. However, these data are non-trivial to interpret and more complicated methods are still suffering from reliability problems (West, 2000). Therefore, my strategy is based upon a rather simple, but efficient method. Using manually constructed wordlists, I am able to measure attention of actors and issues and even frames accurately. Regarding the distinction of frames, I loosely follow Gamson and Mogdiliani (1989), who mention ‘catchphrases’ as one of the devices that signify the presence of a frame (see also Pan and Kosicki, 1993: 61-62).

To be able to pursue a project like this it is worth noting that an infrastructure that makes the management and actual content analysis of large amounts of documents is an absolute requirement. The *ANOKO* database, as developed under supervision of Wouter van Atteveldt at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, provides such an infrastructure and is used for both data management and content analysis. For more elaborate description of the

ANOKO database, please see Kleinnijenhuis and Van Atteveldt (Kleinnijenhuis and Van Atteveldt, 2006).

Attention

With the choice of computer-assisted content analysis, I limit myself to a certain type of media, namely the written press. More specifically, I analyze newspaper articles. Though it might be theoretically possible to analyze for example television coverage using computer-assisted techniques, this was in this specific case problematic, mainly because transcripts were not freely available. From a more substantive point of view, one can also argue that if the interest lies in the *debate* around the issue of immigration and integration of minorities, newspapers are more suitable to consider, since they contain more substantive news than television news bulletins (Kleinnijenhuis, 2003). And, contrary to popular belief television and newspapers are fairly close in content – at least in the Netherlands (Kleinnijenhuis, 2003). Furthermore, I take into account the whole range of national newspapers, thereby capturing the largest part of the variation that is present within the Dutch newspaper landscape. These newspapers represent mainstream politics in the Netherlands (Van der Eijk, 2000) and reach one third of the Dutch population (Cebuco, 2006).

As has been mentioned earlier, I am first of all interested in attention for the issue. In most studies, operationalization has been straightforward: attention is usually measured as the frequency of mentioning of the issue, combined with a measure of prominence. In order to establish attention-scores for newspaper coverage, I follow a two-step approach. First, articles are selected from the digital newspaper archive LexisNexis with a very broad search string. Second, the selected articles are used to search for a list of keywords, which frequencies and position determine the attention for the issue. This list of keywords is constructed based upon manually coding of a (relatively small) sample of the articles. However, the meaning of keywords is not in all cases unambiguous and words may have different meanings depending on the context. The computer cannot grasp the semantic meaning of words. To disambiguate the meaning of the keywords it may be necessary to add a condition consisting of one or more words that need to occur within the article or within a certain distance (e.g. ten words) from the keyword (see for an example of those lists Annex 6). Hence, the keyword ‘counts’ and is included in the calculation of the attention score when this condition is met. The attention score per article is not just the sum of the occurrence of all keywords, but is regarded as being sublineary dependent upon these occurrences. The underlying idea is that for example the tenth occurrence of a keyword contributes less to the saliency of the issue within the article than the first does (see also Manning and Schütze, 2002). Furthermore, occurrences in the headline are regarded as more important than occurrences in the body of the text.

The prominence of the article can be taken into account as well. The assumption here is that more prominent articles can be regarded as more visible and will reach a larger audience. This prominence is based upon two criteria: the position of the article in the newspaper (front page or not) and the circulation number of the newspaper. In Chapter 5

and 6, prominence is fully taken into account. More specifically, as soon as any of the keywords was present at least one time, the following formula is used to calculate the attention for the issue:

$$\text{Eq 2-1} \quad v(\text{issue}) = \sum_{a \in \text{articles}} v(\text{issue}_a) = \sum_{a \in \text{articles}} 2 \log(8f_{\text{head}} + 2f_{\text{body}}) \cdot \text{circ}(a) \cdot fp$$

Where $v(\text{issue})$ is the attention for the issue within a certain period in time. This attention is dependent upon the attention for the issue in all articles (a) that appeared during that period in Dutch national newspapers. The article-level attention score is dependent upon the number of key words in the headline (f_{head}) and the number of key words in the body of the article (f_{body}). The multipliers for head and body occurrences are chosen in such a way that the first occurrence in the headline is weighed as 3 ($2 \log 8 * 1$) and in the body of the text as 1 ($2 \log 2 * 1$). With the presence of more key words, the score increases sublineary, with each multiplication of the weighted number of hits by two resulting in a 1 point higher visibility score. This indicates that the first occurrences of keywords contribute most to the visibility score, while later keywords make less of a difference. $\text{Circ}(a)$ is the circulation figure of the newspaper in which the article is published divided by the mean circulation of the newspapers included in the analyses and fp the article salience, which has a value of 2 if the article is on the front page and 1 otherwise. In Chapters 3, 4 and 7, attention scores are more straightforwardly based upon summing up the number of parliamentary documents and newspaper articles in which each of the pre-defined frames occurs. Prominence is only taken into account by counting newspaper articles that appear on the front page twice. Though search strings and weighting-procedures differ there is high correlation between the monthly media attention scores used in Chapter 5 and 6 and Chapter 3, 4 and 7 (for the overlapping period 1995-2002: $r = .75$).

Framing

When regarding the presentation of an issue several characteristics of the communicating text under study (or even more specific elements, like sentences) can be taken into account offering a wide range of characteristics: e.g. general tone, issue stances, attributions (second-level of agenda setting) and framing. Regarding the latter, scientific debate exists about conceptualization (e.g. using generic versus issue-specific frames) and operationalization (how to measure it?) (De Vreese, 2005). As has been mentioned previously, in this dissertation, frame definition is mainly based upon the classical distinction between *diagnostic*, *prognostic* and *motivational* framing, as has been made by Snow and Benford (1988) for the study of social movements. In a qualitative study, as will be described in Chapter 3, five issue-specific frames are distinguished.

For both newspaper articles (from LexisNexis) and parliamentary documents (from Parlando) a collection of documents is selected using a broad search string. Based on Snow

and Benford's classification, a sample of these possible relevant documents is manually coded. During this procedure, word-combinations (using disambiguity rules like 'AND', 'OR', 'NOT', within x number of words, see Annex 4) are constructed that identify each of the five frames. In the next step, the presence of these frames is established in all newspaper articles and parliamentary documents.

For both the attention and frames and both for newspapers and parliament, document level scores are aggregated to a monthly level. For this time interval, data for real world developments and anti-immigrant party support are also available.

Finally, the presence of a combination of an actor and a frame within newspaper articles can be used to establish which actor is more often associated with a certain frame than other actors. Though this co-occurrence does not directly measure the actual frame-use of actors, supplemented with more specific information on what parliamentary questions are posed by which political parties (explicitly listed in Parlando), it provides insight into which actors employ what frames (see Chapter 7).

2.2 Applying time series techniques on aggregate level data

In this paragraph, I will discuss some particularities of the data and appropriate techniques that are required to analyze them.

Aggregate level data

For all studies presented in this dissertation, I use aggregated monthly measures of the various factors taken into account. Applying time series techniques on these data allow for strong claims on causal relationships between real world cues, parliamentary debates, media coverage and anti-immigrant party support. From a political communication point of view, it is worth mentioning that some skepticism towards the use of aggregate level data sets exists. Critics point to the famous ecological fallacy problem (Robinson, 1950). Ecological fallacy refers to the incorrect assumption that relationships between variables at a group level imply the same relationships to be present at the individual level. This makes inferences about individual behavior from aggregate level data problematic. One should indeed be very cautious to do so: a lot of theoretical claims and empirical findings on a macro level assume certain mechanisms that take place on the individual level, but can not be explicitly tested. In the context of this study, two comments should be made with regard to this issue. First, whether this issue is of any relevance depends on the research questions posed. In this dissertation, the main interest lays in general relationships rather than in –for example - individual-level media-effects as in many studies in the field of political communication. For example, hypothesizing that media attention for the immigration issue increases overall anti-immigrant party support (see Chapter 6) is not to say that one certain individual being exposed to this media attention will vote for the anti-immigrant party. It does result in the expectation that overall more individuals will be inclined to do so. This does not mean that individual-level studies are worthless in this context. On the contrary,

they can offer a lot of additional insight and help to understand certain processes more specifically (see for example Boomgaarden and De Vreese, 2007). Neither does this mean that I do not – in some instances - rely on theories that have been mainly applied in individual-level studies, especially on media-effects on public opinion, to formulate expectations about relationships on the aggregate level. Some caution, however, is indeed required: one might not be able to *establish* causality on the *individual* level, but one can establish this causality at the aggregate level and *make plausible* that certain mechanisms are present at the individual level. These mechanisms might include individual choices by politicians and journalists and changes in electoral preferences of individual citizens.

A second point that is worth making is that how to deal with ecological fallacy problem is still not widely agreed upon. Scholars argue that similar and even worse problems can arise with individual level data (Kramer, 1983) or that applying the right statistical techniques on aggregate level data can overcome the problems (King, 1997). From a substantive point of view, aggregate level analyses offer several advantages. They allow sorting out time order which leads to stronger claims about causality. A second advantage compared to individual level approaches in general is that they allow for investigation of long-term influence on larger social systems (Wu *et al.*, 2002). As Slater (2004: 178) puts it: ‘When such [time series] studies are an option [...] they permit exceptionally robust inference concerning real world effects of media exposure on national populations.’

In this dissertation, the units of analysis are months. Practically, for real world developments and anti-immigrant party support, data for shorter periods are often not available. From a substantive point of view, monthly level data is appropriate to profit from the potential advantages of time series analysis: the period is long enough to take into account substantial amounts of parliamentary documents and newspaper coverage per unit of analysis and it makes possible to capture both middle-range and long-term influences (see for similar monthly-level analyses for example Wu *et al.*, 2002; Goidel and Langley, 1995; Sanders and Gavin, 2004).

Time series analysis

To get reliable results from an analysis with time series data it is a requirement that these data are treated in the appropriate statistical manner. The research questions posed in this dissertation require the establishment of causality between two or more series such as monthly issue attention in parliament and media. To be able to do so, it is important to first fully understand the dynamics that each of the series contains. In this dissertation, econometric time series techniques are employed, which make it possible to take into account the specific characteristics of time-related data and treat them with care. Furthermore, such techniques offer the opportunity to deal with one of the requirements of causality: the cause (independent variable) has to precede the consequence (dependent variable). Sometimes this effect from the independent on the dependent variable sets in immediately. In other cases this might take several months. On the one hand this is a

theoretical question: how much time does one expect before the influence from the independent on the dependent variable becomes apparent. Dearing and Rogers (1996) for example argue that the occurrence of agenda setting effects can range from a couple of days to several months. On the other hand, within the range of theoretically plausible options, econometric techniques help to select the statistically most appropriate time lag.

Though numerous other techniques exist to analyze monthly level data with, the discussion is limited to the ones that are used in the following chapters: ARIMA and VAR analyses. Both are often-employed in econometrics: ARIMA is suitable when it comes to establishing the size and delay of effects of pre-established independent variable on a dependent variable, VAR when establishing what causal relationships between two or more variables exist. Before discussing these two techniques in more detail, I will first discuss potential pitfalls when analyzing time series data. In general, three potential problems with time series are to be taken into account: problems with *non-stationarity*, problems with correctly accounting for *the series' past* and problems with *autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity*.

First, problems arise the series contains an upward (or downward) trend, which is called *non-stationarity*. When a series contains an upward trend, its values are steadily increasing over time. If this is the case for both the dependent series and (one of the) independent series, it is likely that statistically a very large influence from the latter on the first is found that does not make sense from a theoretical point of view and is (largely) spurious. This point is nicely illustrated by David Hendry's (1980) classical example in which he almost perfectly explains the UK consumer's price index by the cumulative rainfall in the UK. This very strong effect is of course theoretically nonsense, but shows up in the analyses because both series show a similar upward trend over time. If a series is non-stationary, a solution that works most of the times is taking differences. This means that instead of using the absolute values in the analysis, the difference between the current and previous value is used. Usually, this removes the trend that is present in the series. Using differenced series still offers the opportunity to determine the effects of an independent variable on a dependent variable. In the next section, I discuss more in detail how to establish whether a series is non-stationary.

The second problem arises when the series' own past is not correctly taken into account. Again, if one fails to deal in a proper manner with the series' past and one leaves information from this past unused, significant effects from other variables on the series can be spurious. In time series values at a certain point in time do not arise out of the blue, but largely depend on previous values. A clear example is 'news being news, partly because it was news yesterday'. The value one time period earlier is a very good predictor of the current value. Taking into account the previous value of the series and use it as an independent variable to explain the series is often a good starting point and sometimes even a sufficient solution. However, in some cases more complicated dynamics are present and these need to be dealt with as well. For example, media attention at certain times peaks. After this peak, it usually moves back quickly in the direction of previous values. This

specific dynamic can be modeled within the ARIMA-framework (see the next section for more detail on how to do so).

The third potential problem arises when the series displays periods of relative tranquility - showing up in steady values with little variance - followed by more turbulent periods, when scores fluctuate more heavily. In this case, the series' variance depends upon the time of measurement, which is called *autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity*. When this is the case ARIMA and VAR-models do not suffice and other statistical techniques – more specifically ARCH and GARCH models - are necessary to obtain reliable results. Since this problem does not occur with the data used in the analyses presented in Chapter 3 till 7, it is not discussed in further detail.

In the next sections, ARIMA and VAR-techniques will be presented in more (technical) detail. It becomes clear in what situations which technique is chosen and what steps need to be taken to assess the power and nature of relationships between the variables included in the analysis.

Figure 2.1 summarizes these steps for both approaches. For both, the first step deals with the first mentioned problem of non-stationarity and the second step with the second (modeling the series' past) and third problem (over-time instability of variance). Step three involves the actual analysis of causal relationships between two or more series. The tests that are used to answer substantial research questions are marked grey, while the other tests deal with proper handling of the data as summarized above.


ONE-DIRECTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: ARIMA

What is it and when to use it?

ARIMA is the abbreviation for Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average. The method was initially developed by econometrists George Box and Gwilym Jenkins (1970) and is therefore also called Box-Jenkins modeling. Its main assumption is that a time series own past contains a lot of information that can help to explain its current value and therefore, before endogenous explanatory variables can even be considered, it is first necessary to build a model that is based on the series' own past. Only in a second phase explanatory variables are added. Accounting for the series' past in a time series design offers similar advantages as the use of an experimental, individual-level study does. To determine the consequences of certain stimuli for individuals' attitudes in an experimental setting, checks for causality are built in by measuring attitudes twice (both before and after the stimuli) and/or by the use of control groups. In that way, one controls for the past. This is what happens within the ARIMA framework as well: by modeling the series' past, one controls for it and likewise within an experimental setting, claims on causality are more persuasive.

ARIMA models are especially suitable for time series that are measured over a longer period in time without missing values. Furthermore, as with ordinary regression analysis, one can analyze causal relationships only in one direction. In other words, it is necessary to establish the dependent variable and the independent variable(s) in advance.

Figure 2.1 Step-wise approach in ARIMA and VAR-modelling



Note: The tests that are used to answer substantial research questions are marked grey.

In Chapter 5, explaining media attention for immigration and integration is the main aim and media attention for the issue is therefore used as the dependent variable in the analysis, while real world developments and key events are the independent variables. In Chapter 6, anti-immigrant party support is the dependent variable, while media attention and other contextual factors are the independent variables. Finally, the ARIMA-framework allows one to easily establish the appropriate lag length on which an independent variable influences the dependent variable.

According to the ARIMA-framework a series can be described as a (p,I,q) process, with p autoregressive terms, I orders of integration (number of times a series needs to be differenced before it is stationary) and q lagged moving-average terms. In the following sections, I will explain the issues related to each of these elements. I will start discussing the integration part that is closely related to the concept of stationarity.

Step one: testing for stationarity

The first step in the ARIMA-model building process is to establish whether the dependent time series is stationary. The assumption of stationarity is one of the basic requirements for properly modeling time series. Stationarity is necessary to be able to make a reliable estimation of parameters within the ARIMA-model. A series is stationary if its mean is unaffected by a change of time origin and thus the expected value is the same for all time points.¹ Most often, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test that accounts for the complicated structure of most time series is used to test whether a series is stationary. If the ADF test indicates that the series is non-stationary, the series is said to contain a 'unit root' and to be integrated of order one or $I(1)$. More specifically, a unit root means that including the lagged dependent variable ($t-1$) as an explanatory variable for a series results in a parameter that is equal to 1. It is then necessary to take differences and continue the model building process with the differenced series. For the differenced series, it is again required to test whether it is stationary. If not, the series is integrated of order two or $I(2)$ and one needs to difference the differenced series. Series that are integrated of order two or higher are quite rare and in the subsequent studies and none of the dependent series has had to be differenced more than once.

Step two: determining the autoregressive and moving average terms

If a stationary series is obtained, one can continue with the second step in the model building process, determining the autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) terms. Here, the earlier mentioned second problem is treated: correctly accounting for the series' past. Autoregressive terms indicate the lagged endogenous variables that are added to the model and resemble the effects of previous values of the series on the current value. Moving averages represent the influence of residuals from specific previous values on the current value. They resemble shocks (resulting in larger unexplained residuals or error terms) in the series that affect later values of the same series at specific points in time. Negative moving averages, for example, indicate that the error terms of specific previous

lags have a negative impact on the series' current value. These negative MAs often show up when modeling for example media attention for specific issues, where an increase in attention caused by a newsworthy event results in a high value and a relatively high unexplained error term. This increase in attention is often followed by a quick return to initial values, resulting in a situation where higher error terms in the past result in sharper decreases afterwards, which can be modeled with negative MAs in the ARIMA-framework. Concretely, this means that the error terms of previous values of specific lags are added to the model and that the coefficient for these MA-terms is taking a negative value. Substantially, these results can be explained by essential features of the news gathering process (see also Chapter 5).

Formally, an Autoregressive Moving Average (p, q) process with p autoregressive terms and q lagged moving-average terms is defined as:


$$\text{Eq 2-2 } y_t = \underbrace{a_0}_{\text{Constant}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^p a_i * y_{t-i}}_{\text{Autoregressive term (AR)}} + \underbrace{\sum_{i=1}^q \beta_i * \varepsilon_{t-i}}_{\text{Moving Average term (MA)}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_t}_{\text{Error term}}$$

This formula formalizes the basic idea that the time series y is a function of a constant, its lagged values, the influence of previous error terms and an unexplained part (the error term or residual). The ultimate goal is to find a specification of the model that properly models the series' own past, without leaving any information from this past unused. Unused information shows up as autocorrelation in the residuals, meaning that the residual at a certain point in time is significantly correlated with residuals from previous values. In that case, the residuals are not mimicking *white noise*, a term borrowed from natural sciences indicating a signal or process that does not correlate in time. When a series resembles white noise, it takes independent random values with a normal distribution. Therefore, the most important criterion to establish whether a certain model is well-specified and the information from the series past is properly included in the model is to test whether the residual is indeed white noise and therefore autocorrelation in the residuals is absent.

In the model building process, one should strive for parsimony. Usually, different ARIMA-specifications of a series may result in residuals that resemble white noise. Model building is a trial and error process: fitting different ARIMA-models and getting the residuals white noise, without including too many AR and MA-terms. Usually, model building is done by comparing the pattern of the autocorrelation function (ACF; giving the correlation of the series at different lag lengths) and the partial autocorrelations (PACF; which measures the correlation between y_t and y_{t-s} controlling for the effect of intervening values of y between t and t-s) of the original series and compare them to patterns typical for different AR and MA-models (see Figure 2.2). This is indicative for the appropriate choice of p and q and constitutes the crucial step in the estimation procedure. The autocorrelation function of an AR(1)-process exhibits a geometrically declining pattern, falling down to zero as the lag length becomes large. For an MA(1)-process the autocorrelation drops to

zero for all lag lengths larger than 1, and, more generally, drops to zero for lag length larger than q for a $MA(q)$ -process. The partial autocorrelation function mirrors the pattern of the ACF. It is declining for an $MA(1)$ -process and drops to zero at lag length bigger than 1 for $AR(1)$ -processes; the intuition here is that these past values do not influence the current value directly, as they are not a part of the model, but only indirectly, through the dynamic structure of the model (y_{t-2} influences y_{t-1} , which in turn influences y_t).

Figure 2.2 ACFs and PACFs for ARIMA (1,0,0) and ARIMA (0,0,1) models



The estimation procedure is fully empirically driven; an a priori theoretical reason is not required to include the AR and MA-terms. Basically then, one fits models until the residuals do not show any autocorrelation. In practical research, values of p and q of over 3 are rare with seasonality being the important exception: for monthly data the lag of 12 months should be carefully examined because many time series – and parliamentary and media data are no exception - contain yearly cycles.

To test the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals, statistics like Ljung-Box Q are preferred over the widely used Durbin-Watson statistic. Despite its popularity among social scientists, the latter test has severe shortcomings: it only tests for first-order autocorrelation and is not valid when the model includes autoregressive (AR) terms.

Additionally, the magnitude of change in a series might be time-dependent and the variance serially correlated – the third potential problem mentioned above. In media attention series, for example, this volatility occurs when periods of relative stable levels of attention alternate with periods in which the attention is less stable and fluctuates sharply. This is called autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and results in residual variance that is not stable over-time. When this autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity is present in the series, it is necessary to model this ARCH-error process. However, also data transformations like using logarithmic values of the original series can be applied to deal with heteroscedasticity. To test whether heteroscedasticity is present in the series, the Lagrange Multiplier test (Engle, 1982) can be used and autocorrelation in the squared residuals can be tested using the Ljung-Box Q test. In the series used for this dissertation, little evidence for autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity is found and no models from the ARCH-family are used. Therefore, I will not discuss them here in further detail.

As mentioned before, more than one model might be suitable to capture the dynamic structure of the series. Choosing between models -the model selection problem- can be done by comparing the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for the various models. These criteria can be seen as a measure of goodness-of-fit, penalizing the inclusion of more parameters.

In the empirical analyses, I find most media series best presented by either $(1,0,q)$ or $(0,1,q)$ models with one or two negative MA-terms at short lags. This exactly represents the dynamic character of media data: it is inherently an autoregressive process (occasionally even with a clear upward trend), where previous values determine the current value (AR(1) process). But it is also a process in which after large shocks (resulting in large error terms) the series tend to move back in the direction of initial values (negative MA-terms).

Step three: Adding explanatory variables

After a suitable specification of the univariate ARIMA-model is obtained, one can expand the model and add exogenous, explanatory variables to the right-hand side of Eq 2-2. To meet one of the basic criteria for causality, i.e. temporal consistency, a change in the independent variable should precede a change in the dependent variable. Therefore, it is

usually necessary to include lagged values of the independent variable in the equation. To select the appropriate lag length in which this independent variable influences the dependent variable one first uses theory: is a short-term (e.g. one month) influence to be expected, or can this influence also occur at longer lags? The second step is then to choose the best fitting lag length within the range that is theoretically expected based upon an analysis of the cross-correlation function (CCF) of the independent and dependent variable. Again, the residuals of the new model should mimic white noise. Furthermore, as with the dependent variable, the independent variable should be stationary as well. Coefficients and standard errors of the independent variables show whether the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable is significant, while the AIC and BIC indicate whether the model has improved compared to the univariate models. For an even more elaborate and technical discussion of ARIMA-modeling I refer to Hollanders and Vliegthart. (2007).

MULTIDIRECTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS: VAR

What is it and when to use it?

ARIMA-models are suitable for assessing relationships between variables in one causal direction. When expectations about this direction are not trivial or recursive and theory is less informative about the characteristics of the relationships (e.g. delay, duration, direction), other techniques, like VAR, are more appropriate (Brandt and Williams, 2007). VAR stands for Vector Autoregression. In a VAR analysis, several equations are estimated, each including a different dependent variable. The right hand side of each equation includes lags of both the independent variable and lags of other variables. A VAR-model, including two dependent variables y and z and constants c_1 and c_2 , can be written as:

$$\text{Eq 2-3 } y_t = c_1 + a_{11} * y_{t-1} + a_{12} * z_{t-1} \dots + a_{1k} * y_{t-k} + a_{1k} * z_{t-k} + \varepsilon_{1t}$$

$$\text{Eq 2-4 } z_t = c_2 + a_{21} * y_{t-1} + a_{22} * z_{t-1} \dots + a_{2k} * y_{t-k} + a_{2k} * z_{t-k} + \varepsilon_{2t}$$

VAR-analyses are suitable for situations where both variables y and z are regarded as endogenous. To put it differently, within a VAR-model both variables serve as independent and dependent variables in separate equations. This method is especially suitable when there are no strong a priori theoretical expectations about the causal direction of the relationship between the two variables or when a mutual influence is expected. In Chapter 4, the relations between issue attention and framing in media and parliament are estimated and in Chapter 7, the model is extended by also including the number of asylum applications and anti-immigrant party support.

VAR-analyses offer several advantages over Simultaneous Equation Modelling (SEM), a strategy probably most often applied by social science researchers dealing with models that include more than one dependent variable. In fact, SEM can be regarded as a form of a VAR-model with restrictions (Brandt and Williams, 2007). It is exactly towards

these restrictions that VAR-modelers direct their criticism. More specifically, in SEM, choices about the inclusion and exclusion of different variables and lagged values have to be made before estimation. Similarly, assumptions about exogeneity and endogeneity of variables have to be made. Often, these assumptions are based on ‘vague appeals [...] to theory’ and/or are not well supported by empirical analysis’ (Brandt and Williams, 2007: 5-6; Sims, 1980). Furthermore, these restrictions frequently do not allow for testing alternative theories about causal relationships in one model.

A model with few restrictions is required for the case under study: based upon theory and previous research, there are some expectations on the causal direction of the relationships between for example media and parliament, but these expectations are in many instances not so strong and empirical validation in encompassing models has been lacking. A possible disadvantage of VAR compared to SEM is that the latter – if the imposed restrictions are valid – gives more precise estimations of effect sizes and results that are more convenient to interpret (Freeman *et al.*, 1989). Another advantage of SEM is that it allows for the estimation of contemporaneous relations between the variables, while VAR only works with lagged values. More specifically, with SEM it is also possible to assess the direction and size of relationships within time unit (i.e. months). Within the VAR-framework, it is possible to assess whether an additional significant contemporaneous relationship is present by looking at the correlations between the residuals ε_{1t} and ε_{2t} from equations Eq 2-3 and Eq 2-4. To assess the direction of this relationship, however, it is necessary to take a lower time unit (e.g. weeks, see also Chapter 7).

Step one: testing for stationarity

The model specification process is very similar to the one applied with ARIMA-modeling. First, stationarity of the series has to be established using the (augmented) Dickey-Fuller test. However, contrary to the ARIMA-model building process, if any of the series is non-stationary, several scholars advise against differencing because it removes long-term dynamics. They suggest the use of a different technique, Vector Error Correction Models (VECM) (Brandt and Williams, 2007; Hamilton, 1994). A VAR-analysis can also be processed if the series are non-stationary but co-integrated according to the Engle-Granger test, indicating that the linear combination of two non-stationary variables is stationary. This co-integration shows up in the observation that the series have a similar trend and substantially means that they develop in a similar way over time. In the studies included in this dissertation, the series are stationary and therefore, I will not go into detail about co-integration and VECM.

Step two: Model specification

The next step is to establish the number of lags of the various variables to be included in the equations. This can be determined using theory and various test-statistics. The number of lags has to be equal for each endogenous variable. First, based on theory about the time lag in which causal influences take place, one can limit the maximum number of lags. Second,

within the boundaries established by this maximum number of lags, one can choose the best model using fit-statistics like AIC and BIC or a Likelihood Test for Dropping Lags (Enders, 1996). As with ARIMA, one has to check whether the series' past is adequately modeled and thus for the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals. If autocorrelation in the residuals of any of the series is present, additional lags for all variables need to be added to the equations. Furthermore, also the Engle-test for ARCH-errors can be conducted. Finally, residuals can be checked for the presence of contemporaneous correlation.

Estimation is done by ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and the system can include more than two variables. Also additional exogenous variables can be added to the equations, but again similarity for each of the equations is required.

Step three: Interpretation of results

Single coefficients of the effects of lagged values of the endogenous variables should be interpreted with the highest caution because of the high levels of collinearity due to the multiple lags included for each variable. In line with Freeman et al. (1989; see also Brandt and Williams, 2007), the following outcomes of the analyses are reported to obtain a good picture of the relationship between the various endogenous variables:

(1) F-tests for the whole blocks of lags of each variable, which indicates whether –overall- any significant causal relationships between the independent variables and dependent variable exists. Establishing causal relationships in this manner is based upon the notion of 'Granger-causality', where a variable y Granger-causes another variable z if the behavior of y in the past improves the prediction of the behavior of z compared to z 's past alone (Brandt and Williams, 2007: 32).

(2) Every finite autoregressive process can be rewritten as a infinite lagged moving average model. A VAR can be rewritten in a Moving Average Representation (MAR). A moving average representation of the variables in the system can help to acquire insight in the consequences of a shock (impulse) in one variable at time 0 on the following values of the other variables (see e.g. Figure 4.1). This helps to obtain a more specific picture and graphical representation of the direction and size of the over-time effects of one series on the other series and therefore contributes to the understanding in the dynamic interaction between the variables. To obtain an impulse response analysis of the moving average representation of the variables included in the system, it is necessary to construct a causal pathway for which the variables are put in the most likely causal order (based on theoretical considerations) and/or to test whether different causal orderings lead to similar results.

(3) A presentation of the decomposition of the Forecast Error Variance, indicating for each variable over-time what portion of the movement in a series can be attributed to its own shocks versus shocks from the other variables. In other words, this method estimates over-time the amount of variation in each of the endogenous variables that can be attributed to its own past and to the past of each of the other endogenous variables. As with the impulse response analysis of the moving average representation, a causal ordering of the variables is necessary.

Chapter 3. Divergent Framing: The Public Debate on Migration in the Dutch Parliament and Media¹

3.1 Abstract

In this chapter we reconstruct how the issues of migration and integration have been framed in the Dutch public debate over the last decade. We examine the patterns in both the parliamentary and the media arena and look at similarities and differences between them. On the basis of two contradictory theories, we formulate hypotheses about overlap and differences between the two arenas and diversity within them. Our results reveal incongruence in framing between the two arenas. After 9/11, however, the framing in which Islam is perceived as a threat to Western society becomes dominant in both arenas. Furthermore, we do not find any proof for the idea of the media as a civic forum, with a high diversity of framing. Framing in parliament, instead, is far more diverse. In contrast to the hegemonic framing in the media, the Islam-as-threat frame is actively contested in the political realm.

3.2 Introduction

In the early 1990s, Dutch politician Frits Bolkestein caused controversy through his claims about the negative impact of immigrants on the Dutch society. The Liberal-Conservative leader emphasized the incompatibility between Islamic and Western values and argued for more demanding policies to pressure immigrants to integrate into Dutch society and accept its norms and values (*de Volkskrant*, September 12 1991). Bolkestein's statements caused some shock since until then, these views had been exclusively associated with the radical right. Also, it was the first time a member of a major political party criticized what was widely regarded as a successful policy approach.

Now, 15 years later, Bolkestein's views have become mainstream. Many politicians, both right- and left-wing, have publicly declared that Dutch integration policies have failed and that urgent policy change is therefore required. The ideal of multiculturalism as a policy goal appears to have been abandoned, and the multicultural society is perceived as a failure (Entzinger, 2003). Moreover, this negative vision is accompanied by a shift in public opinion on migrants. As a recent survey has revealed, Islam is increasingly perceived as a threat to Dutch values (survey *de Volkskrant*, June 2004). These changes in the public discourse are not unique to the Netherlands. The last decade could be labeled a 'decade of

¹ This chapter is based on: Roggeband, C. M., & Vliegenthart, R. (2007). Divergent Framing: The Public Debate on Migration in the Dutch Parliament and Media, 1995–2004 *West European Politics*, 30(3), 524-548.

change' (Luedtke, 2005) in relation the immigration and integration issues. Across Europe a retreat of multiculturalism and a turn to civic integration is visible (Joppke, 2004; Kofman, 2005). In the past few years more pressure is put on immigrants to conform and integrate. This in particular affects the Muslim population, which after 9/11 and other events is viewed as a group reluctant to integrate and accept political values (Modood, 2003).

In the Netherlands a number of recent events, like the rise of right wing politician Pim Fortuyn, the provocative claims of MP Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and the murder of film director Theo van Gogh, sparked off an active debate about the integration of minorities. Opinion makers and politicians appear to agree that a dramatic change in the public debate has occurred, but no research has yet been undertaken to trace exactly when and how this change happened. We will try to fill this lacuna by reconstructing how the issues of migration and integration have been framed in the public debate over the last decade.

Public debate is carried out in different forums: in the mass media, in parliament, in public gatherings, in the streets and other places. We focus here on the two most central forums: the political arena and the media arena. Within these arenas, the different actors involved articulate particular ways of understanding issues. They define not only what issues and problems need our attention, but also how we should look at them. The question as to whether framing in the two arenas largely overlaps or differs is central in this paper. Here we look at whether a similar shift or reversal occurred in both arenas. Furthermore, we compare more substantial characteristics of the debate in the arenas, in terms of diversity and consistency. From different views on the relation between media and politics we derive contradictory hypotheses about the correlation between media framing and parliamentary framing, about the diversity of the framing in both arenas and about the congruence of ideologically different newspapers and use our data to test these hypotheses both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The outline of the chapter is as follows. We start with a theoretical discussion about the framing characteristics of, and possible relationships between, the two arenas. Second, we introduce our methods and data sets. Third, we reconstruct the frames on migration and integration presented in the political and media arena between 1995 and 2005. Finally, we discuss our findings on the differences and similarities between the two debates and examine possible explanations for these outcomes.

3.3 Media and policy framing

In this chapter, we compare how the integration of minorities is framed in the political and in the media arena. The relationship between both arenas is a much-debated issue in social sciences. In chapter 4, we demonstrate that a mutual influence between framing in newspaper coverage and official parliamentary documents exists, but that this influence is rather weak and dependent upon previous use of a frame: an increase in the use of a frame in one arena leads to an increase in the other arena only if this frame has previously been

used regularly in the latter arena. In this chapter, we look more in depth at the nature of the differences and similarities between the two arenas and try to explain these differences and similarities. Additionally, we look at framing changes over-time in both arenas and what can account for these changes.

One of the main questions when discussing the relationship between media and politics is a normative one: to what extent *should* the media reflect the political debate in a democratic society (e.g. Gunther and Mughan, 2000) (McQuail and Van Cuilenburg, 1983). Drawing upon Schumpeterian notions of democracy and closely associated with the Habermas' ideal notion of the public sphere, political scientist Norris (2000) promotes the idea of media as a *civic forum*. The media should allow for *pluralistic competition* among parties and individuals for all positions in power. This specific conception of the role of the media leads to the requirement of availability and balance of the news in terms of both the amount of coverage of issues and the way these issues are covered. This diversity can be reached in different ways, either by treating *external* diversity between various media outlets that have strong political leanings or *internal* diversity, in which case the outlet does not take a stance, but presents multiple and contrasting perspectives on a certain issue. Norris presents a sequential model of political communication in which a source communicates its message to the public through a channel (the media). The media act as instrumental intermediaries between politics and public, and media content, in its relationship to politics, is viewed as information. Though her theory of the media as a civic forum is largely informed by normative notions, in her empirical cases Norris finds considerable evidence for this view.

A contrasting vision is presented by Meyer (2002) who focuses rather on the media as an active political player. Meyer argues that 'the media diminish the opportunities that civil society might have to exert influence on political inputs' (p. 108). Politics and media are two separate realms with different logics. The media logic, according to Meyer, is contained in two filters. The first involves the selection of the news (what counts as newsworthy) and the second the presentation (the means to trigger the audience). As a result of the logic of the media, politics is increasingly 'colonized' by the media. According to Meyer, 'politics becomes dependent on the media's rules, but without completely losing its separate identity' (2002: 57). Koopmans (2004) advances a similar idea and focuses on the selection mechanisms of the media. Contrary to Meyer, Koopmans does not focus on the media as player, but rather sees the media as a bounded space for political communication. The available communication space is limited, while the number of potential actors that want to occupy this space is disproportionately high. It is not only formal political actors such as governments and political parties that insert messages in the public sphere; a large number of other speakers such as interest groups, social movements and opinion makers also try to get their messages across. This results in a high level of competition between actors. The selection mechanisms that media use, according to Koopmans, are similar to Meyer's filters: novelty, prominence and prestige of speaker, level of conflict and possibilities for dramatization. These filters, according to Koopmans et

al. (2005: 262), do not vary strongly within a country: 'news values (e.g. which actors are considered prominent and which issues relevant) are strongly affected by the institutional and discursive opportunity structures in a country on a given issue'. Newspapers, however, express their views and make their own contribution to political agenda setting and opinion formation through their editorials (Koopmans et al., 2005).

3.4 Hypotheses

From these competing theoretical approaches to the relationship between the political arena and the media arena, we can deduce different expectations about the relationship between parliamentary framing and media framing of the issue of the integration of minorities.

Norris' idea of media as civic forum informs the following three hypotheses:

- I. Media reflect pluralist framing in the political realm and we expect a considerable overlap between parliamentary framing and media framing of the issue.
- II. Media framing is more diverse, because the media arena provides as a civic forum space for a broader range of actors with diverging views on the issue to present their opinions.
- III. In view of the differences in political leaning of the different newspapers, we will find some external diversity and differences between the various newspapers in the framing of the issue according to their political position, with more right-wing newspapers framing the issue more in accordance with right-wing politicians' framing of the issue, whereas more left-wing newspapers will frame the issue more in the way left-wing parties frame the issue.

Meyer and Koopmans' idea that the media act as filters or selectors informs our next three hypotheses:

- IV. Politics and the media are two separate spheres, each with its own logic, and will therefore significantly differ in their framing of the issue. The media will present the issue more in terms of frames that have newsworthy characteristics (e.g. conflict and dramatization), whereas in the political arena, where decisions about 'what needs to be done' have to be made, frames with an emphasis on policy will be used.
- V. Because media framing is characterized by more competition due to a larger number of competing actors and limited space, only frames that resonate and are used by a wide variety of actors will be covered in the media. This results in less variety in media framing compared to parliamentary framing.
- VI. In view of the active function of the media as political actors (Meyer) and the freedom of the media to come up with their own position in political issues, we expect considerable variation between newspapers. We expect that variation between newspapers is greater than internal diversity and that dominant framing in the different newspapers does not necessarily coincide with the framing of political parties that have a similar leaning.

3.5 Data

Our research findings are based on two datasets, one consisting of parliamentary data and the other of media data. These are gathered through both qualitative and computer-assisted, quantitative content analysis.

For the political realm, we analyzed all official documents presented to and discussed in parliament between January 1995 and the end of 2004. In this period, four different coalitions governed. From 1995 to 1998 the first so-called ‘Purple’ cabinet took office, consisting of the social-democratic party (PvdA), the conservative-liberal party (VVD) and the progressive liberal party (D66). This was the first Dutch cabinet since World War II that did not include the Christian democrats (CDA). The Purple coalition continued for a second period from 1998 to 2002. In 2002, a new right-wing populist party (Lijst Pim Fortuyn [LPF], named after its murdered charismatic leader) entered the Dutch electoral arena and had a major victory in the parliamentary elections. This party formed a coalition with the Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party, headed by Prime Minister Balkenende. This coalition lasted only 87 days. In the ensuing elections, the LPF lost votes and a new centre-right coalition of CDA, VVD and D66 took office in May 2003.

The policy texts that are presented to parliament can be found through the search engine Parlando, which gives access to all documents presented to, and discussed in, parliament and senate. Additionally we analyze the official written parliamentary questions asked by parliamentarians to members of government, that are also available via Parlando.

To obtain data on the media debate on migration and integration, we analysed news reporting of the five most-read Dutch national newspapers throughout the research period (Bakker and Scholten, 2003): *NRC Handelsblad*, *Algemeen Dagblad*, *De Volkskrant*, *Trouw* and *De Telegraaf*. Although completely independent of political parties, these newspapers do have some different political leanings. *De Telegraaf* and *Algemeen Dagblad* are both regarded as right of centre, popular newspapers that are read by a less educated part of the population than the other newspapers (Bakker and Scholten, 2003). *NRC Handelsblad* is a conservative, neo-liberal right-leaning quality paper, and *de Volkskrant*, having originally a Catholic background, now has a more left-leaning, quality signature. *Trouw* is a newspaper that can be regarded as Protestant-progressive, paying special attention to Christian-religious and Third World issues (Van der Eijk, 2000). In the result section, we make a distinction between popular (*De Telegraaf*, *Algemeen Dagblad*) and quality (*Trouw*, *Volkskrant*, *NRC Handelsblad*) and between right-leaning (*De Telegraaf*, *Algemeen Dagblad*, *NRC Handelsblad*) and centre/left-leaning (*Trouw*, *Volkskrant*) newspapers.

All these newspapers are electronically available via LexisNexis for the period we have studied, except for *De Telegraaf*, which is only digitally available from 1999 onwards. Using framing in later years compared to the framing by the other newspapers in this period and the data available for these other newspapers before 1998, we controlled for the absence of *De Telegraaf* between 1995-1998.

3.6 Methods

To analyze the different frames that prevail in both arenas, we draw from social movement theory (particularly Ferree *et al.*, 2002; Snow and Benford, 1988) and policy (frame) analysis (Rein and Schön, 1996; Van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1992; Verloo, 2005).

We start from the assumption that in both official parliamentary documents and newspaper coverage different representations of the problem are articulated. These representations include a diagnosis (what is the problem, where is it located and what/who causes this problem?), connected to a prognosis (how should the problem be resolved, what ends and what means should be used?) and a rationale or call for action (what courses of action are suggested, and who is responsible for this?) (Snow and Benford, 1988). We added the element of *standing* (Ferree *et al.*, 2002) to this basic structure to locate the actor associated with the frame. Ferree *et al.* (2002: 86) borrow this concept from legal discourse, 'where it refers to the right of a person or group to challenge in a judicial forum the conduct of another'. Standing, or having a voice, is a contested terrain and both in the media arena and the political arena different actors compete to bring forward their interpretations and visions. Standing refers to agency, who is given space to speak. Within policy analysis, Van de Graaf and Hoppe's breakdown of policy texts into their respective causal chains, final chains and normative chains is particularly useful. Causal chains are the connections between what is seen as a cause and what is seen as an effect of a certain policy problem. Final chains are the connections between what is defined as goal and what the means are to reach this goal. Normative chains are the connections between various levels of what is seen as right and what is seen as wrong. For the reconstruction of all these chains, both explicit and implicit interpretations are important.

The above-mentioned elements of diagnosis, prognosis, roles, causality, normativity and finality have been translated into an analytic framework that consists of a coding scheme with a set of sensitizing questions for each element (Annex 1). The first category is about voice or standing and asks which actor speaks, on which occasion, to what audience or forum, and in what form (interview, policy document, letter, essay, etc.). The second category of diagnosis asks what is represented as the problem, why it is seen as a problem, and what is mentioned as causes of the problem. It also analyzes the attribution of roles in the diagnosis, such as who is seen to have caused the problem, and who is the problem holder, who are possible victims and perpetrators. The third category concerns the prognosis that contains what is represented as the solution to the problem, what goals are formulated, how these goals should be achieved. It also analyzes the relationship between ends and means. The fourth category is the call for action (or non-action), who has a voice in suggesting the course of actions, who should be acting and who is acted upon?

These sensitizing questions are used to manually code the different positions of the dimensions mentioned above in both arenas, starting from the assumption that different frames may be presented within one policy document or newspaper article. This analytic

tool helps us to group ideas into frames that typically differ in what is presented as the central problem or as the solution to this problem. Again, this is not to say that we expect to find numerous combinations of framing elements resulting in huge amounts of different frames, but these categories and questions help us to make our search for the main existing frames more systematic.

This instrument was used, in a first inductive phase, for a qualitative analysis on the major policy documents in the field of migration and integration (see Annex 2). We identified five major frames used within the political realm between 1995 and 2005:

Multicultural frame

The multicultural frame, which is often presented as the prototypical Dutch cultural frame, sees (cultural) diversity as an asset that enhances the quality of society. Policy interventions to reduce inequalities in participation in education, labour and politics should respect and foster diversity. Dialogue and civil participation are viewed as a central means to create more understanding and respect towards cultural diversity. In this frame, the diagnosis is little elaborated, it is mainly argued that there is insufficient space for diversity and that discrimination and 'glass ceilings' may prevent migrants from entering the higher echelons in society. Most emphasis is on the prognosis, promoting respect for cultural diversity and creating more space for difference.

Emancipation frame

The emancipation frame problematizes the position and orientation of migrants: they are viewed as backward in participation, customs and views. The prognosis views participation in the labor market and in decision making as key to the process of emancipation. Obstacles to participation should be removed by the government and state policies and arrangements should help migrants in their integration and emancipation process. Migrants are expected to actively shape their own emancipation process.

Restriction frame

The restriction frame sees the entrance of new immigrants as a problem, especially when they are not economically independent. Implicitly, the emphasis is on new immigrants who come to the Netherlands because of marriage with non-native Dutch residents. These migrants are labeled as 'newcomers' or 'import brides'. They constitute a problem not only because of their economic dependence, but also because they often have a traditional, non-emancipated orientation. It is an implicitly gendered frame, as in the political debate politicians principally speak about female immigrants. Solutions presented are restrictions on incoming migrants, and not granting independent permits to these new immigrants.

Victimization frame

The victimization frame is mainly applied in relation to women. Women are presented as victims of a misogynous religious culture that forces them to be obedient and cover themselves to be respected. The headscarf is presented as either a symbol of subordination or something women can be, directly or indirectly, forced to wear. Violence against women is the central mechanism used to reinforce gender inequality, and examples mentioned as 'cultural violence' are domestic violence, honour killings and genital mutilation. The solution to this problem is mainly protection and more secondary emancipation of the women (which is perceived as a way to reduce their vulnerability).

Islam-as-threat frame

In this definition of the problem, the culture and religion of migrants, particularly Islam, is seen as a problem. Islam is presented as a threat to the values of Western civilization, such as church-state relations, freedom of expression, equal gender relations and tolerance towards homosexuality. Proponents of this frame fear the 'Islamization' of Dutch society, which according to them is manifested by the growing number of civil servants wearing headscarves. The proposed solution is to stress the neutrality of the state and to ban religion to the private sphere. Also, the residues of Dutch polarizationⁱ, especially in the school system, are questioned. The creation of Islamic schools is seen as reinforcing segregation in society.

A second phase in our analysis was to translate these frames into search strings to make possible an electronic analysis of all parliamentary documents (including official questions from parliamentarians to members of government) and newspaper articles between 1995 and the end of 2004. Frames are distinguished using search strings to indicate the presence of a given frame.ⁱⁱ This approach is based on one of the devices suggested by Gamson and Modgiliani (1989) that signify the presence of a frame, namely, *catchphrases*, which Pan and Kosicki (1993) mention as an element of the rhetorical structure of a text. The search strings were composed on the basis of the coding of the documents included in our qualitative analysis, complemented with a random sample of both parliamentary documents and newspaper articles (see Annex 4). For each of these documents and articles, the coder established which frames were present and which word combinations were indicative of these frames (see Annex 4). In the final search strings words are combined in both additive (word X or word Y) and conjunctural ways (word X AND word Y, or word X within certain distance of word Y). Although a complete frame contains diagnostic, prognostic and motivational components, we did not take that as an absolute requirement for the presence of a frame. Especially in newspaper articles, framing is often incomplete for several reasons, amongst others due to the limited length of the text.

We used our search strings to search for all official documents presented to parliament between 1995 and 2005 that included one or more of our frames. A total of 5,376 frames

were found in the sample. Our use of the same search strings to analyze the media debate on migration and integration resulted in a total of 14,850 articles that contained a mean of 1.09 frames per article.


To check the reliability of the search strings, a coder coded a sample of 30 articles manually. Coder and computer agreed in 91% of the coding decisions, resulting in a Krippendorff's alpha of .72, which is more than acceptable (Krippendorff, 2003).

3.7 Results

Framing in two arenas

When we compare the overall attention given to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in Dutch newspapers and parliament, we can see that attention given to these issues fluctuates strongly over-time. Figure 3.1 presents the total yearly number of newspaper articles and parliamentary documents using the five frames.

Figure 3.1 Attention to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in parliament (number of official documents) and newspapers (number of articles)




Media framing seems especially vulnerable to specific events and shows clear peaks during 2001 and 2002, probably caused by the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. After a decrease in 2003, the murder of film director Van Gogh (November 2004) leads to increased attention to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in 2004. In parliament we can see a gradual increase in the attention paid to immigration and integration issues, with two slight declines in 1998 and 2002. In general, on a monthly level, for both media ($r = .55$) and parliament ($r = .44$) a positive correlation exists between

the point of measurement and the number of documents, which indicates an overall increase overtime. Also in Figure 3.1 a general increase in overall attention to the issue is visible.

Framing in the political realm

Our findings demonstrate some important shifts in policy framing during the period 1995-2004. As Figure 3.2 shows, different frames have dominated the political realm over-time.

Figure 3.2 Yearly use of each frame in official parliamentary documents



During the beginning of our research period (1995-1997), emancipation and multicultural framing dominated in parliament, and both multiculturalism and emancipation through participation were the official policy goals. The multicultural frame dropped after the right-wing coalition of Balkenende I took office in 2002. The emancipation frame was the dominant Dutch policy frame until 2002, and, although it lost its dominance, it remains a very important policy frame. In 1997, the restriction frame gained ground in parliamentary documents. Discussions about the limited integration of considerable parts of the migrant population led to new legislation for gaining citizenship. Finally, the victimization frame strongly fluctuated in official parliamentary documents throughout the whole period, with peaks in 1996, 1999, 2001 and a continuous ascent since 2003. After 2002, the Islam-as-threat frame, the frame that emerged in the political debate after the 9/11 attacks, became the dominant frame in policy documents and parliamentary debates.

These different frames are promoted by different actors. In the mid 1990s, there was significant political consensus about the policy goals of emancipation and multiculturalism. In 1996, the Minister responsible for Minority Policies, Dijkstal (VVD), even noted that presumably ‘We all agree that minorities should be given the perspective of full participation in society and that pluriformity, mutual respect and maintenance of cultural identity, solidarity, tolerance and integration should be the core concepts of our policy’ (Dutch Parliamentary Records, HTK 1995-1996, 24401, no. 15: 7).

From 1997 onwards, a growing left-right divide became visible over the issues of migration and integration. The second Purple cabinet decided to change the direction of its integration policies and appointed a special Minister for Integration Policies. Although new Minister Van Boxtel (D66) defended the policy logic of multiculturalism, he also criticized earlier policies for not sufficiently shaping the ‘active citizenship’ of migrants (Dutch Parliamentary Records, HTK 1999-2002, 26333, no. 2). One important new instrument was the law on the integration of newcomers (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers), which aimed to actively integrate new migrants as citizens. Whereas the Liberal coalition partner, VVD, promoted a more restrictive immigrant and integration policy, the other two coalition partners, the Social Democrats and the Democrats 66 opted for a less stringent policy. The restriction frame was supported by the Christian Democrats (CDA) and some other more right-wing parties.

The right-wing coalitions headed by Prime Minister Balkenende dismissed the multicultural frame and instead promoted a more assimilatory emancipation frame (Entzinger, 2003; Kofman, 2005). Also, a new Coordinating Directorate for the Integration of Minorities was created inside the Ministry of Justice, and this resulted in a more legal framing in integration issues (Pakes, 2004).

Table 3.1 shows which frames dominate in the formal questions members of parliament posed to the government. It reveals a clear left-right divide in the framing of political parties. Emancipation and multiculturalism are frames mainly used by left-wing parties, whereas Islam-as-treat predominates among right-wing parties. The framing of the political parties in the middle is less clear-cut, the emancipation frame slightly predominates, but other frames such as the restriction frame and the Islam-as-threat frame are frequently used as well.ⁱⁱⁱ

Table 3.1 Percentage use of each frame in questions asked in parliament between 1995 and 2004

	<i>Left (SP, GroenLinks, PvdA)</i>	<i>Centre (CDA, D66)</i>	<i>Right (VVD, CU, SGP, LPF)</i>
Emancipation	47%	33%	22%
Multiculturalism	17%	13%	3%
Restriction	15%	21%	2%
Victimization	5%	10%	6%
Islam-as-threat	16%	23%	67%
<i>Total number of questions (units)</i>	126	67	90


Framing Integration and Immigration

Although the Islam-as-threat frame has become the dominant frame in the political realm since 2001, it is a highly contested one. Since 2002, all frames have been rising in absolute terms in the political realm. The emancipation frame, in particular, competes with the Islam-as-treat frame. Also, the multicultural frame is rising but has not reached its pre 9/11 peak.

Framing in the media

The evolution of frames in the media arena presents a different picture compared to that in political debate. Overall, the attention in the media to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities has increased dramatically during past decade, reaching a peak in 2002 (see Figure 3.3). Remarkably, and in contrast to the image of the Netherlands as a country that cherishes the ideal of multiculturalism, our findings demonstrate that the frame that focuses on Islam as a threat has been dominant in the media debate throughout the whole period under study, except for the period between 1998-2000. Partly this is due to inclusion of reporting on foreign events, especially in the Middle East.

Figure 3.3 Yearly use of each frame in newspaper articles



However, the media frame the issues of integration and migration in Western societies - and more specifically the Dutch society - mainly as issues concerning Islam and Muslim migrants. It is important to note that this is not a new trend, but rather a tendency that has been present since the early 1990s (Baumann, 1998; Snel, 2003). According to Baumann, the European media framed the Rushdie controversy in the early 1990s as a polarization between Islam and the Western world. In these representations, Muslims were forced to choose between Islam or freedom of expression, which was defined as a central value of the Western world (Baumann, 1998). This disjunction between Islam and the Western world

has also been actively constructed within the specific Dutch media debate since the early 1990s (Prins, 2005; Snel, 2003). VVD leader Frits Bolkestein and publicist Pim Fortuyn, who later became a key figure in the Dutch political landscape, used the media to express their discontent with the Dutch multicultural policy model. Both claimed that the values of the Islam are largely incompatible with the values promoted by the Western Enlightenment. According to Bolkestein and Fortuyn, the Dutch policy model that promoted the preservation of cultural identity and values threatened the integration process of migrants in order to conserve their own cultures. Muslims living in the Netherlands should be forced to assimilate to Dutch norms and values (Prins, 2005).

The second most frequently used frame is the multicultural frame. This frame dominated in the newspapers between 1998 and 2000. Remarkably, in this period several well-known PvdA (social-democratic) members such as Paul Scheffer, Arie van der Zwan and Ayaan Hirsi Ali started to criticize the multicultural model in the press. In 2000, Paul Scheffer, a publicist and prominent PvdA member, became a core figure in the media because of his article 'The multicultural drama' (*NRC Handelsblad*, 29 January 2000). Scheffer argued that the policy ideal of multiculturalism had failed. Politicians had ignored the formation of an underclass of migrants with little prospect of integration. Immigrants themselves had been too passive in their efforts to integrate into Dutch society. Contrary to Bolkestein and Fortuyn, Scheffer did not stress Islam as a central factor. Scheffer's essay had a direct impact on the political debate. In April 2000, a plenary debate in parliament was held to discuss Scheffer's statement that integration policies had failed (Dutch Parliamentary Records, HTK 70, 18 April 2000). This debate was requested by PvdA leader Melkert after VVD leader Dijkstal had criticised coalition-partner PvdA for not backing certain policy measures to improve the position of minorities. In the plenary debate, the leaders of most political parties praised Scheffer for pushing the issue of integration higher up the political agenda. However, PvdA leader Melkert also criticized Scheffer's negative vision. Rather than calling integration a drama or failure, he preferred to speak of a 'serial full of struggle' (*NRC Handelsblad*, 19 April 2000).

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 caused an enormous peak in newspaper reports that focused on Islam as a threat to the Western world. In trying to reconstruct the causes of these attacks, the media often attributed the blame to radical Islamists and their spiritual leadership. On the one hand it was stressed that radicalization should be seen as a deviation of a small group; on the other hand Islam was presented as a monolithic culture incompatible with Western cultural values. This presentation of a cultural gap reinforced the image of the Muslim as a potentially dangerous 'other'. In this debate, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a young Dutch Somali woman, played a central role. She was first a member of the Social-Democratic Party, but switched to the Conservative-Liberal Party because she no longer agreed with the Social Democratic stance on immigration issues. She castigated Islam for being an authoritarian religion and especially backward when it came to the position of women (Ghorashi, 2003; Prins, 2005; Roggeband and Verloo, 2007).

Other frames important in the political realm, such as the restriction frame that dominated in 1997, remained marginal in the media. The victimization frame, which strongly fluctuated in the political debate throughout the whole period, with peaks in 1996, 1999, 2001 and a continuous ascent since 2003, has been very gradually rising in the media. Since 2003, this frame has become the second most dominant after the Islam-as-threat frame.

It is important to note that the actors that gain standing in the media are not necessarily formal political actors. Newspapers appear to provide a forum for some critical outsiders. However, these outsiders are closely related to the formal political arena (party members or new candidate politicians). So, where in the political realm the consensus on multiculturalism as a policy ideal still prevailed between 1995 and 1998, some right-wing politicians and publicists used the media to criticize this dominant policy frame. For critical outsiders who seek to contest the dominant news frame, it appears to be far more difficult to gain standing. According to some, it has become almost impossible to present more moderate viewpoints (PvdA MP Albayrak in *de Volkskrant*, 3 April 2004).

More pluriformity in the civic forum or media as selector of frames?

According to our first hypothesis, the media reflect the pluralist framing in the political realm, and therefore a considerable overlap exists between parliamentary framing and media framing of the issue. As has become clear from Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, the frames used in both arenas differ to a large extent. However, do they follow the trends? In other words, if one frame is going up in one arena, does it also go up in the other? Table 3.2 shows the correlation of the total attention to the issue and the proportional use of each of the frames between the media arena and the political arena. Since the institutionalized character of the parliamentary arena might make it slower in reacting to all kind of external developments causing framing change than the media arena, we allow the media to have a maximum lag of six months. This is in line with outcomes of classical agenda setting research indicating influences up to a couple of months between various agendas (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). The largest coefficients for each frame within this time span are reported. In contrast to our first hypothesis, we do not find evidence here either for a large overlap between the two arenas. Only the total attention and the proportional use of the Islam-as-threat frame are correlated to a considerable extent at the same time lag. This correlation is likely to be caused by external events such as 9/11 and, in general, there does not seem to be that much overlap between the two arenas. Other frames show smaller correlations on longer lags or even no significant correlations at all (emancipation frame). If we take into account the fact that both arenas are subject to the same external events and might influence each other as well (chapter 4), it is legitimate to call the overlap fairly small.

Table 3.2 Correlation between total attention and proportional use of each frame in parliament and media (monthly values)

<i>Total attention (no lags)</i>	.287***
Multicultural Frame (media lagged 4 months)	.204**
Emancipation (media lagged 1 month)	.020
Restriction (media lagged 1 month)	.145*
Victimization (media lagged 1 month)	.179**
Islam-as-threat (no lags)	.358***

Note: N=120 months; *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$ (one tailed test); Lag selection based on cross-correlation functions (CCF)

A final way to look at the congruency of both arenas is to test whether earlier-mentioned events and persons, that from our qualitative analysis turned out to be important in shaping the debate, changed the framing of the issue in both arenas in similar ways. More specifically, we look at how the debate changed after Scheffer's newspaper article on the 'multicultural fiasco' (January 2000), after 9/11 (September 2001), after the appearance of Fortuyn (February 2002)^{iv} and his assassination (May 2002), and the election of Hirsi Ali in parliament (January 2003). To do this, we split our research period in six sub-periods:

- (1) Purple era (January 1995-January 2000)
- (2) Post-Scheffer (February 2000-August 2001)
- (3) Post-9/11 (September 2001-January 2002)
- (4) Fortuyn (February 2002-May 2002)
- (5) Post-Fortuyn with his party LPF in government (June 2002-December 2002)
- (6) Hirsi Ali (January 2003-December 2004)

Though we acknowledge that these events and actors were far from the only ones determining the framing during a certain period in time, they are regarded as crucial and, if parliament and media overlap in their framing trends, they should have caused at least some similar changes in both arenas. Table 3.3 presents the framing in both arenas during each of the six periods.

Table 3.3 Different use of frames during different periods in parliament and media (monthly values)

	<i>pre- Scheffer</i>	<i>post- Scheffer</i>	<i>post-9/11</i>	<i>Fortuyn</i>	<i>post Fortuyn</i>	<i>Hirsi Ali</i>	
N (months)	61	19	5	4	7	24	
Parliament							F-score (one way Anova)
Multicultural	23%	22%	25%	21%	19%	16%	3.179**
Emancipation	33%	30%	24%	27%	28%	23%	3.862***
Restriction	22%	29%	13%	22%	29%	24%	3.365***
Victimization	14%	14%	10%	12%	8%	14%	1.377
Islam-as-threat	9%	5%	29%	18%	17%	24%	42.333***
<i>Attention</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>24</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>3.749***</i>
Media							
Multicultural	32%	44%	16%	35%	24%	21%	15.989***
Emancipation	4%	5%	1%	5%	9%	6%	4.747***
Restriction	4%	6%	3%	7%	5%	6%	1.505
Victimization	14%	19%	6%	11%	11%	17%	4.675***
Islam-as-threat	47%	27%	74%	42%	52%	49%	14.108***
<i>Attention</i>	<i>72</i>	<i>101</i>	<i>397</i>	<i>182</i>	<i>337</i>	<i>209</i>	<i>33.238***</i>

Note: N=120 months; *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test); for each arena columns sum up to 100% per period, F-scores test for the use of each frame and total attention whether significant changes across periods exist. Attention is expressed in mean number of frames per month.

The F-scores in Table 3.3, comparing means across periods, show that all frames, except for victimization in media and restriction in parliament, differed significantly across the various periods under study. Also, we find that the eventual changes in framing in each period are not similar in both realms (with the exception of the post-9/11 period).

- In period 1 (January 1995-January 2000), there is a predominance of the emancipation and multicultural frame in parliament, whereas in the media the Islam-as-threat frame is the most frequently used, followed by the multicultural frame.
- In period 2, after the publication of Scheffer's essay on the 'multicultural fiasco' (February 2000-August 2001), we see few changes in parliamentary framing (the restriction frame is going up slightly), whereas some changes in media framing can be observed. Scheffer's essay appears to have had some effects on the media framing as we can see an increase in the number of articles discussing the

multicultural frame. Also, there is a slight increase of the victimization frame. The Islam-as-threat frame is less prevalent during this period.

- In period 3, after the events of 9/11 (September 2001-January 2002), there is an increase of the Islam-as-threat frame in both the media and parliament, although this change is considerably larger in the media.
- Period 4 is the period when Pim Fortuyn launched his election campaign (February 2002-May 2002). The framing in both parliament and media in this period is very similar to the pre-9/11 period, with exception of the Islam-as-threat frame being more prevalent than prior to 9/11.
- Period 5 is the period after Fortuyn was murdered and his party LPF formed part of the new right-wing government Balkenende I (June 2002-December 2002). In this period, we can see a decline of the multicultural frame in the political realm. In the media, the emancipation frame is slightly increasing, also the Islam-as-threat frame (probably due to the retrospection on 9/11).
- In period 6 (January 2003-December 2004), Ayaan Hirsi Ali became a member of parliament for the Conservative-Liberal party (VVD). Her voice appears to have affected the framing in the political realm. Our findings show an increase in the frames promoted by Hirsi Ali (victimization and Islam-as-threat) in parliament (Roggeband and Verloo, 2007), but this increase is only weakly reflected in the media framing.

Our findings thus suggest few similarities in framing trends in both realms. Some events or persons have had more impact on the framing in the political realm as is the case with Hirsi Ali and the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (these are mainly political events). The publication of Scheffer's essay, which can be considered a media event, appears to have caused more discussions in the media than in the political realm. We therefore refute the first hypothesis.

The fourth hypothesis, on the contrary, is largely confirmed by our findings: the incongruence between framing in both arenas (in number of frames and in timing) supports Meyer's idea that politics and the media are two separate realms, each operating according to its own logic. We indeed found that in the media arena newsworthy frames dominated most of the time, whereas in the political arena more policy-related frames circulated. This, however, changed after the 9/11 attacks. From 2002 onwards, the debate in the political arena also focuses principally on Islam as a threat to Dutch identity and values.

We now turn to our second and fifth hypotheses. The second hypothesis predicted more diversity in the media framing compared to the political arena, because, as a civic forum, it provides space for other actors with diverging views on the issue. We do not find support for this thesis either. The framing in the political realm is more diverse, whereas the framing in the media appears to have an almost hegemonic character. Table 3.4 shows for the parliamentary and the media arena the mean of the monthly frames necessary to encompass 50 per cent and 75 per cent of the monthly total coverage of the issue. Furthermore, it presents the same statistics for the five separate newspapers.

Table 3.4 Frame diversity in parliament and media (monthly values)

Source	No. of frames 50% of coverage	No. of frames 75% of coverage
Parliament	2.05	3.23
Media total	1.57	2.35
<i>T-test for equality of means</i>	8.277***	12.729***
NRC Handelsblad	1.44	2.25
Algemeen Dagblad	1.25	2.02
Volkskrant	1.48	2.34
De Telegraaf	1.21	1.87
Trouw	1.45	2.02
<i>F-test (one way Anova)</i>	6.692***	8.963***

Note: N=120 months, except *De Telegraaf* (N=72); *** p < 0.01 (two tailed test)

The most resonant frame is the Islam-as-threat frame and is adopted across a wide range of different newspapers. For all newspapers, it takes on average less than 1.5 frames to reach 50 per cent of the coverage and around 2 frames to reach 75 per cent. There are, however, significant differences between quality newspapers on the one hand and popular ones on the other, with the quality newspapers being more diverse in their framing. In particular, *De Volkskrant* scores considerably higher than, for example, *De Telegraaf* (1.48 and 2.34 compared to 1.21 and 1.87). Although the media show some frame variation, selection mechanisms indeed appear to be at work.

If we compare the total of the media arena to the parliament, we see that the framing in parliament is considerable more diverse: t-tests show that the difference in means between both arenas is highly significant. This difference is even more striking if we compare individual newspapers with parliamentary framing. The results confirm the view of the media arena as being highly competitive and selective in the use of (hegemonic) frames (hypothesis 5). This suggests that not all actors have equal access to the media to express their views, but that actors that promoting hegemonic frame have more standing.

Our third hypothesis predicts external diversity and differences between the various newspapers in framing of the issue according to their political position, with more right-wing newspapers (mainly *NRC Handelsblad* and *De Telegraaf*) framing the issue more in accordance with right-wing politicians' framing of the issue (e.g. more use of Islam-as-threat frame), whereas more left-wing newspapers (mainly *de Volkskrant*) will frame the issue more in the way left-wing parties frame the issue (e.g. multicultural framing and emancipation framing). Table 3.5 presents the proportional use of each of the five frames by each of the five newspapers, while Table 3.4 indicates the frame diversity of each newspaper.

Table 3.5 Framing use by separate newspapers

<i>Newspaper</i>	<i>Multicultural</i>	<i>Emancipation</i>	<i>Restriction</i>	<i>Victimization</i>	<i>Islam-as-threat</i>
NRC Handelsblad	29%	4%	5%	15%	47%
Algemeen Dagblad	24%	3%	7%	14%	51%
Volkscrant	34%	5%	4%	15%	43%
De Telegraaf	30%	4%	7%	17%	42%
Trouw	33%	5%	5%	15%	42%
F-value	5.32***	2.16*	3.60***	0.72	3.96***

Note: N=120 months, except *De Telegraaf* (N=72); *** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.10$ (two tailed test); rows sum up to 100% for each newspaper

The results of this analysis offer some support for the third hypothesis: there is indeed a difference between the more right-wing newspapers (*NRC Handelsblad*, *Algemeen Dagblad* and *De Telegraaf*) compared to the mainstream and left-leaning newspapers (*de Volkskrant* and *Trouw*). The more right-wing newspapers make in general more use of restriction and Islam-as-threat framing, framings more often associated with right-wing politics: *Algemeen Dagblad* scores highest on both: 0.07 and 0.51 respectively, while *NRC Handelsblad* scores 0.05 and 0.47. Both *Trouw* and *de Volkskrant* score lower, especially on the latter: 0.43 and 0.42. They make more use of the multicultural and emancipation framing. *De Telegraaf* is an exception and shows relatively high multicultural coverage and low Islam-as-threat coverage. This is largely due to the fact that *De Telegraaf* is only included from 1999 onwards. If we conduct an analysis for the various newspapers since 1999, we find that the differences between Islam-as-threat are not significant (*De Telegraaf* at the same level as *NRC* and *Volkscrant* [0.43], *Trouw* lower [0.38], *Algemeen Dagblad* higher [0.47]) and the differences in multicultural framing decrease, with *De Telegraaf* becoming the lowest multicultural framer after *Algemeen Dagblad*. For four of the five frames, the differences between newspapers are significant. However, if we correlate the proportional use of each of the frames by each of the newspapers (not presented here), we find high correlations, especially for the frames that are used regularly; this means that the various newspapers largely follow the same patterns in frame use over-time and differences are rather limited.

Another interesting difference between the various newspapers is in frame diversity. Table 3.4 shows that the popular newspapers (*Algemeen Dagblad* and *De Telegraaf*) are less diverse than the quality newspapers (*NRC Handelsblad*, *de Volkskrant* and *Trouw*). So, quality newspapers appear to come closer to the ideal of a civic forum than more popular newspapers. The total media arena is slightly more diverse than the separate newspapers; this, again, indicates some level of variation across these newspapers as well.

So we find some support for our third hypothesis and for the idea that newspaper differences should not be neglected. However, we cannot confirm our sixth hypothesis: newspapers follow largely the same framing trends and the differences between the various newspapers seem to be rather small, compared to the differences that exist within

newspapers. Furthermore, differences in newspapers framing are in line with their political leaning.

3.8 Conclusions

In this paper we have reconstructed the framing of the issues of migration and integration in the Dutch political arena and the media during the last decade. We have found quantitative (issue attention) and qualitative (framing) shifts in both realms. While the attention for the issues of migration and integration in parliament is more stable throughout the whole period (with yearly cycles) and has risen somewhat since 9/11, the attention in the media has risen enormously since 2001. In both domains, since 2001 there has been an emphasis on immigrant religious culture, equated with Islam that is perceived as a threat to Dutch culture and values and as a principle obstacle to the integration of Muslim migrants.

More remarkable are the differences in framing between the political realm and the media. We found that (a) there is relatively little correlation between both spheres, (b) we see divergent shifts in framing in both realms during different periods in time (following important events in society) and (c) there are differences in frame variation between the two arenas. Although the Islam-as-threat frame has dominated the media debate throughout most of the period we have studied, this frame was rather marginal in the political realm before the events of 9/11. In the political realm, there is a larger diversity in the frames used, and different frames dominated over-time. During most of the time, the issues of migration and integration were framed in terms of emancipation. In 1996/1997 a restriction frame dominated, and since 2002 a frame that points to Islam as a threat and an obstacle to integration has become dominant. However, our findings indicate that this frame is heavily contested in the political realm. It is mainly right-wing parties that promote the Islam-as-threat frame, whereas left-wing parties continue to support emancipation and multicultural frames.

The incongruence between framing in both spheres supports Meyer's claim that the political arena and the media are to an important extent separate spheres, with different agendas. Parliamentary framing overlaps only to a limited extent with media framing. We did not find support for the idea that the media act as a pluralist forum. In contrast, our findings rather indicate that media framing is highly selective, resulting in hegemonic rather than pluralist framing. This suggests that not all actors have equal access to the media to express their view, but that actors that promote or support the hegemonic frame have more standing. It is rather that the selection mechanism of the media prevents deviant actors from taking part in the discussion than that the media are the open arena that Norris (2000) claims them to be. However, we found that some quality newspapers allow for more diversity than more popular newspapers.

Pluriformity in framing in the political arena appears to be greater than in the media, with each of the frames being used on a considerable number of occasions. Our results show that this frame completeness in the political arena is not reflected in the media. This

result might lead to a non-representative picture in the media that might affect public perceptions of the issue. Also, as Guiraudon (1998: 292) argues, the ‘negative dynamic between the press, public opinion, and the electioneering politician’ may lead to more restrictive policies. Similarly, Givens and Luedtke (2004) demonstrate that an increase in media attention to the issue of immigration is related to more restrictive immigration policies. Our findings demonstrate that the turn to more restrictive policies in the Netherlands occurred well before the boom of media attention on migration issues. The dominant framing in the media of Islam as a threat, however, appears to have diffused to the political realm since 2001. In contrast to the hegemonic position of this frame in the media, the Islam-as-threat frame is highly contested in the political realm.

Meyer’s (2002) claim of separate spheres with different dynamics appears to apply particularly well to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities, which simultaneously and paradoxically are becoming more international and national issues. Whereas there is a continuing international debate about the ‘clash of civilizations’ that Western nation states are facing, the regulation of immigration and integration remains the territory of the state, the level of Europeanization of immigration policy remains low (Luedtke, 2005) and the recent turn to civic integration may even reinforce nation-statism (Kofman, 2005).

Chapter 4. Press and Parliament: Relationships Between the Debate in Media and Politics²

4.1 Abstract

In this article, we examine how the attention and framing of political issues in the press and in parliament influence each other and how this attention and framing is influenced by key-events outside the media and parliamentary realms. Our case is the debate on immigration and integration in the Netherlands between 1995-2004. Our empirical analyses are based on a computer-assisted content analysis of both parliamentary documents and newspaper articles. Results show bi-directional causal relationships between media and parliament. In the case of attention only long-term influence relationships are found, while framing influences follow an interesting pattern: an increase in the use of a frame in one arena leads to an increase in the other arena only if this frame has already been used regularly in the latter arena. External events have more considerable and consistent impacts on issue attention and framing in both arenas.

4.2 Introduction

In recent years, the issue of immigration and integration of minorities have been central to political and public debates in most Western European countries. International developments such as 9/11, the war in Iraq and recent attacks in Madrid and London not only changed the amount of attention on the issue, but influenced the tone and focus of these debates as well. In the Netherlands, heightened attention for the immigration and integration issue and shifts in the framing of this issue are also due to internal political and societal developments – mainly the rise and assassination of new politician Pim Fortuyn and the murder on film maker and criticaster Theo van Gogh – making this country a compelling case to study the complexity of framing processes.

In this relatively turbulent environment, multiple actors try to define events by trying to bring forward their diagnoses and prognoses of the problems involved. In this article, we focus on two central arenas in which these framing processes take place, the parliamentary and the media arena. In the first, the actors involved are elected representatives who interact with the executive power. In the latter, elected officials play a role, but also various other actors (e.g. opinion leaders, journalists, social movements) strive for a place. Due to this partial overlap in actors, but also because these arenas are vulnerable to all kind of external influences, it is likely that causal relationships exist between both arenas. Here, we ask in

² This chapter is based on Vliegthart, R., & Roggeband, C. M. (2007). Framing Immigration and Integration: Relationships between Press and Parliament in the Netherlands. *International Communication Gazette*, 69(3), 295-319.

which arena which framing is propagated and how each arena influences the other. We track the development of five frames and how frequently they are used in each arena. We also explore how key national and international events influence the media and parliamentary framing.

We collected both newspaper articles on immigration and integration in the five national newspapers and official documents from the Dutch parliament between 1995 and 2004 and analyzed these using computer-assisted content analysis. First, we established the occurrence of different frames over-time in each arena. Then we used VAR-modeling to look at causal relationships between the two arenas, while controlling for major external events. Results offer insight into frame-formation processes for this specific case, but could potentially be generalized to other countries and other politically contested issues.

4.3 Relationships between parliamentary and media framing

Although there are several studies available on the relations between political agendas and media coverage, this research has mainly focused on the question of *which* issue(s) (attention) are presented and not on *how* these issues are presented. This might be the case for several reasons. First, convincingly assessing relationships between both arenas requires labor-intensive coding that spans a relatively long period of research. Second, the dominant theoretical concepts and approaches have directed researchers into a certain direction, which has left some questions unaddressed. For instance, one of the central concepts in political communication during the past decades has been agenda setting (1972). Stemming from this theory is the idea of agenda building, which deals with how the media agenda is created (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). The focus is on which issues make it on the agenda and how salient they are, rather than how they are presented.

During recent years the concept of framing has become increasingly present in the social sciences. Framing helps us to understand how salient issues are presented. Scholarly attention to this concept has grown rapidly, not only in the field of political communication, but in various other social science sub-fields as well (e.g. Benford and Snow, 2000; Entman, 1993; Valkenburg *et al.*, 1999). No consensus has been reached about how framing should be defined and operationalized in a media setting. Current conceptualizations of framing vary in complexity (for an overview see De Vreese, 2005). Most of these conceptualizations, however, are at least partly in line with the classical definition of the framing concept offered by Entman (1993: 53), who speaks of '[selecting] some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular definition of a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described'. Little is yet known about the relations between framing in the media and in the political realm. The agenda setting literature shed a light on this question, since it deals with the same overarching question: Who follows whom? Though agenda setting and framing are inherently different concepts, the underlying mechanisms for influence relations between media and parliament

might be similar. On the one hand, agenda setting deals with which issues are on the agendas and which are not and can be seen as an 'inter-issue' contest between various actors promoting different issues. On the other hand, framing deals with the different way these issues are presented, which may be called an 'intra-issue' contest. However, in both instances actors try to influence agendas and make them as favorable as possible, being either in terms of the problem salience or in problem 'definition'. In their overview of the literature concerning the mass media's agenda setting influence on the political realm, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) conclude that different studies have led to contradicting results. This is due to the divergent definitions and operationalizations of the political agenda that have been employed on the one hand and to a focus on either election campaigns or routine times politics on the other hand. Walgrave and Van Aelst argue that findings indicating the media agenda's influence on the political agenda depend on whether the researcher looks at institutional/substantial measures (e.g. laws, budgetary spending) or more symbolic policies (speeches, interviews, hearings and debates). Though the use of the term 'symbolic' might be somewhat confusing, since it reduces political debates to little more than speech-acts, they convincingly demonstrate the differential impact of the media. With regard to substantial measures little or no influence is found, whereas a strong influence is often established in case of symbolic policies (e.g. Edwards and Wood, 1999). Here, we focus on official parliamentary documents, which according to Walgrave and Van Aelst's distinction are more institutional (the parliament as legislative power) and on written parliamentary questions, that are more symbolic in nature (controlling the executive, or 'grilling the government' to use Walgrave and Van Aelst's terminology). Combining both elements, a moderate influence from media on parliament can be expected.¹

The second element that determines the influence of media on politics is the time-period under study: either election time or routine politics. Different studies have demonstrated that during election times there is limited or no influence from the media agenda on the political agenda, while in routine times more mixed results are found (e.g. Brandenburg, 2002; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). According to Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006), there might be several reasons for the limited influence of media on the political agenda during election campaigns. First, studies of election campaigns deal with short periods in time and are not able to grasp any long-term effects. Second, during election periods politicians vigorously try to garner attention for their points of view and to influence the media agenda, instead of the other way around. Third, in election times media devote more attention to politicians, thereby providing them with the opportunities to get their messages out. Fourth, particularly during election times certain rules, traditions and practices regarding fairness and balance limit the autonomy of the media. In the ten-year period we studied (1995-2004), three parliamentary national elections were held, but the largest part of our research-period consists of 'routinized' politics, so there is no a-priori expectation of limited or no media-influence.

The next question is what form this influence takes. In general, an increase in issue attention in the media leads to an increase in issue attention on the parliamentary agenda. This influence, however, is more likely when the amount of attention on the issue is substantial (Eilders, 2000, 2002). Since we expect that the same mechanisms operate for framing, we assume that increased use of a certain frame by the media leads to an increased circulation of this frame in parliament, but this influence only occurs when the frame is present in a substantial amount of the total media coverage of the issue.

We not only expect media framing to influence parliamentary framing, but the reverse relationship as well. Several studies take both possible influence patterns into account and, again, show mixed results. Soroka (2002), researching the relation between parliament, media and public opinion for three issues in Canada in the period 1986-1995, finds different relations for different issues. He argues that, in line with Zucker's obtrusiveness hypothesis, media effects on politics and public are limited for those issues that can be experienced directly by public and politicians (e.g. inflation). Wood and Peake (1998) show that for several foreign issues in the USA, the media determine presidential actions, while the reverse relationship is not found. Brandenburg's study (2002) relating the daily issue agenda's of the two main political parties in the 1997 UK parliamentary elections to various media outlets contradicts these findings. Taking nine issues into account, he finds that the content of all researched media outlets are to a certain extent guided by the political parties, while no influence of media content on parties' agendas is found. Finally, two studies of the Dutch context are worth mentioning. Studying the salience of social-economic issues in party programs, media coverage and among the public in the period 1980-1986 Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg (1995) find a positive influence of the political agenda on the media agenda and a boomerang effect (i.e. a negative influence) from the media on the political agenda. Kleinnijenhuis' study (2003) that takes into account a wide range of issues during the parliamentary election campaigns of 1994, 1998 and 2002, indicates that opinion making in the media is to a large extent influenced by the earlier presented opinions of politicians. Even though this research does not compare the political agenda to that of the media, but only looks at media coverage, it confirms Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg's (1995) conclusion that 'media follow politics'.

To summarize, a positive influence of the political agenda on the media agenda is often found, but this finding is not robust. We assume a similar mechanism like the influence of media framing on parliamentary framing is operating. We therefore hypothesize that increased use of a frame within parliament leads to increased use of this frame in media, but this influence only occurs when this frame is present in a substantial amount of the parliamentary documents.

4.4 Events

Events that occur both outside the media arena and the parliament play a crucial role in the agenda building and framing of issues. Shifts in framing might occur because of events within institutionalized politics (e.g. elections that change the power relations within parliament) or sudden (inter-)national events (e.g. attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, murder on politician Pim Fortuyn) that dramatically alter the current political climate.

The media arena is particularly vulnerable to the occurrence of events (Kepplinger and Habermeyer, 1995). News values determine why some but not other events make it into the news. Events have to pass the news threshold, which consists of news values attributed to the real world. Galtung and Ruge (1965) note that what happens in the real world gets attributed some news factors (or not) that determine the chance that events make it into the news. Again, making it into the news is something different from significantly shifting the framing of an issue for a period of time. To accomplish this an event must (a) dominate the news for a longer period in time or change the political power base in society permanently and (b) be incongruent with the way the issue has been framed before the event or result in political actors propagating other frames that gain dominance in society.

Though it is argued that the political is more routinized and less influenced by external events than the media arena is (e.g. Wood and Peake, 1998), external 'shocks' are likely to have an impact as well. The most obvious influence is from parliamentary elections that change the composition of parliament and consequently the configuration of actors that are involved in the framing process. Assuming that different political parties with different ideologies propagate different frames, electoral gains for a certain party might help to gain standing and legitimacy for its framing of a certain issue, consequently leading to a more frequent use of this framing in both the parliamentary and media arena.

Even when an event meets previously mentioned requirements, differences may persist regarding *how* the influence takes place. First, differences exist in *what kinds* of framing-shifts are taking place. In some cases, this is quite predictable. For example, the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 are likely to increase the frequency of a frame that presents Muslims and Islam as a threat to Western societies. In other cases, this is less obvious: the announcement of populist Pim Fortuyn to run for the parliamentary elections in 2002 could have led to a lot of media attention to his opinions on the issue of integration of minorities, which were a rather diverse palette of partly contradictory statements (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). The influence of this event on the parliamentary arena, if any, is even less predictable. Second, there are differences in *the duration* of the framing-shift. Some events change the framing of the issue (semi-)permanently, as might be the case for events that cause a sustaining change in power relations within society, while others only change the framing during the course of the event or for a limited time period afterwards. Third, the *size* of the framing-shift can differ. In some cases, shifts are subtle, with one frame gaining some ground at the expense of other frames. In other cases,

like 9/11, events may cause much larger changes (paradigm-shift), such as complete abandonment of certain frames, while others become dominant for the first time.

While we have some a priori expectations about how certain events might influence the parliamentary and media arenas, little theory-building and empirical research is available on this issue, so we treat it here mainly as an empirical, exploratory question. In the methods section, where we describe our events, we will formulate some more specific expectations about the kind of influences each event may have. We now turn to our methods, where we will address how we developed our frames and which key-events we take into account.

4.5 Methods

Frames

De Vreese (2005: 53) argues that there is little consensus about how to identify frames in the news. According to him, roughly two strategies can be applied. The first is inductive in nature: no pre-defined frames are used and frames emerge during the course of analysis (e.g. Gamson, 1992). The second is deductive in nature and texts are analyzed using pre-defined and operationalized frames. Furthermore, De Vreese also makes a distinction between generic and issue-specific frames. The former are of a more general nature and can be applied to different issues in different contexts (Valkenburg et al., 1999), the latter are tailored to the specific issue and context under study (e.g. Shah *et al.*, 2002).

In our study we use pre-defined, issue-specific frames established through a qualitative pre-study. We chose issue-specific frames, because we analyze both media content and parliamentary documents. Since these documents differ in significant respects from newspaper articles, proposed generic news frames (e.g. human interest, economic consequences, see Valkenburg et al., 1999) are unlikely to be present in parliamentary documents, so issue-specific frames are most appropriate for comparison purposes and to trace influences between the two arenas more precisely. In chapter 3, the procedure, frames and resulting data set are described in more detail.

Events

We use dummy-variables to capture the effects of key-events. Several events are expected to be influential in determining the intensity of news coverage about immigration and integration. The selection of events deserves special attention. One does not know in advance which events might affect the intensity of immigration and integration news and parliamentary coverage, and looking at this coverage itself for possibly relevant events can be considered as selecting on the dependent variable, which is theoretically and methodologically inappropriate. Therefore, we chose a somewhat common-sense procedure to establish key-events. We distinguish three types of events that could potentially determine the intensity of reporting about immigration and integration issues.

The first type is parliamentary elections, here classified as institutional events, where we distinguish two different categories of events. First, as a result of election outcomes, the framing of the issue of immigration and integration might fluctuate because of changing power distribution among parties and changes in the composition of the government. In our research period, we distinguish the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002. The Liberal-Conservative *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD), booked electoral gains in 1998. In 2002, a week after party leader Pim Fortuyn was assassinated by an environmentalist, the new populist anti-immigration party *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) won about 17 percent of the votes and entered government together with the VVD and the Christian-Democrats (CDA). We did not include the advanced parliamentary elections of January 2003, since the political attitude of the new government towards the issue remained similar, even though it shifted the support for the various parties. In general, one might expect that a shift in political power to more right-wing parties leads to a framing-shift towards more immigrant-unfriendly frames (e.g. Islam-as-threat and restriction) at the expense of the other frames. Second, we included the election *campaigns* of 1998 and 2003 as separate events, since these are likely to be times in which debate on political contested issues intensifies and in which politicians are likely to promote frames that they expect to be electorally successful.ⁱⁱ

The second type of key-events encompasses international incidents, here referred to as unpremeditated events. We take into account three key-events: 9/11 needs to be considered, since it dramatically heightened the public debate about the integration of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the war in Iraq, starting in March 2003, and the bombing of several trains in Madrid in March 2004 are likely to have changed media coverage towards immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. In general, we expect these events to have resulted in an increased framing of Islam-as-a-threat.

A third type of key-event relates to political and societal actors trying to influence public debate with their opinions. Here, we focus on unconventional opinions about the issue of immigration and integration of minorities and classify these attempts as deliberate events. Koopmans (2002) and Prins (2005) suggest that two national actors and their statements have been of central importance in the debate on immigration and integration. First, the publication of Paul Scheffer's newspaper article on the *multicultural fiasco*, written in January 2000, which might have caused increased multicultural framing and second, the political campaign of *Pim Fortuyn*, who was elected leader of new-party *Leefbaar Nederland* in November 2001 and stirred up the public debate on the issue of immigration and integration of minorities.

A final event that we included is the murder on movie director and social critic Theo van Gogh in November 2004. He was assassinated by a Muslim-extremist because of his controversial attitudes towards the Islam. This event resulted in increasing tensions between Muslim minorities and other parts of the population and probably increased attention to the Islam-as-threat frame as well.

4.6 Analysis

To analyze the influences of the media and parliamentary agenda on each other and the effects of the key-events on both, we conduct a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) analysis (see chapter 2). Our dependent variables are the monthly proportional uses of each of the frames in each of the arenas, meaning that the sum of scores of the five frames every month equals 1.00. We try to explain the proportional use of each frame in one arena with the previous use of this frame in both arenas. Furthermore, we also conduct an analysis for the total number of used frames, which indicates the influence of each arena on the total substantial attention (agenda) for the issue. With the augmented Dickey Fuller test, we test whether the series are stationary, which is a requirement for using VAR-analysis (see Chapter 2).

Table 4.1 presents the results of this test. We used the AIC to establish the appropriate lag length for the test.

Table 4.1 Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for presence of unit root

	Parliament	Media
Total attention	-6.46 (1 lag)	-4.87 (0 lags)
Multicultural	-6.20 (0 lags)	-3.72 (1 lag)
Emancipation	-6.70 (1 lag)	-8.38 (0 lags)
Restriction	-4.39 (5 lags)	-5.74 (0 lags)
Victimization	-5.95 (0 lags)	-4.51 (4 lags)
Islam-as-threat	-3.69 (1 lag)	-4.27 (1 lag)

Note: AIC is used to establish appropriate lag-length; All results indicate absence of unit-root ($p < .01$)

Results indicate stationarity for all our variables, which makes a VAR-analysis appropriate. The number of lags that needs to be included for each variable can be established using a Likelihood Test for Dropping Lags (Enders, 2004, see also chapter 2). We assume that influences between both agendas do not occur over a longer period in time than 6 months, which is in line with outcomes of classical agenda setting research indicating influences up to a couple of months (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). We start with a model including six lags and drop lag by lag, until the Likelihood Test indicates loss of significant explanatory power of the model.

Following Freeman et al. (1989), we report the following:

- (1) F-tests for the whole blocks of lags of each variable, which indicates whether – overall- any significant causal relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable exists (Granger-causality), supplemented with the coefficients of the dummy-variables and the explained variance.
- (2) A presentation of the decomposition of the Forecast Error Variance, indicating for each variable over-time what portion of the movement in a series can be attributed to its own shocks versus shocks from the other variables.
- (3) An impulse response analysis of the moving average representation of the variables in the system (see also chapter 2).ⁱⁱⁱ

In our analysis, key-events are added as independent variables to the various models. Key-events are captured by including dummy-variables for each of the events. These effects can be both temporarily (having values as ...,0,1,0) or permanent (... ,0,1,1).^{iv} Furthermore, effects occur directly, but it can also take some time before the event leads to changes in framing. We refrain from formulating explicit hypotheses about how various events affect the dependent variables, since we have no firm theoretical foundation on which to base these hypotheses. For some of the introduced effects, however, we can think of certain expectations. We anticipate, for example, that parliamentary elections have permanent effects, since they change the political power base for a longer period in time, but it might take several months, before this effect occurs due to for example coalition formations. We expect international events to have direct effects because they occur during a limited period and lead to (unexpected) changes in the political environment. In most of the cases, this effect is likely to wear off quickly, though in the instance of 9/11 a more permanent change in attitudes towards the Islamic world and also Muslims in Western societies may have occurred. For the deliberative events the scholarly literature suggests that these events have led to an enduring shift in the political debate on the issue of immigration and integration of minorities (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003; Koopmans, 2002). For the murder on Van Gogh we expect an abrupt effect. Whether this effect is permanent or temporarily will probably be hard to establish using our data, since our research period ends one month after the murder. For each of the events, the time lag and the duration of the effect on framing will be assessed empirically by looking at the common model-test statistics (R-squared, Akaike Info Criterion) for attention and framings, choosing for each dummy the lag length and duration that overall captures the consequences of the external event best. We allowed a maximum lag of three months for parliamentary elections and one for other events, to ensure that changes in framing are indeed likely to be caused by the specific event.

4.7 Results

Relationships in issue attention

We now turn to the bi-directional relationship between the two arenas. As demonstrated in chapter 3 there is some overlap in the overall attention to the issue and the proportional use of each of the frames in each arena, but differences exist as well. However, causal relations between the two arenas may become visible if we account for timing and external key-events. Table 4.2 presents the results of the analysis for total attention to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. The Likelihood Test suggests that a model with four lags is the most appropriate. As expected there is indeed a strong yearly trend in the parliamentary arena, with the 12-month coefficient being highly significant. The recent past has a significant impact as well (F-test for Granger-causality highly significant). Attention in the media arena also has an influence on parliamentary attention, it Granger-causes parliamentary attention for the issue. This influence, however, is not straightforward: the impulse response analysis demonstrates that effects are initially negative and become temporarily positive after five months (Figure 4.1a). Overall, this results in a rather limited impact: after 18 months media attention accounts for 5.7 percent of changes in parliamentary attention (Table 4.3). Interestingly enough, the media coverage one year earlier has a positive influence on the current parliamentary attention to the issue. Apparently, there are long-term influential relationships where media coverage affects actions in parliament in the long run. Furthermore, several events have a significant impact on the overall parliamentary attention to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. For instance, 9/11 has a positive and permanent influence, while Fortuyn's entrance into the political arena has a negative influence. The latter is likely to be a statistical artifact, because it occurs only two months after 9/11 and probably indicates declining attention to 9/11 rather than the actual influence of Fortuyn. The third event that has a significant and permanent influence on the parliamentary agenda is the war in Iraq. The discussion about the Dutch government's official position in relation to the Iraq war and the subsequent debate afterwards has included elements of the immigration and integration issue, perhaps the Islam-as-threat frame in particular. Remarkably enough, both the elections of 1998 and 2002 have no impact. A change in government and shifts in parliamentary standing of various parties does not change the attention to the issue in parliament. However, as we will see further on, changes in parliamentary standing do change the framing of the issue.

Table 4.2 VAR Analysis (4 lags) for the attention for immigration and integration in media and parliament (period 1995-2004)

	<i>Dependent variables</i>	
	Parliament	Media
Constant	7.77** (3.61)	20.94 (20.95)
Parliament (F-test)	5.13*** (0.00)	0.92 (0.45)
(t-12)	0.42*** (0.08)	0.74* (0.49)
Media (F-test)	1.94* (0.06)	4.75*** (0.01)
(t-12)	0.02** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.06)
Election campaign 1998 ²	-11.61 (9.28)	-35.48 (53.88)
Election 1998 (t-2) ¹	0.80 (2.32)	-2.35 (13.49)
Scheffer (t-1) ²	-0.39 (9.32)	91.96** (54.12)
9/11 ¹	13.99** (7.20)	428.57*** (42.15)
Fortuyn ¹	-16.34** (8.14)	-323.61*** (47.25)
Election 2002 (t-3) ¹	-8.18* (5.57)	40.80 (32.33)
Election campaign 2003 ²	10.53 (12.30)	190.77*** (71.37)
Irak ¹	15.17*** (5.21)	-110.26*** (30.22)
Madrid ²	12.48 (9.84)	305.86*** (57.12)
Van Gogh ¹	5.82 (9.66)	403.86*** (56.08)
Ljung Box Q (24)	22.76	31.21
Durbin-Watson	1.97	2.04
Centered R-squared	0.61	0.86

Note: All parameters are estimated using OLS. For lags of parliament and media, an F-statistic that tests for Granger-causality is reported with significance level in parentheses; lag selection on basis of Likelihood Ratio Test for exclusion of last lag (starting point 6 lags); for events unstandardized regression coefficients (Bs) are reported with standard errors in parentheses; ¹ effect is permanent; ² effect is temporarily * p<0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (one tailed), N = 108 months.

Attention to the issue in the media is only minimally influenced by the parliamentary agenda: we find that attention in the parliamentary agenda one year earlier influences the media agenda, but the effect is barely significant. More recent parliamentary attention does not have a significant influence on media attention. In the long run, parliamentary attention accounts for 5.8percent of the changes in media attention (Table 4.3) and over-time this effect is positive (Figure 4.1a). These results only give limited evidence for the claim that media tend to follow politics. Furthermore, media attention in previous months influences current media attention. In general, events are more likely to have an effect on the media agenda and these effects tend to be larger. Like the parliamentary agenda, 9/11 has a positive and permanent effect and the entrance of Fortuyn two months later is accompanied by a decline in attention to the immigration and integration issue. Also, Iraq has a highly significant influence, but this influence is negative. In the media Iraq is not connected to the immigration and integration issue. Furthermore, both Scheffer's multicultural fiasco and the

terrorist attacks on Madrid have a positive, but temporal influence. The murder of Van Gogh results in more attention to the issue in the last two months of our research period. Finally, a political landslide after the 2002 parliamentary elections resulting in a more rightist government increased the media attention to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. During the 2003 election campaign, the issue became more salient in the media. This was not the case in 1998, when it was not a central issue in the campaigns of most political parties.

The VAR-analyses show that our model explains 61 percent of the variance in the parliamentary agenda and 86 percent of the variance in the media agenda. Test statistics are satisfactory, with neither residual statistics indicating autocorrelation in the residuals.

Relationships in framing

Now, we turn to the framing of the issue. Our Likelihood test suggests various lag lengths for the different frames, ranging from one for the victimization frame to six for the Islam-as-threat, multicultural and restriction framing. None of our analyses finds autocorrelation in the residuals, which indicates that the models are well specified. Our models explain a considerable amount of the variances in our frames, though large differences exist: the R-squared is .24 for the variance in the media use of the victimization frame, while it is .78 for the parliamentary use of the Islam-as-threat frame. Except for the multicultural framing, we explain parliamentary framing better than media framing. So, we might be able to predict the *amount* of attention more accurately for the media arena, but the parliamentary framing is more consistent and can be predicted more precisely.

How do media and parliament influence each other? The answer is complex and patterns do not always correspond with our general expectation that the framing in one arena will influence the framing in the other arena. For the Islam-as-threat framing, most common in the media arena, we find a positive influence from parliament on media: parliamentary framing has a significant influence on media framing (F-value significant, see Table 4.4) and this influence is over-time largely positive (see Figure 4.1b). After 18 months, parliamentary Islam-as-threat framing accounts for 9.1 percent of the changes in media Islam-as-threat framing (Table 4.3). For the multicultural frame, which has been present substantially in both arenas, framing in the media arena positively influences the parliamentary arena, while overall parliament has a negative influence on the media (see Table 4.4 and Figure 4.1 Simulation of the response to a one standard deviation change in standardized attention and frame scores for parliament and media). For this frame, mutual influences are the strongest compared to the other frames: after 18 months, parliament accounts for 13.6 percent of the variation in parliamentary framing, while media accounts for 16.4 percent of the variation in media framing (Table 4.3). In the case of victimization, we find a limited, but mutual positive relationship (Figure 4.1d), though the F-test indicates that the influence of parliament on media only approaches significance ($p=.11$). For the emancipation frame, which has been dominant in parliament, an ambiguous effect of parliament on media can be found: it is initially largely positive, but becomes negative in

the longer run (Figure 4.1e) and results overall in a small boomerang-effect, where more frame-use in parliament results in less frame-use in the media. In the long run, it accounts for 6.7 percent of the variation in the use of the emancipation frame in the media (Table 4.3). The reversed relationship is clearly positive, but only approaches significance ($p=.11$). In the long run, emancipation framing in the media accounts for 2.4 percent of the variation in emancipation framing in parliament (Table 4.3). F-statistics for the analysis of the restriction frame suggest no relationship between both arenas. The general pattern seems to be that media are reluctant to follow parliament when changes occur in the dominant parliamentary frames (emancipation and multicultural). Furthermore, there are positive influences from the media on parliament (multicultural and victimization) and from parliament on the media (Islam-as-threat and victimization). Apparently, if frames have already been dominant in one arena, increased use of those frames in the other arena reconfirms the importance of that frame for actors in the first arena and increases their use there. Actors in both arenas actively follow increases in framings that they already deemed important, while especially the media arena shows a counter-reaction for increases in those frames that parliament has previously deemed important.

Figure 4.1 Simulation of the response to a one standard deviation change in standardized attention and frame scores for parliament and media




Table 4.3 Decomposition of Forecast Error Variance for Attention and framing in parliament and media

Innovation in			
Forecast error in	t (months)	Parliament	Media
Attention			
Parliament	6	96.0%	4.0%
	12	95.2%	4.8%
	18	94.3%	5.7%
Media	6	2.8%	97.2%
	12	2.8%	97.2%
	18	5.8%	94.2%
Islam-as-threat			
Parliament	6	98.5%	1.5%
	12	98.3%	1.7%
	18	98.3%	1.7%
Media	6	6.6%	93.4%
	12	8.9%	91.1%
	18	9.1%	90.9%
Multicultural			
Parliament	6	86.1%	13.9%
	12	84.1%	15.9%
	18	83.6%	16.4%
Media	6	2.7%	97.3%
	12	12.8%	87.2%
	18	13.6%	86.4%
Victimization			
Parliament	6	96.9%	3.1%
	12	96.9%	3.1%
	18	96.9%	3.1%
Media	6	2.2%	97.8%
	12	2.3%	97.7%
	18	2.3%	97.7%
Emancipation			
Parliament	6	97.7%	2.3%
	12	97.6%	2.4%
	18	97.6%	2.4%
Media	6	6.6%	93.4%
	12	6.7%	93.3%
	18	6.7%	93.3%
Restriction			
Parliament	6	96.2%	3.8%
	12	95.9%	4.1%
	18	95.9%	4.1%
Media	6	4.2%	95.8%
	12	4.4%	95.6%
	18	4.5%	95.5%

Note: each line presents the percentage of the forecast error t months ahead in the row variable that is due to innovations in the column variable.

Framing Integration and Immigration

Table 4.4 VAR Analysis for the use of six immigration- and integration-frames in media and politics (period 1995-2004)

	Islam-as-threat			Multicultural			Victimization		
	6			6			1		
Number of lags									
Constant		<i>parliament</i>	<i>media</i>		<i>parliament</i>	<i>media</i>		<i>parliament</i>	<i>media</i>
	4.88 (4.94)		41.10*** (9.40)	8.33* (5.42)		30.64*** (6.35)	6.04*** (1.74)		8.33*** (2.30)
parliament (F-test)	5.77*** (0.00)		1.86** (0.05)	1.81* (0.05)		2.23** (0.02)	40.41*** (0.00)		1.58 (0.11)
media (F-test)	0.76 (0.30)		3.04*** (0.01)	2.70*** (0.01)		2.47** (0.01)	2.70* (0.05)		3.40** (0.03)
Election campaign '98 2	10.02** (5.98)		-26.16** (11.37)	1.20 (7.00)		19.86*** (8.07)	-6.73* (5.06)		4.28 (6.71)
Election 1998 (t-2) 1	-0.54 (2.21)		-16.85*** (4.22)	-10.63*** (3.00)		11.06*** (3.46)	-1.11 (1.11)		4.02*** (1.56)
Scheffer (t-2) 2	-1.44 (5.78)		-12.23 (11.00)	10.73* (7.08)		14.13** (8.17)	-13.69*** (5.16)		3.13 (6.84)
9/111	19.37*** (4.52)		37.60*** (8.60)	6.88* (5.06)		-23.25*** (5.84)	-3.99 (3.66)		-11.44** (4.86)
Fortuyn1	-11.00** (5.40)		-29.17*** (10.27)	2.26 (5.79)		10.75* (6.68)	2.98 (3.97)		6.02 (5.27)
Election 2002 (t-3) 1	2.40 (3.04)		7.19 (5.79)	-1.97 (3.56)		-5.37* (4.01)	-2.38 (2.65)		0.94 (3.52)
Election campaign '03 2	-6.42 (6.11)		-20.15** (11.62)	-4.23 (7.10)		5.05 (8.18)	-0.45 (5.43)		0.75 (7.19)
Irak1	2.90** (2.90)		-12.66** (5.53)	-2.55 (3.15)		-1.03 (3.64)	2.97 (2.39)		5.12* (3.17)
Madrid2	-1.12 (6.21)		-7.77 (11.82)	3.22 (6.80)		-5.43 (7.84)	1.01 (5.22)		6.31 (6.92)
Van Gogh1	4.20 (5.86)		14.95* (11.14)	2.12 (6.60)		-0.63 (7.61)	2.24 (5.14)		-4.47 (6.81)
Ljung-Box Q (24)	20.38		14.85	11.48		18.38	22.66		27.12
Durbin-Watson	2.11		1.96	1.92		2.07	1.96		1.99
Centered R-squared	0.78		0.65	0.44		0.68	0.40		0.24
N (months)	114		114	114		114	119		119

Table 4.4 (continued) VAR Analysis for the use of six immigration- and integration-frames in media and politics (period 1995-2004)

Number of lags	Emancipation		Restriction	
	3	6	3	6
Constant	<i>parliament</i> 20.67*** (4.46)	<i>media</i> 4.19*** (1.71)	<i>parliament</i> 12.45*** (3.53)	<i>media</i> 5.60*** (1.88)
parliament (F-test)	8.02*** (0.00)	2.79** (0.02)	5.18*** (0.00)	0.78 (0.29)
media (F-test)	1.51 (0.11)	1.38 (0.13)	0.83 (0.27)	2.49** (0.02)
Election campaign '98 2	-8.53 (8.89)	6.67** (3.40)	-0.24 (9.06)	-3.58 (4.78)
Election 1998 (t-2) 1	-0.27 (1.98)	-0.48 (0.78)	4.49** (2.56)	4.54*** (1.35)
Scheffer (t-2) 2	-3.98* (8.76)	5.59*** (3.36)	14.49** (8.52)	-4.70 (4.50)
9/11	-10.34* (6.41)	-2.84 (2.46)	-8.24* (5.95)	-4.69* (3.14)
Fortuyn1	8.45 (6.98)	3.49* (1.92)	4.48 (6.54)	3.13 (3.45)
Election 2002 (t-3) 1	-4.74 (5.11)	0.54 (1.96)	2.88 (4.40)	0.94 (2.32)
Election campaign '03 2	4.82 (9.41)	9.99*** (3.61)	11.18 (8.89)	-0.24 (4.69)
Irak1	0.09 (4.17)	0.50 (1.60)	-1.44 (3.83)	0.63 (2.02)
Madrid2	3.93 (9.00)	-0.13 (3.45)	-9.58 (8.39)	4.18 (4.43)
Van Gogh1	-0.24 (8.79)	-3.16 (3.37)	-6.95 (8.38)	-5.76* (4.37)
Ljung-Box Q (24)	23.81	21.51	26.76	23.12
Durbin-Watson	2.00	2.24	2.10	2.07
Centered R-squared	0.37	0.29	0.46	0.29
N (months)	117	117	114	114

Note: All parameters are estimated using OLS. For lags of parliament and media, an F-statistic that tests for causality is reported with significance level in parentheses; lag selection on basis of Likelihood Ratio Test for exclusion of last lag (starting point 6 lags); for events unstandardized regression coefficients (Bs) are reported with standard errors in parentheses; ¹ effect is permanent; ² effect is temporarily * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (one tailed).

Various external events also contribute to changes in the way the issue is framed. Consider the elections of 1998 and 2002. As expected the outcome of the parliamentary election of 1998 with electoral gains for the Conservative-Liberal party leads to an increase in the use of the restriction frame in both parliament and media. In parliament, this happens at the expense of the multicultural frame. In the media, we find another remarkable shift in framing, from Islam-as-threat to multiculturalism. As we already noted, the media arena does not follow parliament when it comes to multiculturalism. Here, we suggest that a critical multicultural frame was advanced in the media after political support for the multicultural ideal declined. Remarkably enough, the 2002 parliamentary election, which altered the political landscape considerably and resulted in a more right-wing parliament and government, did not change the framing of the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in any of the two arenas. Probably, this is due to changes that had already occurred in the months before the election, mainly due to 9/11. During the weeks before the elections of 1998 and 2003, a shift becomes visible in the media framing away from the 'Islam-as-threat' frame towards frames propagated in the parliamentary realm (mainly multiculturalism and emancipation). Apparently, during election campaigns, politicians are better able to get 'policy-related' messages out and as suggested by Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) the press is more willing to give politicians the floor to express their politicized views.

9/11 shifted the framing in both arenas to the Islam-as-threat frame, at the expense of several other frames. Fortuyn's entrance accompanies, though does not necessarily cause, a decrease in this effect, but the Islam-as-threat frame remains dominant after 9/11, as depicted in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. The two other events that can be labeled as 'terrorist' have only limited effects: the attacks on trains in Madrid did not change the framing, while Van Gogh's murder led to more Islam-as-threat framing in media and less restriction framing in parliament. The war in Iraq has different effects in each arena, following the same pattern as the general attention to immigration and integration. Apparently, in parliament politicians connect the war in Iraq to the threat of radical Islam, while this is not the case in the media arena. Finally, Scheffer's multicultural fiasco resulted in some temporary changes, most significantly an increase in multicultural framing in both arenas.

Finally, for both the attention as for the five frames, we tested whether there was any contemporaneous correlation between the residuals of media and parliament that might point to additional shorter-term relationships (within a one-month time span) between the two realms (see also Chapter 2). However, we did not find a significant correlation for the attention or for any of the frames, giving no evidence for such relationships.

4.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, we investigated the intriguing relationship between the media arena and the parliament's framing of the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in the Netherlands from 1995-2004. Our VAR-analyses accounted for agenda setting, framing and

effects of external events as possible explanations for both quantitative (issue attention) and qualitative (framing) shifts in each arena. Though results are complex, some interesting patterns can be distinguished. Regarding the relationship between the overall attention to the issues in both arenas, we found little short-term influences from one arena on the other, but results indicated a long-term bi-directional influence. Although external events influence both agendas, the impact on the media agenda is larger. International events such as 9/11 and the war in Iraq influence both agendas permanently. The effects of parliamentary elections are limited, while the effects of prominent actors trying to influence the public debate are ambiguous.

For our five issue-specific frames, we found an interesting pattern: increases in the use of a certain frame in one arena leads to increases in the other arena, but almost exclusively for those frames that have already been used frequently in the latter arena. The press is reluctant to adopt parliamentary frames that have not previously been popular in the media. Finally, external events have a considerable impact on how issues are framed in both media and parliament. In general, especially the outcome of the parliamentary election of 1998, with a shift away from multiculturalism in parliament towards more restrictive policies and 9/11, increasing Islam-as-threat framing in both arenas, altered the public and political debate significantly and permanently. The weeks preceding an election show more media attention to those frames that are usually more present in parliament. More than influencing each other, both parliament and media are influenced by developments in the 'outside' world. In that respect, our results do not confirm statements on 'mediacracy', mediatization of politics and the like as suggested in some of the recent literature (e.g. Mazzoleni and Schulz, 1999). A final noteworthy conclusion concerns the (un)predictability of both agendas. We predicted the attention of the issue more accurately for the media agenda, perhaps because it more directly reflects developments in the 'real' world. However, we were more successful at predicting the content of the parliamentary agenda, which may be due to the greater internal consistency of this agenda over-time. This points to inherent institutional differences between the two arenas, with the media being more flexible, variable and event-sensitive and parliament being less moldable, more routinized and stable.

Chapter 5. Attention in the Media: Facts and Issue-Coverage in Dutch Newspapers³

5.1 Abstract

An intriguing question in communication science deals with factors determining the intensity of news reporting about certain issues. This chapter investigates whether the attention for the issue of immigration and the integration of foreigners in news coverage largely reflects selected real world developments or whether it is rather dependent on (political) key-events. We compare the direct effects of real world developments and key-events in Dutch newspapers for the period 1991-2002. Results indicate that events have a more direct impact on the attention for the immigration and integration issue in the news. We furthermore find that international events have a direct, but temporarily effect, while most institutional, national events influence media attention permanently.

5.2 Introduction

Immigration and the integration of foreigners are highly contested in a growing number of Western European countries, heatedly debated in the public as well as political arena. News reporting about the integration of Muslim minorities has attracted scholarly attention (Nacos and Torres Reyna, 2003; Poole and Richardson, 2006) and effects of news coverage of the issue of immigration and integration of minorities on public opinion and behavior have been demonstrated (Gilens, 1996; Lubbers *et al.*, 2000; Walgrave and De Swert, 2004; see also Chapter 6). During recent years, international events like the September 11 attacks in the US and the subsequent war on terror have led to increasing attention for and problematization of immigration and the integration of ethnic minorities in media coverage (Nacos and Torres Reyna, 2003). Few studies, however, demonstrate how news coverage is affected by such key-events as opposed to socio-economic real world developments. This chapter addresses this question and looks at extra-media influences on media coverage. More specifically, we consider real world factors that determine the *attention* in media coverage for the immigration and integration issue. We investigate whether the attention for this issue in news reporting largely reflects *real world developments*, such as the level of immigration and the number of asylum applicants, or whether it is dependent upon social or political *key-events*, like 9/11 or parliamentary elections. Furthermore, we explore the similarities and differences in the type of effect caused by different types of events. By

³ This chapter is based on Vliegthart, R., & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2007). Real world Indicators and the Coverage of Immigration and Integration Issues in Dutch Newspapers. *European Journal of Communication*, 22(3).

considering the direct impact of real world developments versus key-events, and by spelling out the diverse impacts key-events potentially can have, we contribute to the general understanding of news production processes.

We consider news coverage of immigration and integration in Dutch newspapers in the period from May 1991 until December 2002. This considerably long research period – more than eleven years – combined with the application of advanced time series techniques, allows to assess the nature of the relationship between real world cues and media coverage reliably. Within this context and the selected time frame, the issue of immigration and integration of minorities is a very interesting research object: it was modestly debated during the last decade of the previous century while especially during 2001 and 2002 it was focus of great political and public attention (Sniderman *et al.*, 2004: 36).

5.3 News content as a reflection of reality?

The present study considers whether news content reflects real world factors, and if so, whether *real world developments* or immigration-related *key-events* are more important in shaping the attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. The average news media consumer merely gets to know about a fraction of all things happening on any given day around the globe. The world is too complex to be fully represented, which leads to an indispensable selection process on the side of the media.ⁱ Journalists, editors, news agencies and also institutional arrangements function as gatekeepers in this selection process. The term ‘gatekeeper’ refers to certain strategically important gates that information has to pass to make it into the news (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). Besides journalists’ personality and social factors, time constraints and the availability of visuals are important aspects for the gate keeping process: ‘News is always produced within a context of numerous and powerful internal and external pressures, which are almost bound to deflect journalism from any ideal goal of recounting “truth”’ (McQuail, 1992: 182).ⁱⁱ

News values determine why some but not other events make in into the news. Galtung and Ruge (1965) note that whatever happens in the real world gets attributed some news value based on the presence of certain news factors that establishes the chance of that event to make it into the news.ⁱⁱⁱ Though being criticized on methodological grounds and also for their focus on events without taking larger political and economic developments into account (Rosengren, 1974), Galtung and Ruge’s study still provides starting ground for most research regarding the relationship between ‘reality’ and news reporting (for other (conceptualizations of) news values, see for example Gans, 1980; Harcup and O’Neill, 2001; Herbert, 2000; Hetherington, 1985).

The question then is what aspect of reality is described and how that very reality influences the media’s depiction of reality. A relevant distinction is whether news coverage of certain issues is led by socio-economic real world developments like economic growth, unemployment, crime rates, level of immigration and public opinion^{iv} or by expected or unexpected key-events, such as elections, disasters or terrorism attacks. Though both the

impact of real world developments and key-events has been object of empirical investigation, no study thus far integrated both into a single design and simultaneously assessed their impact and compared their effects in an over-time perspective.

5.4 The representation in the news of real world developments

Due to the wide range of available indicators, the relationship between real world developments and media coverage is most commonly investigated in the economic realm. Since similar selection processes are likely to be at stake in the present investigation, it is worthwhile to discuss the outcomes of these studies. They show mixed results. Mosley (1984) compares the levels of the official statistics for unemployment, inflation, and the balance of payments with the levels of the same indicators reported in UK newspapers for a period of 21 year. He shows that the reported values frequently differ from the official values and that economic news reporting is more intensive in times of bad economic conditions. An extensive content analysis of US television news between 1982 and 1987 confirms these results (Smith, 1988).

Contrary, Goidel and Langley (1995) analyze the amount and the tone of economic news reports in the New York Times between 1981 and 1992 and conclude that news coverage of the economy reflects changes in economic conditions. These results are in line with Behr and Iyengar (1985), who find a considerable overlap between television news coverage and real world cues for the issues of unemployment and inflation. They conclude that news coverage provides at least a partial reflection of the state of the nation. Sanders, Marsh and Ward (1993) analyze the economic news content of British newspapers for a period of eight years and suggest that the press coverage of the economy is to a considerable degree a reflection of developments in the real world. In their analysis of the relationships between the real economy, press coverage of the economy, and subjective economic assessments, Wu, Stevenson, Chen and Güner (2002) find that news reporting on the economy generally followed economic reality rather than public sentiments. They conclude that when looking at the long run, media are doing quite well in reflecting economic developments.

The moderate relationship between real world developments and media coverage is confirmed by Lubbers et al. (1998) in relation to the subject of the present study. The authors look at the relation between the amount of news on ethnic minorities in Dutch newspapers and the number of asylum applications and residence permits granted with yearly aggregates. Whereas they find virtually no relationship between news coverage and asylum applications, they conclude that media attention paid to ethnic minorities is associated with the trend in residence permits. They show that when the amount of residence permits went up, news coverage about immigration issues increased as well. On a similar vein, Brosius and Esser (1995) find that news coverage to some degree followed violent attacks against foreigners in Germany.^v

Results from these studies are in line with what is concluded by Dearing and Rogers (1996) in their extensive review of agenda setting studies: Real world indicators are sometimes a necessary but certainly not a sufficient explanation of media agenda setting.^{vi} Though their study is limited in terms of time period and data use, Lubbers et al. (1998) provide some indication that for issues related to ethnic minorities this holds indeed. Both the results considering economic issues and those with regards to ethnic minorities might be explained by the fact that negativism can be regarded an important news value (Galtung and Ruge, 1965). This becomes apparent in the fact that in time of recession news reporting about the economy increases (Mosley, 1984). For the present study, which takes into account both the level of immigration and the number of asylum applicants, this leads to the following hypothesis:

- I. Increasing levels of immigration and of the number of asylum applications lead to more attention for immigration and integration in media coverage.

5.5 The relationship between key-events and media reporting

According to Vasterman (2005: 513-514) a key-event can be a genuine event, independent of news coverage, but can also be an incident within the media arena: for example an interview or a disclosure by investigative journalists. Few studies consider the impact of key-events on news reporting and generally demonstrate that events do affect the media attention for the issue coverage (Brosius and Kepplinger, 1990; Daschmann and Brosius, 1999; Kepplinger, 1992; Kepplinger and Habermeier, 1995). Most of this research, however, employs a rather narrow conception of key-events by looking at incidents like natural disasters or disruptions of violence.

The impact of key-events on issue attention is often explained by their prototyping function (Brosius and Eps, 1995). Kepplinger and Habermeier (1995) find certain events, like earthquakes and traffic incidents, leading to more coverage of similar events in the following period, even when the number of incidents has decreased compared to the period before the key-event took place. These empirical findings show a clear relationship between key-events and attention for related issues in media coverage. They, however, only look at short term-effects, taking into account the first weeks after the occurrence of an event.

Vasterman's research on media hypes (2005) yields similar outcomes. He demonstrates that the key-events in his study – violent acts that are labeled 'senseless' by public officials - influence the salience of the violence issue for a longer period of time. However, after a while the effect wears off and attention for the issue returns to its initial levels. Brosius and Eps (1995) find comparable results when studying extreme right violence in Germany. Taking four large impact events in terms of number of victims and degree of violence as a starting point, they conclude that similar events are more likely to be covered than other unrelated events. They suggest that these events serve as *prototypes* for journalists. These prototypes are concrete images that represent events' abstract nature or schemata and transform them into concrete images of objects, persons and incidents.

When events are similar to the high-impact prototype, they are more likely to be covered (see also Bennett and Lawrence, 1995).

In our case one can, for example, expect that after 9/11 events that have some similar characteristics (for instance suicide-bombings committed by Islam extremists) are more likely to receive coverage and that the overall attention for terrorism increases, also in the longer run. Furthermore, not only prototyping is likely to occur, also a form of ‘framing’ might take place: journalists will focus on characteristics of a certain event that are similar to those of previous newsworthy events. In this way, they might after 9/11 increasingly label events as ‘terrorists acts’. Journalists follow certain pre-constructed frames of reference in the coverage of events and these frames of reference might well be influenced by earlier events (Noelle-Neumann and Mathes, 1987: 398).

Using a slightly different terminology, Zillmann and Brosius (2000) discuss *exemplars*, those events that are used to exemplify a larger population of events that has some common characteristics. They argue that in some instances selective exemplification occurs, indicating a clear selection bias. As Zillmann (1999: 70) argues: “recipients give disproportional attention to concrete, often vividly displayed events, especially to those that engage the recipients’ emotions, and this attentional preference comes at the expense of attention to more abstract, comparatively pallidly presented information”. When applied to journalistic choices on what to report or not, exemplification theory suggests that journalists’ choices are strongly event-driven and that they are more likely to present examples of engaging events than abstract figures.

In Chapter 4, several key-events were included in the analysis. In that case, they acted as control variables in the analysis of the relationships between parliament and media. In this chapter, we are more substantially interested in the nature of their impact. We take a broad conception of key-events and include several types of events. We propose making a distinction *unpremeditated events*, *institutional events* and *deliberative events* (see Chapter 4 for a similar classification). This distinction is of exploratory kind and its value will be discussed after the presentation of the results. *Unpremeditated events* are most similar to those events that are taken into account in previous research discussed above. They take place outside the media and are – at least in a long-term perspective - suddenly imposed. Wars, for instance, trigger immigration of refugees to receiving countries as well as public debates on how to handle that situation. Thereby an unanticipated international event can shape news coverage about a very domestic issue such as ethnic minority integration. However, key-events can also have a less abrupt and unexpected character and be embedded in the institutional system of a country (*institutional events*). Parliamentary elections, for example, can change the formal balance of power between various political parties within a democracy, resulting in the formation of new governments and changes in the political agenda. These changes are likely to be, at least partly, reflected by the media agenda (Kleinnijenhuis, 2003; Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006), especially since journalists rely heavily on institutional (often governmental) resources to obtain information (‘indexing’, see Bennett, 1990).^{vii} Finally, a third type of

key-event that might impact issue attention is political and societal actors trying to influence public debate with their arguments and opinion on a given issue (Huckins, 1999). Here, we focus on unconventional or new considerations with reference to immigration and integration issues and classify these attempts as *deliberative events*.

Based on the literature discussed, we can assume key-events to change media attention for issues. Due to the prototype-recognition of journalists, attention for events similar to the prototype increases and thereby indirectly attention for the more general issue at stake goes up. In extreme cases, this might lead to a media hype (Vasterman, 2005). More institutionalized events can change the political agenda that influences the media agenda. This demonstrates the importance of taking into account key-events in addition to earlier-mentioned societal real world developments in a longitudinal design with regard to the real world and media coverage. These considerations lead to the following hypothesis:

- II. Key-events related to immigration and integration increase the attention for immigration and integration in media coverage.

Real world developments and key-events are not completely endogenous. The occurrence of certain events might influence real world developments, like wars triggering asylum applications from certain regions. Vice versa, real world events (like high numbers of immigration) might create a context in which deliberative events are more likely to be successful.^{viii} Therefore, it is hard to disentangle the indirect effects of both, but we are able to compare the direct effects of real world developments with those of events. Based on the moderate influence of real world developments suggested by the studies discussed previously and the importance of key-events, we expect that the *direct* effects of key-events override the importance of *direct* effects of real world indicators. Therefore, our third hypothesis is:

- III. Key-events concerning immigration and integration more strongly influence the intensity of reporting on these issues than extra-media real world developments do.

Subsequently, we will discuss the selection of events for our study and we will formulate exploratory expectations about the type of effect of different events in terms of timing of occurrence and duration. We test our hypotheses for the newspaper coverage of the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in the Netherlands.

5.6 The Dutch case

The issue of immigration and integration has been visible on the political and media agenda in the Netherlands during the entire research period. Though both governmental advisory bodies and politicians have acknowledged problems with the integration of ethnic minorities as early as the late 1980s, Dutch integration policy and ‘multicultural society’ have widely been regarded as successful and as an example for neighboring countries

(Koopmans, 2002; WRR, 1989; Zuwanderungskommission, 2001). There were some opposing opinions though: in the beginning of the nineties the leader of the Dutch Conservative-Liberal party (VVD) Frits Bolkestein gained attention for his claims about the negative social, cultural, and economic impact of migrants on Dutch society and the need for a stricter policy towards migrants. According to Bolkestein migrants should assimilate to Dutch norms and values. He stated that the integration-process was threatened by the tendency of migrants to preserve their own cultures (Bolkestein, 1991). Extreme-right political parties gained seats in national parliament during the 1989 and 1994 general elections (Kleinnijenhuis *et al.*, 1995) and anti-immigration sentiment was present among parts of the Dutch population during this period (Verberk and Felling, 2002). Finally, the problems of the Dutch government to establish effective policies and procedures to deal with comparably high numbers of asylum seekers, especially from the former Yugoslavia, attracted a considerable amount of media attention in the mid-nineties.

Though in general the debate surrounding the issue of immigration and integration of minorities was present during the nineties (especially during election times) (Van Holsteyn and Mudde, 2000), it is said to have really started off with the emergence of populist politician Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 parliamentary election campaign and also due to the 9/11 attacks. Fortuyn succeeded in mobilizing a substantial part of the electorate by, among others, attacking the “backward Islamic culture and the Dutch integration policies” (“Grens Dicht Voor Islamiet”, 2002; Kleinnijenhuis *et al.*, 2003). After his assassination just a week before Election Day, his party LPF gained 26 out of 150 seats in parliament and entered government. Due to disputes and chaos within the party, the LPF did not succeed to retain this support and after only a few months, re-elections took place, in which the party lost 18 of its 26 seats.

5.7 Method

The dependent variable is the attention for the issue of immigration and integration in newspaper coverage. As independent variables we include the level of immigration, the number of asylum applications, the interaction between immigration and asylum seekers, and various key-events.

Media attention for immigration and integration

To obtain data on the intensity of news reporting about immigration and integration we conducted a computer-assisted content analysis of the five most-read Dutch national newspapers (Bakker and Scholten, 2003): *NRC Handelsblad* (1991-2002), *Algemeen Dagblad* (1992-2002), *de Volkskrant* (1995-2002), *Trouw* (1992-2002) and the *Telegraaf* (1998-2002). All articles published in these newspapers are digitally available. Articles were selected using an extensive search string (see Annex 5), containing words and word co-occurrences (see Annex 6) indicating articles dealing with immigration and integration according to the method discussed in Chapter 2. This search resulted in 165,337 articles for

the entire period. The scores per article are aggregated, resulting in monthly attention scores for immigration and integration issues. For months in which, because of digital unavailability, not all newspapers could be analyzed, the scores are weighed to correct for this gap. This approach makes the analysis of large amounts of newspaper articles possible, as is desirable for studies considering media content over a long period of time (Johnston, 2002).

Immigration and asylum applications

The level of immigration is the monthly number of people that moved to the Netherlands. The number of asylum applicants is the monthly number of people registering for asylum in the Netherlands. Monthly data are available from the Dutch governmental statistical institute CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) from May 1991 onwards.

Key-events

We use dummy-variables to capture the effects of key-events. Several events are expected to be influential in determining the intensity of news coverage about immigration and integration. The selection of events, however, deserves special attention. One does not know in advance which events might affect the intensity of immigration and integration news coverage, and looking at the news coverage itself for possibly relevant events can be considered as selecting independent variables because of fluctuations in the dependent variable, which is methodologically inappropriate.^{ix} Therefore, we choose to select our events based on a distinction in types of events and on recent scientific literature (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003; Koopmans, 2002) on the debate surrounding immigration and integration in the Netherlands. We distinguish the three types of key-events that we introduced above. The first type encompasses *institutional events*. Both during the election campaign and as a result of the election outcomes, the attention for the issue of immigration and integration might fluctuate, either because of the extent that it is a politically debated issue during the campaign or because of an increase or decrease in the support for right-wing political parties, which are generally regarded as closely linked to these issues (Van der Brug, 2004). In our research period, we distinguish the *parliamentary elections of 1994, 1998 and 2002*. The 1994 election resulted in a modest victory for the extreme-right party *Centrumdemocraten* (CD). The Conservative-Liberal *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie* (VVD) booked electoral gains in 1998. In 2002, the new populist anti-immigration party *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) won about 17 percent of the votes and entered government together with the VVD and the Christian-Democrats (CDA). We expect the elections of 1998 and 2002 to influence the attention for immigration and integration positively and permanently. After both elections, winning right-wing parties entered government and the political power-base of the government shifted clearly to the right. With this shift, the involvement of government in immigration and integration policies is likely to increase. As Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg (1995) and Kleinnijenhuis (2003) show,

Dutch media outlets tend to follow politics and are therefore likely to pick up this shift, which is translated into increased attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. It may, however, take several months before this increase takes place, because, due to coalition formations, it takes that long before the new government takes office. For the 1994 election, we also anticipate a rise of attention for the issue. We expect an increase in media attention during or shortly after the election campaign, but this effect is likely to wear off quickly. In this election the extreme-right Centrumdemocraten increased their number of seats from one to three, which might have caused a slight increase in attention for the party and its issues, but since this victory did not mean a fundamental change in the political power relations, it is unlikely that the party was able to increase the position of the issue of immigration and integration of minorities on the political agenda permanently. Another reason to expect a positive effect during the campaign relates to the fact that the VVD made the immigration issue central in its 1994 election campaign (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1995).

The second type of key-events encompasses *unpremeditated events*. During the nineties, especially the war in former Yugoslavia is of relevance. We take into account two key-events: The occupation of Srebrenica by the Serbs despite the presence of Dutch UN-soldiers in July 1995 and the NATO-attacks on Kosovo in March 1999. Also 9/11 needs to be considered, since it heated the public debate about the integration of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands dramatically (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003) and this generally sparked (negative) media coverage of Muslims (Hutcheson *et al.*, 2004). We expect unpremeditated events to lead to an abrupt increase in attention for the issue, since the event and the related problem diagnosis is likely to attract media attention immediately. In line with the findings of Vasterman (2005) on media-hypes caused by key-events, we expect that this increase is temporarily, but only wears off slowly, though chapter 4 demonstrates a permanent effect for 9/11.

Our third type of key-events are *deliberative events*. Following Koopmans (2002) and Kleinnijenhuis et al. (2003), we distinguish three incidents. First, in September 1991, in a speech during the Liberal International Conference *Frits Bolkestein*, former leader of the VVD, discussed possible problems with the multicultural society, thereby breaking a taboo hitherto in Dutch society. Second, we distinguish the publication of an influential newspaper article of publicist Paul Scheffer on the *multicultural fiasco*, written in January 2000. Finally, the *interview with Pim Fortuyn* in February 2002, in which he heavily criticized the Islam culture, is included in the analysis. Deliberative events can impact media attention in numerous ways. Here, we only take those into account that are mentioned in the literature as having influenced the debate more substantially. If they have a permanent effect, however, we would expect that this effect is rather on the way in which an issue is discussed than on the issue attention. For issue attention we expect only temporarily effects: controversial statements increase the general discourse around an issue for some time and though new views might be adopted by media or other actors, we have no reason to assume that this will lead to a permanent increase in issue attention (see also

the results of chapter 4). Since the deliberative event is directly reported in media coverage and it is likely to provoke immediate reactions, the influence on issue attention is in general taking place abruptly. In some instances, however, it may take some time before the debate really ‘takes off’ and increases issue attention significantly.

5.8 Analysis

For our analysis we rely on ARIMA models (see Chapter 2). To ensure normality of our variables, we tested for skewness (whether the variable is asymmetrical distributed around its mean) and kurtosis (measuring the peakedness of the distribution) for each of our interval variables. Doornik and Hanssen (1994) developed a combined test for this (E_p) that resembles a chi-square distribution. The results presented in Table 5.1 suggest that we have to reject the null-hypothesis of a normal distribution for each of our variables. We decided to take the natural log of these variables, for which the test indicates a normal distribution (see Table 5.1). Though such a log-transformation changes the nature of the series (it especially ‘flattens’ the peaks in the variables) and it results in estimated effect sizes that are less straightforward to interpret, it is an often-applied strategy when dealing with this kind of data. Research has shown that it is nevertheless possible to assess effects of independent variables on the dependent variable (see Clarke *et al.*, 1994).

Furthermore, a Box-Jenkins analysis can only be processed if all variables in the model have stationary means and variances. To test this, we use the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test suggest that for all of our interval variables the null hypothesis of the absence of a unit root needs to be rejected (Table 5.1) and therefore, the series need to be differenced. It is then also necessary to difference the series that indicate the key-events.^x The Dickey-Fuller tests on the differenced variables suggest that they are stationary (Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Diagnostic characteristics of the variables, period May 1991- December 2002

Variable	E_p -test for normality original series	E_p -test for normality log-transformed series	Dickey Fuller test log-transformed series	Dickey Fuller test log-transformed, differenced series
News on immigration	102.00	1.45‡	-3.16	-10.79*
Immigration	12.22	1.43‡	-0.98	-3.93*
Number of asylum seekers	10.56	5.16‡	-2.14	-5.31*

Note: ‡ indicates normality ($p < 0.05$); * indicates absence of unit root ($p < 0.01$).


The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions for the transformed series suggest negative moving averages at lags 1 and 2. We test whether autocorrelation in the residuals is absent using the Ljung-Box’s Q statistic. In our case, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of autocorrelation, indicating that the model is well specified.

Finally, we test whether for ARCH-errors using the Lagrange Multiplier test (Engle, 1982). The Ljung-Box Q test suggests no autocorrelation in the squared residuals (Table 5.1) and the Lagrange Multiplier test indicates no ARCH-errors at any lag, indicating the absence of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and validating our choice for an ARIMA-model instead of an ARCH-model. After establishing the correct univariate specification, we analyze three models: one encompassing the variables indicating real world developments, the second encompassing the events and the third encompassing both. This allows to not only look at the effects of the different types of independent variables, but also at the explanatory power of the different models (Residuals Means Square) as well as their goodness of fit (Akaike Info Criterion). Thereby, we can establish whether *real world developments* or *key-events* drive issue attention. Based on our predictions about the nature of the influence of the various events, we allow the lag of the effects of parliamentary elections to range between minus one and three months, so it can occur both during the last weeks of the election campaign and the months afterwards. For the effect of international events, we allow a maximum lag of one month, for deliberative events, a maximum of two months. While we model the effects of real world developments as linear, the impact of key-events can take several forms as illustrated in Figure 5.1. Effects can occur gradually as well as abruptly and can be permanent, temporary or gradually declining. In all cases, an impact parameter will be distinguished (in the example this is 0.5) that indicates the maximum magnitude of the effect. Furthermore, in the case of gradual effects an adjustment parameter will be calculated, indicating at which speed this magnitude is reached or disappears.^{xi}

5.9 Real world developments versus events

Before turning to the statistical analyses we shortly focus on the dynamics of the variables. Immigration level was relatively high in the early 1990s, while it decreases from 1994 onwards. From 1996 immigration is again rising steadily until 2001, when they decrease again. The number of asylum applicants shows a somewhat different pattern, with peaks in 1994 and 1999, while decreasing steadily since 1999 (see Figure 5.2).

Figure 5.1 Different types of interventions



Note: In all cases the impact parameter is 0.5. In case of gradual interventions, the adjustment parameter is 0.25.

The attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in newspapers increased throughout the years. Immigration issues had a relatively low salience until late 1997 (see also Lubbers *et al.*, 2002; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000). Thereafter the attention for the issues increased moderately until 2001, after which there is a rather steep incline with considerable fluctuation in 2001/2002 (see Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.2 Immigration and number of asylum applications in the Netherlands





Figure 5.3 Attention for immigration and integration in Dutch newspapers



We now turn to our first model, testing the impact of the immigration level and the number of asylum applicants (Table 5.2, Model A). The analysis shows no influence of the number of asylum applicants on news coverage. The immigration level only has a modest influence at a lag of six months. Also the interaction of immigration and number of asylum seekers yields no significant effect. Real world developments in immigration and asylum applications do not have a great impact on the attention for immigration and integration.

Table 5.2 Influence of social-economic real world developments and key-events on media attention for immigration and integration; period May 1991- December 2002

Predictor	Model A Coefficient	T-value	Model B Coefficient	T-value	Model C Coefficient	T-value
Moving average (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.42***	-4.96	-0.47***	-5.43	-0.48***	-5.50
Moving average (<i>t-2</i>)	-0.22**	-2.53	-0.26***	-2.91	-0.26***	-2.84
Immigration (<i>t-6</i>)	0.25**	2.03	†		0.23**	1.99
<u>Unpremeditated events</u>						
Srebrenica ¹	†		0.32**	1.83	0.36**	2.05
Kosovo (<i>t-1</i>) ¹	†		0.31**	1.75	0.31**	1.76
9/11 ³	†		0.77***	4.10	0.79***	4.22
δ			0.77***	6.11	0.75***	5.72
<u>Institutional events</u>						
Elections 1994 ¹	†		-0.42***	-2.39	-0.43***	-2.44
Elections 1998 (<i>t-3</i>) ²	†		0.28**	1.86	0.26**	1.76
Election 2002 (<i>t-3</i>) ²	†		0.44***	2.47	0.38**	2.14
<u>Deliberative events</u>						
Bolkestein (<i>t-1</i>) ²	†		0.53***	3.52	0.50***	3.35
Interview Fortuyn (<i>t-2</i>) ¹	†		0.24*	1.36	0.23*	1.32
RMS	7.00		5.19		5.03	
Akaike Info Criterion	-2.95		-3.13		-3.15	
Ljung-Box Q (30)	33.40‡		26.25‡		27.48‡	
N	139		139		139	

Note: Not significant variables are left out the analysis: number of asylum seekers; interaction immigration* asylum seekers; Scheffer's multicultural fiasco. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (1-tailed); † variable not included in model; ‡ indicates absence of correlation in residuals (p < 0.05); ¹ effect is abrupt and temporarily; ² effect is abrupt and permanent; ³ effect is temporarily and gradual declining

The second model (Table 5.2, Model B) only includes the various key-events. All events, except for the publication of Scheffer's multicultural fiasco essay, have a significant impact, though different in strength and form. We first turn to the *institutional events*. The 1994 parliamentary election, at which the extreme-right Centrumdemocraten had electoral success, has a remarkable negative impact, though lasting only for one month. This effect occurred in the same month as the election and it might well reflect a decrease in attention after a campaign in which the issue received considerable attention (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1995). As we expected, both the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002 yield a positive and lasting effect. With the VVD in 1998 and the LPF in 2002, right-wing parties gained electoral support, which arguably enabled them to get their issues, among which immigration and integration, on the media agenda. This took some time, however, as suggested by lags of 3 months in both cases. As argued before, this is possibly caused by the fact that in both instances the winning parties entered coalition negotiations after the election and only after some time entered government.

Second, and confirming our expectations, the *unpremeditated events* all have a temporal influence on the attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. The two key-events dealing with the war in former Yugoslavia have a moderate impact at small lags. This impact however, does not last longer than one month. 9/11 has a significant and direct strong impact, causing a 115 percent increase in issue attention,^{xii} that declines only slowly over-time. Third, the consequences of *deliberative events* differ. Both attempts of Bolkestein and Fortuyn to influence the public discourse were successful. The effect of Bolkestein's speech was quite large and permanent, while the effect of the interview with Fortuyn had been modest and temporarily with a lag of two months. Scheffer did not succeed to change the amount of attention for the issue. The explanatory power of model B than that of model A, with the Residual Means Square (RMS) being 7.00 and 5.19 respectively. Also the goodness of fit of the second model is better, indicated by a lower AIC of -3.13 compared to -2.95.

Finally, we test the all-inclusive model, including both real world developments and key-events (Table 5.2, Model C). Results from the previous models remain unchanged with all independent variables having roughly the same impact. Taking both real world developments and events into account results in the best model in terms of explanatory power (RMS is 5.03) and similar goodness of fit compared to the event-model (AIC is -3.15). Obviously, key-events have a much larger direct impact, but both real world developments and key-events matter when explaining the intensity of coverage about immigration and integration.

The results are partly different from those of Chapter 4. However, we contend that these differences are largely (statistical) artifacts rather than indicating substantial differences. First, here we find positive effects of the parliamentary elections of 1998 and 2002, while in Chapter 4, no significant influence is established. This can be the consequence of the inclusion of the parliamentary agenda in the model of chapter 4 or the different way the issue attention is measured. In this chapter we have included a wider

range of articles, while in the previous chapter a more specific set of articles was used. Another difference is the effect of 9/11, which was modeled as being permanent in the previous chapter, while here we find a slowly decaying effect. This is likely to be a consequence of the employed method: the ARIMA-framework is better able of capturing the changing consequences of events over-time. Finally, in Chapter 4 we found Scheffer to influence issue attention temporarily, while this effect did not show up in this chapter. This is again likely to be a consequence of the way attention is measured: the consequences of Scheffer's multicultural fiasco on the overall attention are limited, but if we look at the number of framing acts that is measuring more specifically the *national debate* we find an increase in the intensity of the debate.

5.10 Towards a typology of event-effects

We distinguished three types of key-events: institutional, unpremeditated, and deliberate events. We consider it an asset of this study to be able to consider whether the various events show specific patterns in terms of how they affect the intensity of the immigration and integration issue. For each type of event, Table 5.3 provides a description of the effect in terms of direction, duration and timing of occurrence.

Table 5.3 A classification of the effects of various key-events

Characteristic	Examples	Type of effect
<i>Institutional events</i>		
Election campaign: gains small extreme-right party	Elections 1994	Negative, temporarily, direct
Election campaign: gains larger right party, (re-)entering government	Elections 1998, Elections 2002	Positive, permanent, after few months
<i>Unpremeditated events</i>		
International crises	Srebrenica, Kosovo, 9/11	Positive, temporarily, direct (sometimes pulse decay)
<i>Deliberative events</i>		
Prominent actors trying to influence public debate	Bolkestein, Scheffer, Fortuyn	Various

In general, the effects do not occur gradually, but abruptly, though this might be well after a few months. However, we should use the word 'abrupt' with some caution when dealing with monthly data: it might well be that within a month there is some gradual increase in

intensity, which cannot be captured here. Some remarkable differences can be observed when looking at the various types of event effects.

In the case of institutional events, we see a somewhat mixed picture. As has been noted above, the distinguished elections were very different in terms of the course of the campaign as well as in terms of the outcomes. In the case of the 1994 election, the extreme-right Centrumdemocraten gained several seats in parliament, but the party and its main issue were largely neglected by the other parties (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1995), and apparently also news media avoided covering this issue in the month after the election. However, when more moderate right-wing parties are successful and enter government, they seem to be capable of influencing the media attention for the issue permanently, probably by making this issue more important in policy making and indirectly more relevant for journalists.

Overall, the effects of unpremeditated events occur directly and are, as we expected, temporary, even the effect of 9/11, though in that case the effect only declines at a very slow rate. All these events can be regarded as newsworthy as soon as they occur, but they lose their newsworthiness after a while. This type of events is not capable of permanently changing the selection and prototyping processes of journalists.

With regards to prominent actors trying to influence the public debate (deliberative events), we see very mixed results. Certain news values might influence the newsworthiness of the public actor and his or her opinion (e.g., reference to elite-persons, personalization). The success of public actors in getting (permanent) attention for their opinions and issues in the media depends on all kind of factors and dynamics (Koopmans, 2004), which makes it very difficult to explain why some messages do penetrate the public debate and others not. In our specific case, the successes of both Bolkestein and Fortuyn are often attributed to their charismatic performance (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). In general, the political and societal attention for their statements might have lead to a change in journalists' prototypes (Brosius and Eps, 1995), creating opportunities for other actors to get media coverage concerning the same issue.

5.11 Conclusion

The present study investigates the influence of several real world developments and key-events on newspapers' attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. Both the long period under investigation and the application of advanced time series analysis have contributed to the reliability of our results. They show a limited direct influence of real world developments, while events generally have a stronger direct impact. The results suggest that key-events are more likely to pass the news threshold and might indeed function as journalistic prototypes for longer periods of time. Real world developments are regarded as less newsworthy: the fact that for instance the number of asylum applicants is high does not necessarily mean that media actors regard the issue of immigration and integration of minorities as more relevant. Furthermore it is shown that

variation in the type and the duration of effects of various events can be partly attributed to specific event characteristics. Unpremeditated events have an abrupt and temporary or slowly declining impact, while effects of most institutional events take longer to capitalize, but they have a permanent nature. The influence of deliberative events, in which case prominent actors try to influence the public debate, is harder to predict and both characteristics of the source and the message are likely to determine the outcome in terms of increased issue attention. The question how these characteristics and the way they interact influence the attention for the broader issue is an intriguing and interesting one, which deserves further research.

We have explored the intriguing relationship between real world factors and issue coverage intensity and have provided clues concerning the different effects of key-events and real world developments. The study carries some potential shortcomings in terms of data used: other (unavailable) trend data like crime and unemployment rates for immigrants could influence the attention for immigration and integration. Another concern is the dependent variable: the study looks only at the attention for immigration and integration in media coverage and in future research it would be beneficial to make finer distinctions in terms of different aspects of news coverage (framing) and evaluative elements. Another interesting point that remains largely unaddressed in this chapter is which (deliberative) events make it into the news and have considerable impact on news coverage. Here, we selected those events that other scholars have regarded as important. To be able to address this question more fully, one needs to have an overview of all deliberative attempts by certain groups of actors. Here, for example press releases issued by political parties and societal organizations might offer an opportunity to have at least a more elaborate selection of deliberative attempts. Finally and related, including a measure of the political agenda and possible other societal agendas would enrich our understanding of how media-coverage comes about and might be more suitable to capture the effects of heightened issue attention during election times (now captured by institutional events) or deliberative attempts (now captured by deliberative events). The slightly different results of Chapter 4 indicate that including the political agenda can indeed make a difference.

Furthermore, future research should move beyond the issue of immigration and integration to test whether the patterns and relationships found here also hold for other issues, such as for instance the environment or certain domestic policy issues. Such studies would enable us to draw firmer conclusions about the general impact of events and real world developments.

We have made a first attempt to come up with a typology of event effects. We have approached this question in a rather open manner and have interpreted our conclusions accordingly. In this way, we believe that we have given a preliminary answer to a largely neglected question in the communication literature and that we have contributed to the revitalization of the debate on the relation between the real world and media coverage.

Chapter 6. Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigrant Parties: The Role of News Media Content⁴

6.1 Abstract

Anti-immigrant populism is on the rise throughout Western Europe. Traditionally, economic and immigration-related factors are used to explain support for anti-immigrant parties at the aggregate level. Until recently, however, the role of news media, has received only limited attention. The present study assesses the power of news content as explanatory contextual factor, simultaneously controlling for the unemployment rate, the level of immigration, and leadership. The results show that the attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in national newspapers has a significant and positive impact: The more news media reported about immigration-related topics, the higher the aggregate share of vote intention for anti-immigrant parties, even when controlling for real world developments. Future research explaining anti-immigrant party success needs to take into account the role of news media content.

6.2 Introduction

A vast number of European and Australasian democracies witnessed electoral success of right-wing anti-immigrant parties throughout the past two decades (Betz, 1994; Eatwell and Mudde, 2004; Fennema, 2004; Norris, 2005). Whereas in some countries these parties emerged and largely disappeared again, such as One Nation in Australia, or the Republikaner in Germany, in other countries they made a rather successful entrance into the party system, such as the Freiheitlich Partei Österreich (FPÖ) in Austria or the Vlaams Blok in Belgium. Factors contributing to the success of anti-immigrant parties have been object of heated popular and scientific debate. We argue that an important point has been largely neglected in previous analyses: the role of media content. Previous explanations focus either on the level of the individual voter (Betz, 1994; Eatwell and Mudde, 2004; Fennema, 2004; Norris, 2005) or on the macro level, considering contextual factors (Andersen and Evans, 2003; Betz, 1994; Givens, 2002; Golder, 2003b, 2003a; Ignazi, 2002; Jackman and Volpert, 1996; Kitschelt, 1995; Lubbers et al., 2002). The present study looks at the latter to explain the dynamics in electoral success of anti-immigrant populist parties. Only recently news media content has been adopted as an independent contextual factor (e.g. Mazzoleni *et al.*, 2003; Walgrave and De Swert, 2004). We contribute to existing literature by improving upon previously employed methodology and more importantly by demonstrating

⁴ This chapter is based on Boomgaarden, H. G., & Vliegenthart, R. (2007) Explaining the Rise of Anti-Immigrant Parties: The Role of News Media Content. *Electoral Studies*, 26(2), 404-417.

the importance of news media content as explanatory factor, whilst controlling for other real world factors and developments.

Previous macro-level studies consider three sets of variables: economic variables, most notably the unemployment rate, immigration-related variables, and electoral system variables, such as the number of political parties or the threshold to enter parliament. However, until recently the literature largely ignored an important factor that accounts for dynamics in public opinion towards and electoral support for anti-immigrant populist parties, which is the mass media. As stated by Blumler (2003: xvi) ‘any future attempt to analyze populism without taking into account [...] “the media factor” will be severely incomplete’. By focusing on particular issues and by providing public space for the core issues of anti-immigrant populist parties, the news media intentionally or unintentionally provide an information environment in which electoral support for these parties increases (see also Billiet *et al.*, 1993). We further consolidate the argument of the importance of taking news media content into account when explaining the popularity of anti-immigrant populist parties. Only a small number of previous studies consider the impact of media (Jagers and Walgrave, 2003; Mazzoleni *et al.*, 2003; Walgrave and De Swert, 2004).

The present study investigates the impact of news content to explain the rise of anti-immigrant parties in the Netherlands while simultaneously controlling for the influence of the state of the economy, the level of immigration and the leadership of Pim Fortuyn. Over a period of thirteen years we assess the influence of the different variables on vote intention for anti-immigrant parties. Thereby, we provide a rigid test of whether news media content can be held partly responsible for the rise of these parties. The Netherlands is an interesting case to consider. The country witnessed rather modest success of anti-immigrant parties during the 1990s and a dramatic increase and subsequent decrease of support throughout the years 2001/2002, thereby offering the opportunity to test whether causal relations hold in situations of different levels of anti-immigrant party support.

6.3 The dependent variable: Support for anti-immigrant parties

Our dependent variable is support for anti-immigrant populist parties in the form of vote intention measured in public opinion surveys. Since our analysis stretches over a period of 13 years, we are dealing with a varying set of parties throughout the years. The terminology used to describe parties on the far right of the political spectrum is rather inconsistent, unclear and confusing. Previous literature speaks about extreme right, right-wing, radical right, anti-immigrant, racist, neo-fascist, populist or neo-populist parties, oftentimes without providing clear definitions and failing to distinguish between different conceptualizations (for an exception, see Golder, 2003b, 2003a). Fennema (1997; , 2004) refers to parties in this party family as anti-immigrant parties. He argues that ‘the general overlap between protest, racist and extreme-right parties lies – obviously – in the fact that they all attack the government’s migration policy’ (Fennema, 1997: 489) and that ‘one thing they all share in common is resentment against migrants’ (Fennema, 1997: 474).ⁱ For

the Dutch case, we identify three parties that share the characteristics set out above. Subsequently, we provide information on the history and development of the three Dutch anti-immigrant parties that are at the core of our analysis.

The Centrumpartij (CP)

The CP was founded in 1980. It gained one seat in parliament in the 1982 national election, but has not had any members in parliament since 1986 and did not take part in the 2002 election anymore. The CP established itself as an openly racist and xenophobic party, making use of traditional tactics of extreme-right parties, for instance promoting a party program called “Eigen Volk Eerst” (own people first). Most prominent member in the early 1980’s was Hans Janmaat, who was forced to resign as chairman in 1984. He then founded the CD, which is seen as the beginning of the end of the CP. The party further radicalized throughout the years and ever more clearly promoted racist and national-socialist points of view (see also Lucardie, 1998).

The Centrumdemocraten (CD)

The CD was founded by Hans Janmaat in 1984. Whereas the CP sought further radicalization, the CD tried to establish itself as a more moderate right-wing party, still adhering to the principles of racism and xenophobia, however, in a more disguised way. In the national elections in 1989 and 1994, the CD won one and three seats respectively in parliament (out of a total of 150 seats). During that time, the party gained over seventy seats in regional and local elections as well. 1994 was the party’s most successful year, when pre-election polls predicted up to eight seats in the then upcoming election. The CD disappeared from parliament in 1998 and did not take part in the 2002 election. Janmaat died in 2002, which was believed to be the end of the CD (see also Lucardie, 1998).

The Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF)

The LPF signifies the most recent and most dramatic upsurge of anti-immigrant populism in Dutch party politics. In November 2001, Pim Fortuyn became the leader of the moderate, traditionalist new party Leefbaar Nederland (LN) for the upcoming election in 2002. After controversial statements about the Dutch constitution and Islam, Fortuyn was forced to resign and one day later founded his own party, the LPF. Focusing among others on issues such as asylum-seekers and immigration and the preservation of Dutch culture and values, the LPF quickly gained support among the population. Fortuyn was assassinated nine days before Election Day in May 2002. His party did take part in the election, won 26 seats in parliament and joined a three-party government coalition with the Christian Democrats and the Conservative-Liberals. After only a few months the coalition government collapsed, mainly due to internal struggles within the LPF. In the subsequent election in January 2003, the party was able to regain only eight seats and is part of the opposition since (see also Couwenberg, 2004).ⁱⁱ

6.4 The independent variable: Why news content matters

Support for anti-immigrant parties in the Netherlands is volatile and greatly fluctuated throughout the research period. The aim of this study is to establish the degree to which news media contribute to these fluctuations. We believe that most previous macro-level approaches to explain the rise of anti-immigrant parties have missed an important factor by ignoring the information environment provided by news media. Mazzoleni (2003: 2) states ‘the scholarly literature about populism has paid very limited attention to the contribution of the media, especially the news media, to the surge of populism’.ⁱⁱⁱ

Investigating Austrians’ political orientations and news media use, Plasser and Ulram (2003) find a correlation between peoples’ fear of foreigners and the use of tabloid style newspapers. They conclude that the FPÖ more than other parties ‘must try to guide the media agenda and manage political and social issues in an active way, and to direct public attention to its own framing of problems’ (Plasser and Ulram, 2003: 40). Their analysis of news content that would contribute to such a relationship, however, remains descriptive and their statistical analyses are rather weak. Similarly, when analyzing the success of the Front Nationale in France, Birenbaum and Villa (2003) argue that Le Pen’s success was primarily based upon his ability to influence the political debate by bringing up themes and issues that were not present on the domestic political agenda.

Stewart, Mazzoleni, and Horsfield (2003) conclude that “media factors” do play a vital role in the emergence and development of neo-populist parties. They argue that news media when selecting stories lean to choose those issues that are known to appeal to the public, and that especially Austrian, French, Italian, Australian and Canadian outlets ‘tended to report (sometimes favorably, mostly critically) on the anti-immigration (and anti-immigrant) policies of the neo-populist movements’ (Stewart et al., 2003: 226). In the present study we are not particularly interested in the valence of news reporting but rather in the attention for immigration issues in the media. We expect that attention for the issue of immigration and integration affects the publics’ cognitive accessibility of this issue. We believe that news media coverage highlighting immigration issues as politically and socially important significantly contributes to the success of anti-immigrant populism.

Walgrave and de Swert (2004) investigate the impact of media coverage on support for the Vlaams Blok for the period between 1991 and 2000. Their theoretical framework is twofold: ‘By combining the issue ownership thesis with agenda setting theory the media can be considered as affecting voting behavior.’ (Walgrave and De Swert, 2004: 482). Concerning issue ownership, Walgrave and De Swert conducted an analysis of the Vlaams Blok party manifestos, yielding four main issues the party focuses upon, Flemish nationalism, immigration, anti-politics, and crime policy. Three newspapers and two television newscasts were analyzed to assess the attention for the four issues related to the Vlaams Blok. Walgrave and de Swert (2004) demonstrate a strong association between the success of the Vlaams Blok and media coverage of the party’s themes. Similarly, Karapın

(2002) argues that a high publicity and public attention for immigration issues contributed to the success of radical right parties in Germany in the 1990s. As acknowledged by Walgrave and de Swert (2004: 496) their study falls short of controlling for real world indicators and has to rely on unsatisfying data concerning voting intention. Building upon their theoretical framework, the present study deals with these shortcomings and provides more evidence of the proposed relationship in a different context.

We contend that anti-immigration themes are at the core of Dutch anti-immigrant parties and their voters' interests (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 1995). Therefore, we consider it most relevant to look at news media coverage of the issue of immigration and integration and its impact on support for anti-immigration parties. We rely upon the theoretical framework provided by Walgrave and de Swert (2004). On the one hand we argue that the attention for the immigration issue in the news sets the public's agenda (Dearing and Rogers, 1996; McCombs and Shaw, 1972). An increase in attention would accordingly lead to an electorate that considers the immigration issue as problematic and important to be dealt with. Anti-immigrant populist parties focus on just these issues. The issue ownership hypothesis argues that certain parties own certain issues and that people feel drawn to a certain party when they believe it can deal with the issue at stake more effectively than other parties. It is about issues that confer an advantage in order to prime their salience in the decisional calculus of voters' (Petrocik et al., 2002: 599; see also Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996; see for a recent adjustment Van der Brug, 2004). Therefore immigration issue attention in media, in combination with the ownership of the issue by the anti-immigrant parties, influences people to support and vote for those parties (Walgrave and De Swert, 2004: 481-483).

Dutch newspapers are independent from political parties. Since witnessing a strong move towards depillarization in the 1960s and 70s, the Dutch media system is characterized by a rather autonomously acting press, without partisan alignment or endorsements and showing high internal pluriformity in terms of content (Van der Eijk, 2000: 329; see also Hallin and Mancini, 2004).^{iv} Therefore we believe newspapers to be independent in their coverage of political news, deciding what to cover based on news values and audience demands, but not based on party political pressures. This is not to say that the news does not pick up on issues brought to the forefront by political actors, however, the press exercises great freedom in making the choice whether to report on what is being said and thereby contributes independently to formation of audience agendas.

6.5 Controlling for unemployment, immigration, and leadership

The utilitarian perspective on support for anti-immigrant parties emphasizes the impact of *economic factors*. At the individual-level, it is assumed that a person's economic position, such as occupational status, class membership, income (Betz, 1994; Van der Brug *et al.*, 2000; Givens and Luedtke, 2004; Iversflaten, 2002; Lewis-Beck and Mitchell II, 1993), or individuals' evaluations of their personal or the national economic situation (Lewis-Beck

and Mitchell II, 1993; Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003) can influence support for anti-immigrant parties. An unfavorable economic situation makes people more likely to turn against foreigners or immigrants based on a belief that these groups threaten economic security (see also Sniderman *et al.*, 2000). This sentiment against foreigners then translates into support for anti-immigrant parties. At the aggregate level, some studies find a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and support for anti-immigrant parties (e.g. Anderson, 1996; Jackman and Volpert, 1996). Recent studies, however, argue that unemployment rates only matter in times when immigration levels are high: only the interaction term between unemployment and immigration yields a positive relationship with support (Golder, 2003b, 2003a; Jesuit and Mahler, 2004; for contradicting evidence see Knigge, 1998). We do include both the unemployment rate and the interaction term between unemployment and immigration in our model.

Immigration related variables also prominently feature the literature. At the individual-level, the personal contact hypothesis would predict that frequent contact to foreigners reduces negative attitudes towards them (Allport, 1954; see also Ray, 1983), so that people living in a country/area with many foreigners should be less prejudiced and therefore less likely to support right-wing parties. On the other hand, it could be assumed that a high number of foreigners living in a country can make citizens more likely to see them as competitors on, for instance, the job or housing market. Accordingly, it is argued that people are more likely to develop anti-immigrant sentiment, therefore might be more susceptible to arguments by right-wing parties and thus more inclined to support and vote for them.

At the aggregate level, some studies demonstrate a positive relationship between the number of foreigners or immigrants and anti-immigrant party support (Givens, 2002; Golder, 2003b, 2003a; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002), whereas others provide contrary results (Jesuit and Mahler, 2004). Golder has shown the positive effect of immigration levels on support for populist parties: 'higher levels of immigration always help populist parties' (Golder, 2003b: 460). Many studies confirm the positive relationship using a range of different indicators, such as the number of foreigners or non-Western residents living in a country or the number of asylum seekers (Anderson, 1996; Givens, 2002; Knigge, 1998; Lubbers *et al.*, 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001; Pfaller, 2002). This study uses the monthly level of immigration.^v

In addition to these contextual control variables, we include a Fortuyn specific *leadership* measure. Generally, literature on voting behavior suggests effects of leadership strength, charisma and personalization of politics on citizens' votes (e.g. Aarts, 2001; Kaase, 1994). Husband (1998) has taken this concept to explain electoral success of extreme right parties (see also Eatwell (2003) and Madsen and Snow (1991)). Lubbers *et al.* (2002) empirically test the argument using expert ratings from various countries categorizing the strength of charisma of anti-immigrant party leaders. They show that strong leadership (in combination with a strong party organization) significantly and

positively influences voting for the extreme right (for conflicting evidence, see Van der Brug and Mughan, 2007).

Particularly for the period of Fortuyn, it is important to take leadership quality into account. Research on media coverage during the 2002 campaign showed that, when compared to other political actors, Pim Fortuyn alone received approximately 25 percent of the coverage (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). The authors state that ‘Fortuyn was the party, and the party was Fortuyn’ (p. 79). Any analysis dealing with populist parties in the Netherlands without taking into account the effects of Fortuyn’s performance is, at least, incomplete (see also Couwenberg, 2004; Pennings and Keman, 2003). The present study does not consider other party leaders for two reasons. First, Fortuyn was regarded as far more competent by the Dutch population than any other previous populist party leader and during the 1990s, Janmaat was arguably considerably less visible and appealing than Fortuyn in the short period in 2001 and 2002 (Van der Brug and Mughan, 2007). Second, the entrance of Janmaat into the party system falls outside our research period, and his death stood at the end of an already long decline in popularity of his party. Therefore, only Fortuyn’s entrance into and his disappearance from the political system are taken into account.

6.6 Additional factors

Recent studies show *political or electoral opportunity structures*, thus the openness of a political system for new party actors, to matter for anti-immigrant party support (e.g. Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; Van der Brug *et al.*, 2005). Arzheimer and Carter (2006) distinguish long-term institutional variables, like the disproportionality of the electoral system, medium-term party system variables, such as parties’ ideological positions, and short-term contextual variables. Due to our single-country research design, long-term institutional variables do not vary at all and accordingly cannot be put to test here. Short-term variables encompass both immigration and unemployment levels, which are already included in the research design. We make a first attempt to consider party system factors in a longitudinal study by testing the effects of party’s position on immigration issues. Due to our single-country focus, however, little variation in this set of independent measures is to be expected and therefore, anticipated effects are unlikely to materialize.

In addition to contextual variables also *individuals’ predispositions* have been shown to explain support for anti-immigrant parties. The most important attitudinal variables relate to individuals’ levels of prejudice towards immigrants or anti-immigration sentiments (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002; e.g. Van der Brug and Fennema, 2003) and to political discontent (Bélanger and Aarts, 2006). Socio-demographic factors, such as gender, age, and education (e.g. Lubbers et al., 2002) and occupational (or class) status (e.g. Kitschelt, 1995) also influence individuals’ likelihood to vote for an anti-immigrant party. Data on these attitudinal and socio-demographic measures at regular time points, however, are either not available (e.g., anti-immigration attitudes) or do not have sufficient variance on an

aggregate level (e.g., gender). Therefore we have to refrain from putting these considerations to test in the present model.

6.7 Hypotheses

In accordance with the literature reviewed above, we formulate the following hypotheses concerning the effects of alternative explanations for support for anti-immigrant populist parties other than media content.

- I. The unemployment rate positively influences support for anti-immigrant populist parties only in times when immigration is high. Unemployment has no main effect on anti-immigrant party support.
- II. The level of immigration positively influences support for anti-immigration parties.
- III. The entrance of Fortuyn into the political system positively influences and his disappearance after his assassination negatively influences support for anti-immigrant parties.

Concerning news media content, we expect that an emphasis on the core issue of anti-immigrant populist parties will influence public support for those parties (Walgrave & de Swert, 2004). We focus on immigration issues in the news as such and immigration coverage that relates to the economy (referred to as economic news in an immigration frame). Thereby we can directly assess the differential impact of real world data on immigration and immigration and the economy on the one hand, and news reporting about just these issues on the other hand.

- IVa. The media attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities positively influences support for anti-immigration parties.
- IVb. The media attention for the economy in an immigration frame positively influences support for anti-immigration parties.

6.8 Methods

Attention for immigration news and for economic news in an immigration frame

To obtain data on the media attention for immigration we conducted a computer-assisted content analysis of the five most-read Dutch national newspapers (Bakker and Scholten, 2003): *NRC Handelsblad* (1990-2002), *Algemeen Dagblad* (1992-2002), *de Volkskrant* (1995-2002), *Trouw* (1992-2002) and the *Telegraaf* (1998-2002). All articles published in these newspapers are digitally available. Articles were selected using an extensive search string (see Annex 5), containing words indicating articles dealing with immigration and integration. This search resulted in 168,240^{vi} articles for the whole period. Within our sample we searched for more specific word combinations (see Annex 6) and for those articles mentioning economic terms in order to obtain data on the frequency of articles that

deal with economic issues in an immigration frame. Attention is operationalized by calculating a score for all the articles as described in Chapter 2.

The scores per article are aggregated resulting in monthly attention scores for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. For months in which, because of electronic availability, not all newspapers could be analyzed, the scores are weighted to correct for this gap. The same procedure is followed when estimating the attention for economic issue in an immigration frame. Though we acknowledge the deficiencies related to the use of automatic content analysis (Althaus *et al.*, 2001), we believe that for our purposes it presents an appropriate strategy, since we only deal with attention and not with tone or direction of the news. Prior research has shown that the intensity of reporting – as opposed to the tone of the coverage – can be measured appropriately using similar computer-assisted methods (Johnston, 2002). Furthermore, such an approach makes the analysis of large amounts of newspaper articles possible, as is desirable for studies considering media content over a long period in time.

Level of immigration, unemployment rate, and Fortuyn

The level of immigration is the monthly number of people that moved to the Netherlands. Unemployment rate is measured as the percentage of the total labor force with seasonal fluctuations removed. Data are available from the Dutch governmental statistical institute CBS from 1990 onwards. We use two dummy-variables to capture the effects of the Fortuyn's leadership, one for his entrance in the political arena as party leader of LN in November 2001 and one for his assassination in May 2002.^{vii}

Political opportunity

Concerning party-related political opportunity variables we tested the effects of ideological positions of the mainstream right party (the VVD) and the degree of convergence in party positions between mainstream parties on this issue (Arzheimer and Carter, 2006). We draw upon data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge *et al.*, 2001) and for both variables construct a measure based on the party's policies on multiculturalism, which is the category most closely related to the issue of immigration and integration of minorities.

Support for anti-immigrant populist parties

Support for anti-immigrant populist parties is the percentage of people that reported intending to vote for one of the following parties when asked for their vote choice if parliamentary elections were held next Sunday. We consider the Centrumdemocraten (CD), the Centrum Partij (CP), and the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) as anti-immigrant populist parties. Furthermore, we regard Leefbaar Nederland (LN) during the months of Fortuyn's party leadership. Data were made available by the opinion poll institute TNO-NIPO from 1990 until the end of 2002.^{viii}


6.9 Analysis

For our analysis we rely on Box-Jenkins transfer modeling (e.g., McCleary and Hay (1980); for an example in political science see Clarke, Mishler, and Whiteley (1990), see also Chapter 2). In the first step, we test the univariate ARIMA-model. Subsequently, we add successively the Fortuyn variables, immigration, unemployment and the interaction between the two and finally our media variables. In the first series of analyses we take into account the period 1990-2002. Subsequently, we retest our hypotheses for the period from 1990 to June 2001, thus excluding the support for LN and the LPF. This allows estimating the robustness of our results: When similar results are found for the two periods, it indicates that the established effects are stable over-time and thus not contingent upon differences between the various political parties included in our dependent variable.

6.10 Results

Before turning to the statistical analyses we provide some descriptive information on the dynamics of the various variables. Figure 5.2 displayed the development of immigration in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2002. We see immigration levels being relatively high in the early 1990s, slightly decreasing from 1994 onwards. From 1996 until 2001 immigration is steadily on the rise again, dropping once more after 2001. Unemployment (Figure 6.1), by contrast, was about six percent in the early 1990s and steadily rose, reaching almost eight percent in 1994. Thereafter, unemployment steadily decreased to below 2 percent in 2001, after which it somewhat increased again.

Figure 6.1 Unemployment and support for anti-immigrant populism in the Netherlands, period 1990-2002 (monthly data)



As we discussed in chapter 5, we see the attention for immigration issues in newspapers increasing dramatically throughout the years (Figure 5.3). Immigration issues had a relatively low salience until late 1997 (Lubbers et al., 1998: 420; Semetko and Valkenburg, 2000: 104). Thereafter it slightly increased until 2001, after which there is a rather steep increase with considerable fluctuation in 2001/2002. Last, we see support for anti-immigrant populist parties peaking for the first time in the early to mid-1990s, approaching four percent in 1994. However, the much more dramatic increase took place in 2001, when within a few months support rose to approximately 16 percent (Figure 6.1). We now turn to the statistical analyses to test the hypotheses stated above.

A Box-Jenkins analysis can only be processed if all variables in the model have stationary means and variances. The visual representation of the anti-immigrant party support series and the accompanying statistics suggest that the level differs greatly over-time. Therefore, we transformed the variable by logging and differencing its values (for more information see Annex 7).^{ix} The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions for the transformed series suggest a moving average at lag 1, which indeed has a significant coefficient in a univariate-ARIMA model (see Table 6.1, Model 1a). The residual statistics now indicate no correlation in the residuals (Ljung-Box Q over 20 lags) and the absence of a unit-root (Augmented Dickey-Fuller test) (see Table A1 in Annex 5).

Table 6.1 Influence of Fortuyn, immigration and media on anti-immigrant populist party support, period 1990-2002

Predictor	Model 1A		Model 1B		Model 1C		Model 1D	
	coefficient	t-value	coefficient	t-value	coefficient	t-value	coefficient	t-value
Moving average (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.37***	-4.93	-0.46***	-5.98	-0.37***	-4.35	-0.39***	-4.66
Rise Fortuyn	†		1.18***	2.41	0.76*	1.53	0.79*	1.60
Dead Fortuyn (<i>t-4</i>)	†		-1.18***	-2.56	-1.16***	-2.47	-1.09***	-2.36
Immigration (<i>t-1</i>)	†		†		0.50**	1.95	0.73***	2.70
Unemployment (<i>t-2</i>)	†		†		-3.59***	-3.03	-3.51***	-2.96
Unemployment * Immigration (<i>t-7</i>)	†		†		0.33***	2.44	0.29**	2.14
News on immigration (<i>t-3</i>)	†		†		†		0.38**	1.89
News on economy (<i>t-1</i>)	†		†		†		0.40*	1.69
RMS	43.81		40.06		34.65		33.25	
AIC (N=147)	-1.217		-1.262		-1.363		-1.377	
Ljung-Box Q (df=20)	18.50		18.21		19.28		20.21	
N (months)	155		151		147		147	

Note: variables are made stationary by logging and differencing. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (one-tailed); † variable not included in model

We next model the Fortuyn leadership effect by adding two dummy-variables (Model 1b). The effects of these variables can occur gradually as well as abruptly and can be temporary as well as permanent. The analysis suggests that both variables have an abrupt and permanent effect. The entrance of Fortuyn sorts this effect immediately and causes a 225 percent increase in support for anti-immigrant and populist parties.^x The effect of the assassination of Fortuyn only takes place with a lag of four months and leads to a 225 percent decrease. Both dummy-variables have a significant influence on the dependent variable and adding them results in a superior explanatory model compared to the univariate ARIMA model. The Residual Means Square (RMS) decreased from 43.81 to 40.06 and a slightly better model-fit is indicated by the AIC, thus confirming our third hypothesis about the effects of Fortuyn's leadership.

In the third model (Table 6.1, Model 1c) we added the immigration level, the unemployment rate and their interaction term. The analysis suggests following effects: immigration at lag 1, unemployment at lag 2 and the interaction at a lag of 7 months. Model 1c shows that all three have a significant effect on support for anti-immigrant populist parties. Hypothesis 6.1 is partly confirmed: the interaction-variable has indeed a positive influence on support, though only with a relatively long lag. Unemployment, however, shows a significant negative influence whereas no influence was expected. Hypothesis 6.2 is confirmed. High levels of immigration lead to higher anti-immigrant populist party support. Again, the explanatory value improves, with the RMS decreasing from 40.06 to 34.65 and the AIC indicating a better goodness of fit.^{xi} Including party-related political opportunity variables did not result in any significant effect or model improvement. As anticipated, visual inspection of the values of these variables shows that for our research period, variation over-time is very limited. Also, only a very limited number of points of measurements can be taken into account, since values only change prior to and after parliamentary elections.^{xii}

The last model (Table 6.1, Model 1d) includes the two newspaper attention variables. The cross-correlation function indicates most likely effects with a time lag of three months for news on immigration and a lag of one month for news on the economy in an immigration frame. The two indicators have a significant influence. The results confirm hypotheses 4a and 4b. Attention for immigration issues in the news positively influences support for anti-immigrant populism. The RMS (33.25) again decreases and the AIC indicates that this model is superior to the previous models.

Subsequently, we present the results of our second analysis, excluding the last 18 months and thereby the presence of LN and the LPF in our time series (for more details see Table A2 in Annex 5). Accordingly, the two leadership variables are excluded. Table 6.2 shows that the results are very similar to the previous ones. Immigration, unemployment and the interaction between unemployment and immigration are all influencing the dependent variable in the same direction and at the same time lags. The independent variables add to the explanatory power of our model, with the RMS decreasing from 32.63 to 24.76 and the AIC points to a better goodness of fit for the model. When adding the news content variables, we again find a positive influence of the attention for immigration issues at a lag of three and of the attention for economic issues in an immigration frame at a lag of one. Again, compared to the previous model we find a decrease of the RMS and of the AIC. The results are identical to the ones in the previous analyses, indicating no different patterns for the different time periods.

Table 6.2 Influence of economy, immigration and media on anti-immigrant populist party support, period 1990- June 2001

Predictor	Model 2A coefficient	t-value	Model 2B coefficient	t-value	Model 2C coefficient	t-value
Moving average (<i>t-1</i>)	-0.56***	-7.66	-0.52***	-5.76	-0.56***	-7.32
Immigration (<i>t-1</i>)	†		0.60***	2.44	0.86***	3.22
Unemployment (<i>t-2</i>)	†		-4.68***	-3.32	-4.73***	-3.37
Unemployment * Immigration (<i>t-7</i>)	†		0.57***	3.56	0.53***	3.32
News on immigration (<i>t-3</i>)	†		†		0.39**	2.14
News on economy (<i>t-1</i>)	†		†		0.35*	1.42
RMS	32.63		24.76		23.61	
AIC (N=129)	-1.387		-1.588		-1.605	
Ljung-Box Q (df=20)	14.84		11.78		10.84	
N	137		129		129	

Note: variables are made stationary by logging and differencing. * $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (one-tailed); † variable not included in model.

6.11 Conclusion

We set out to provide evidence for the relevance and importance of taking media content into account when explaining the rise and decline of anti-immigrant populist parties. Relying upon previous work by Mazzoleni et al. (2003) and Walgrave and de Swert (2004) we expected an emphasis in news content on immigration-related issues to significantly contribute to the success of anti-immigrant populism. This was confirmed by the empirical results. We found a significant positive influence of news on vote intention for anti-immigrant parties. We considered the attention for both general news on immigration issues and economic news in an immigration frame. In both periods under analysis, immigration news was a stronger predictor than economic news in an immigration frame. This indicates that it was not primarily the focus on economic threat in immigration-related news that made people turning to support anti-immigrant parties but presumably some perception of a cultural threat and therefore accordingly a public problematization of immigration. However, also the effect of economic news in an immigration frame was significant. There was public sensitivity for the relationship between the two aspects in the media and consequently people were more likely to turn towards the right of the political spectrum. The news variables are effective with a lag of three months respectively one month. This is in line with what to expect in the light of agenda setting research. Dearing and Rogers

conclude that time lags in agenda setting can vary ‘from a few weeks to several months, between the media agenda and the public agenda’ (Dearing and Rogers, 1996: 68). Therefore we believe our results concerning news media impact on vote intention not to be merely a statistical artifact but demonstrating a substantive relationship. Hereby we confirm findings of Walgrave and de Swert (2004), showing an influence of news media issue attention on anti-immigrant party success. We add to their results by simultaneously controlling for the impact of real world indicators, which provides a rather rigid test of the basic proposition, and by making use of complete survey data series. We note that the impact of news media on anti-immigrant parties has been confirmed in a number of countries now, thus substantiating the relationship.

Is it sufficient to only look at the intensity of reporting rather than also to consider the tone of the coverage? We believe that certainly for the present study a pure intensity measure is adequate, since we are looking at agenda setting effects, where traditionally tone of coverage is not considered (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). However, it could be argued that a positive tone in coverage of immigration issues would contribute to a decline in anti-immigration votes; even so when there is a lot of coverage. Yet, Lubbers, Scheepers, and Wester (1998), conclude that groups of ethnic minorities in Dutch newspapers are reported about in terms of criminalization and problematization.^{xiii} Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that immigration reporting oftentimes coincides with negative reporting and thus positively influences the public’s concerns about these issues. Further research, however, should test this assumption (see Chapter 7).

To provide more conclusive evidence for the role of news content, we controlled for contextual indicators. We find a significant and positive influence of the interaction between unemployment and immigration on aggregate vote intention with a relatively long time lag of seven months. This seems reasonable, however, since the assumption made by the interaction is a rather complex one. The situation of a deteriorating economy has to be cognitively linked to rising immigration, which arguably takes time to get through to the people. Since a number of recent studies emphasize the role of an interaction term between immigration and unemployment for right-wing party success (Golder, 2003b, 2003a) we believe this result to be more than just a statistical artifact. We find a significant positive influence of immigration on aggregate vote intention for an anti-immigrant party in both periods under analysis and a significant negative effect of the unemployment rate.^{xiv} Fortuyn’s leadership strength affected anti-immigrant party support in the expected directions. The entrance of Fortuyn into the political arena positively contributed to support. His assassination, though with a lag of four months, affected support negatively. The latter indicates that it might have been the lack of strong leadership that contributed to the weakening support for the LPF. This result also indicates that Fortuyn likely appealed to a great group of supporters that otherwise would not be considered as traditional anti-immigrant voters.

We believe our findings to be rather robust for a number of reasons. First, we use monthly data for all indicators with no missing values over a considerable period of thirteen years.

This presents a good opportunity to test the proposed causal relationships between the variables. Second, though with minor differences, the findings in the two periods we looked at overall both show the same results, indicating no large differences between traditional extreme-right parties (CD and CP) and the more recent phenomenon of anti-immigrant populism (LN and LPF) with regards to their support being partly dependent upon news content.

The questions whether newspaper content is exogenous or whether it is likely that external events drive both media coverage and anti-immigrant party support is an important qualification to consider. Newspapers might indeed from time to time be inclined to report about external events that simultaneously could affect anti-immigration party support. However, especially the intensity with which media cover an event is still largely based on independent editorial decisions and processes in the news production chain (i.e., news values, gatekeeping). We therefore argue that this qualification does not fundamentally alter our conclusions. After all, most people hear or read about events in the media and do not experience them directly (e.g., Mutz, 1998). In that sense, to what degree an event or an issue is considered important and consequently might have an impact on vote intention largely depends on the intensity of discussion of the event in the media. Thus, if we consider news media as independent societal actors, we must acknowledge that the mediatization of events and issues in terms of attention is largely based on the media's decision as how and how intensively to cover it.

Future research can improve on the present study by, for instance, addressing a broader range of aspects in news content, such as attention for the parties under analysis. Further, a more sophisticated content analysis might be useful, in which not only the attention for certain issues is considered, but in which relational aspects such as support or criticism are also taken into account. Here the tone in immigration stories towards anti-immigrant parties would be interesting to look at over-time. Moreover, it would be interesting to test the relations put forward here in a cross-national design, since that would allow for the inclusion of system-specific variables and for a better test of effects of party-related political opportunity structures. Finally, individual data, collected in varying information contexts, including measures of vote intention and media exposure should be used to investigate whether the aggregate relation holds at the individual level. Thereby it could be considered whether the effect of media content is immediate and direct, or whether it is (at least partly) mediated by attitudinal variables, i.e. media content positively affecting anti-immigration attitudes that in turn increase support for anti-immigrant parties. Nevertheless these possible improvements, we believe that we made an important contribution to the study of the role of news media in explaining the popularity of anti-immigrant parties.

Chapter 7. Fitting the Pieces Together: An Anatomy of a Political Process

7.1 Abstract

In this chapter, I consider the relationships between all the variables that have been central in the previous chapters. Here, these relationships are tested in a single model. I look at real world cues, parliamentary documents, media coverage and anti-immigrant party support and how they are interrelated. As presented in the first chapter, the case on which I focus is the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in the Netherlands from 1995 until 2004. As in the previous chapters, I employed computer-assisted content analysis to analyze parliamentary documents and newspaper articles. Both issue attention and framing are measured. Additionally, data on asylum applications and anti-immigrant party support were obtained.

The results largely confirm the findings of previous chapters. Using monthly level data, I am able to proof limited relationships between official parliamentary documents and media coverage and between official parliamentary documents and anti-immigrant party support. Between media coverage and anti-immigrant party support a clear bi-directional relationship exists: more attention and less favorable coverage leads to more anti-immigrant party support, while more party support also leads to more (negative) media attention. Media coverage is triggered by real world cues, but only by key-events like 9/11 and the assassination of filmmaker Theo van Gogh and not by more abstract figures on asylum applications. Finally, additional weekly-level analyses show a short-term influence of media attention on the attention for the issue in parliament, but only for transcripts of parliamentary debates and not for official parliamentary documents.

7.2 Introduction

In the previous chapters various relations between real world cues, parliamentary debates, media coverage and anti-immigrant party support have been investigated. The goal of this chapter is to bring together the previous empirical chapters and test *as a whole* the research model presented in the first chapter. This offers the opportunity to test whether the results found in the various chapters also hold when the other variables are taken into account. This excludes the risk that these results are spurious and a consequence of the exclusion of a third variable that influences both the independent and dependent variable. Furthermore, additional relationships that have not been considered in the previous chapters (e.g. between parliament and anti-immigrant party support) are taken into account as well.

Compared to the existing literature, the analyses presented in this chapter stand out in two ways. First, as in the previous chapters of this dissertation, the majority of the related studies deals with the relationship between two or three of the previously mentioned factors only and often causal relations are only investigated in a single direction (e.g. the influence of the media on the public) (Hetherington, 1996; Shah et al., 1999). Second, in the cases that all four factors are taken into account (e.g. Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995; Soroka, 2002), the focus is on the *attention* for issues in politics and media. Instead, I take into account all possible causal relationships for issue attention but I also look at *framing*, which indicates *how* the issue is discussed. This enables me to give a more encompassing picture of the political process surrounding the issue of immigration and integration. Furthermore, the time series approach adopted in this chapter reveals the dynamic interaction and direct and indirect relationships between the four factors. This methodological approach is in line with those of the previous chapters.

7.3 Real world cues, parliament, media and party support: about chickens and eggs

In this section, I will shortly discuss the relationships between the four factors, based on the findings of the previous chapters, expanded with findings from the literature. This overview is far from complete and too much overlap with previous chapters is avoided. Also relations that have not been tested previously are only shortly introduced and I refrain from formulating explicit hypotheses. The main interest in this chapter lies in sketching the overall model, adopting an open approach.

Real world and parliament

The political agenda and the way political problems are presented are influenced by what happens in the ‘real world’. The relationship between real world developments and parliament has not yet been considered in this dissertation. Ideally, agenda-formation and presentation of issues (i.e. framing) are determined by the results of previous policy-making that form the input for subsequent political debates (feedback mechanisms, Easton, 1965; Kingdon, 1984). This relationship, however, is likely to be far from perfect, as policy outcomes are hard to measure and by no means unambiguous. Additionally, there is not one response to disappointing policy results and problem definitions and solutions have a strong political (ideological) component as well. At the general level of real world developments figures on immigration such as the number of asylum applications are relevant. Here, the relationships between real world developments and politics are likely to be weak. After all, the number of asylum applications is only to a limited extent guided by actual policy and labeling it solely a policy outcome is unrealistic, even though politicians often want people to believe otherwise. Numerous other factors outside the national political realm affect these figures. Still, policy as formulated in official parliamentary documents might to some extent affect these figures. When considering the reverse causal relationship, these figures cannot be regarded as a perfect reflection of the effectiveness of previous policies, but they

might confront politicians with the assertion that ‘something needs to be done’ in a certain area. Hence, at this level I expect a weak, bi-directional relationship between real world developments and the political debate. First, an increase in the number of asylum applicants is expected to lead to an increase in the political attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. Second, it might also lead to more anti-immigration framing, since with increasing numbers of asylum seekers the integration of minorities is more likely to be perceived as a problem that needs to be solved. In a similar vein, more (negative) attention in political debates could be expected to lead to less asylum applications, because this attention reflects (the expectance of) more restrictive policies towards immigrants, although a measurement of these policies is not directly included in my research.

Next to general figures that reflect real world developments, there might also be an influence from (unexpected) external ‘shocks’, *key-events* (Kepplinger and Habermeier, 1995). In Chapter 4 we demonstrated that these events can change both attention for and framing of the issue in the political arena. For the events included in the analyses in the analyses presented here, Chapter 4 shows that 9/11 has a permanent, positive influence on attention for the immigration issue and its framing according the lines of ‘Islam-as-a-threat’ and therefore to less favorable coverage from the immigrants’ point of view. The other key-events (bombings in Madrid and the murder on Van Gogh) did not cause any significant changes in attention or framing in parliament.

Real world and media

In Chapter 5 the impact of the level of immigration and the number of asylum seekers on media attention for the immigration issue was investigated for the period 1991-2002. Only a weak effect from the level of immigration with a lag of six months was found. These results suggest a limited influence from these real world developments on media attention for the issue. For a reversed effect little theoretical grounding and no empirical evidence is present in the literature.

However, attention only tells part of the story, and another relevant question is how real world developments influence the way the issue is presented, i.e. framed. So far, this question was not yet taken into account in this dissertation. Once again, little empirical evidence is available. However, there is considerable research on the media representation of the state of the economy. This literature suggests that the tone of the coverage is – at least to a certain extent – in line with economic indicators like unemployment, growth and inflation (Sanders et al., 1993). So, when economic indicators are showing a favorable development, news coverage is also likely to be more positive about the economy. A similar outcome can be expected for immigration related developments. Making the assumption that a high influx in the number of asylum applications is perceived as a ‘problem’ (Lubbers et al., 2000), this leads to the expectation that an increase in the number of asylum applications contributes to a more negative framing of the immigration issue. One can also speculate about a reverse causal influence: highly negative media coverage might, over-time and again probably only to a limited extent, affect the country’s reputation

among possible immigrants and thereby decrease the level of asylum applicants. This expectation presupposes the existence of transnational links between diaspora and their home country and a certain level of integration of these diaspora in the host society, since knowledge about media coverage has to be obtained and transmitted.

Regarding key-events the outcomes have been less ambiguous. Chapter 6 shows that several events, of which 9/11 is the most important one, lead to substantial increases in media attention for the immigration issue. In line with previous research (e.g. Zillmann and Brosius, 2000), it is demonstrated that key events' direct effects override the direct effects of more general real world developments. Also in Chapter 4, a large impact of 9/11 on the level of the media attention is detected. This impact is permanent. A similar impact for the assassination of Van Gogh is found, while the bombings in Madrid only lead to a temporary increase in issue attention. Looking at the framing of the issue, 9/11 led to a permanent increase in 'Islam-as-threat'-framing, while again the bombings in Madrid had no impact. The assassination of Van Gogh led to a small increase in the use of the 'Islam-as-threat'-frame.

Real world and party support

The direct effects of *real world cues* on *vote intention* are frequently researched. In Chapter 6, a straightforward positive impact of immigration on anti-immigrant party support is found (see also Anderson, 1996; Givens, 2002; Golder, 2003b). Again, there is no strong theoretical reason to assume a direct reverse causal relationship. The direct effect of key-events on vote intention is less often investigated. Usually, it is assumed to be mediated by the media (Norris et al., 2003). However, it is possible that certain events have such a large-scale impact upon society that they directly influence the public's attitudes and thereby its political preferences as well. This is not yet investigated in this dissertation, but will be in this chapter. Thereby, the question whether media coverage is perfectly mediating the effect of key-events on political preferences is addressed. An obvious example of a large impact of a key-event on the public has been 9/11 in the United States, where it led to considerable changes in support for the various political parties: presidential approval and support for the incumbent Republican party went up considerably, while the oppositional Democratic party lost support (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003).

Parliament and media

Chapter 4 demonstrated nuanced relationships between official parliamentary documents and newspaper coverage. Regarding issue attention mainly long-term relationships were found: media attention one year earlier influences parliamentary attention and vice versa (see Table 4.2). In the short run only a small negative impact from media attention on the level of parliamentary attention was observed. With regard to framing, bi-directional relationships contingent upon the frame under investigation were found, following an interesting pattern: parliamentary framing influences media framing when the frame is

already frequently employed in the media. Similarly, media framing impacts on parliamentary framing only when considering often-used frames in parliament. So, one could assume that a confirmation-seeking process is present, both among politicians and journalists.

In Chapter 4 the analysis of parliament focused on *official* parliamentary documents. These documents encompassed policy proposals by government and parliament and written questions posed by parliamentarians to members of government and their responses (see also Chapter 3). These official documents can be regarded as more substantive as for example integral transcripts of debates. According to Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) the media agenda's influence on the political agenda depends on whether the researcher looks at the 'substantive political agenda' having tangible regulatory, legislative, or administrative consequences (e.g. laws, budgetary spending) or at what they label the 'symbolic political agenda' reflecting policy changes that are largely rhetorical (e.g. speeches, hearings and debates). With regard to substantial measures little or no influence is found, whereas a strong influence is often established in case of symbolic policies (e.g. Edwards and Wood, 1999). One can argue about whether parliamentary debates are to be labeled as solely 'symbolic', because this implicitly assumes that these debates are substantively inconsequential, which is very often not true. Still, official parliamentary documents are less inconsequential in terms of policy consequences. In debates parliamentarians might be more driven more by short-term interests and their claims and statements are not necessarily and directly reflecting actual policy content. In this chapter an additional analysis is conducted to check whether the use of transcripts indeed results in a stronger influence of the media agenda on the parliamentary agenda (see Van Noije, 2007 for the use of similar documents regarding the immigration and integration issue in the Netherlands).

Parliament and party support

The relationship between parliament and anti-immigrant party support has not yet received any attention in this dissertation. The more general relation between politics and the public is the central concern of a widely-cited study by Page and Shapiro (1983). They analyze policy and public opinion data for a whole range of issues in the United States between 1935 and 1979 and find a large congruency between the two. They conclude that public opinion affects policy, rather than the other way around. Also Monroe (1998) concludes that policies often follow public opinion, especially when it comes to issues that are highly salient among the public. The influence from public opinion on policy-content is argued to be stronger than in the past, due to the increased possibilities of polling public opinion and the use of these possibilities by politicians (Geer, 1996). Also Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg (1995) find some evidence for this pattern of direct 'bottom-up' agenda setting. Though I do not directly consider public opinion, anti-immigrant party support indirectly indicates whether the public regard immigration as an important issue and in fact, whether it intends to act politically in accordance with this importance as well (see also Chapter 1). In the

literature, little empirical evidence is found for a direct impact of political debates on the public. Overall, this results in the expectation that increased anti-immigrant party support leads to an increase in attention for the issue in the political realm and towards a framing that is more congruent with those of anti-immigrant parties.

Media and party support

Top-down media agenda setting is one of the most investigated and confirmed objects of study in the field of political communication, at least since McCombs and Shaw seminal study on agenda setting effects (1972). With regard to anti-immigrant party support, Chapter 6 shows, in line with previous research (2004) the positive effects of issue attention on anti-immigrant party support. The reversed relationship from party support on media is less often hypothesized and when investigated, little evidence is found for effects of the public agenda on the media agenda (e.g. Behr and Iyengar, 1985; Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995).

Research on framing-effects shows that the way the issue is framed is important for public attitudes and opinions. Usually, framing effects are tested at the individual level (e.g. Druckman, 2004; Scheufele, 1999), looking at how certain media content influences individuals' attitudes and behavior. However, looking at framing-effects on an aggregate, national level is relevant and possible as well: it might inform us on the effects of news framing on larger populations. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2003) propose the idea of valenced news frames. They argue that news can be framed positively or negatively from a certain actor's point of view and that this influences attitudes towards these actors in a straightforward manner: positive framing leads to positive attitudes. Here, I elaborate on this notion by hypothesizing that frames that are most often used by anti-immigrant parties are likely to be those frames that are in line with the parties' point of views and ideology and therefore most favorable for these parties. Consequently, the increased use of those frames, regardless by which actor, leads to more support for anti-immigrant parties.

7.4 Operationalization of the concepts

Before discussing how I will empirically analyze the relationships that are discussed in the previous section, I will focus on the measurement of the various concepts.

Framing in parliament and media

In this study I use the frames multicultural, emancipation, restriction, victimization and Islam-as-threat. These frames are also used to determine the attention for the issue (see Chapters 3 and 4). In addition to the official parliamentary documents used in Chapters 3 and 4 (policy proposals and written parliamentary questions), transcripts of parliamentary debates were collected to obtain an attention score for the issue, resulting in an additional 1,071 frames.ⁱ A moderate correlation between the monthly-level attention score for these

transcripts and other parliamentary documents exists ($r=.51$). This indicates that the issue attention in official parliamentary documents overlaps with – but is certainly not equal to – the attention in parliamentary debates.

To establish which frames are connected to anti-immigrant parties I look at frame-actor combinations. Therefore, I use the co-occurrence of party names and frames both on an article level (newspapers) and the use of frames by the various parties in written parliamentary questions. Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 present the outcomes, showing a consistent pattern. Table 7.1 presents for the total dataset the percentage of articles in which each of the frames occurs (first row). The same is done for articles that also include a reference to any party name (second row) and for a further division in clusters of parties (left-wing, center, right-wing, anti-immigrant; third till sixth row). The table presents for each of these clusters the percentage of mentionings of any of the parties belonging to the cluster together with each of the five frames. Furthermore, significant differences in the occurrence of each frame between the clusters are marked. Table 7.2 displays the number of written parliamentary questions including each of the five frames asked in total and by parliamentarians belonging to parties in each of the four clusters. I use these questions since they can be attributed most clearly to a political party. Both in parliament and media ‘Islam-as-threat’ is most often related to (in articles) and used by (in parliamentary questions) anti-immigrant parties. In 40 percent of the newspaper articles in which anti-immigrant parties are mentioned, the Islam-as-threat frame occurs as well, compared to 27 percent for center parties and 28 percent for left-wing parties. In parliament, the frame is used in 45 percent of the parliamentary questions posed by anti-immigrant parties compared to an average of 34 percent. Overall, restriction is most often related to center and moderate right-wing parties in media coverage and used by center parties in parliament. The use of the victimization frame is only marginally different for the various parties, while multiculturalism and emancipation are most often used by left-wing parties, which are in general more favorable towards immigration and immigrants. Left-wing parties occur with the multicultural frame in 43 percent of the newspaper articles that deal with immigration and integration of minorities, compared to 35 percent for anti-immigrant parties. Regarding parliamentary questions, the use of the multicultural frame occurs in 17 percent of the questions posed by left-wing parties and, on the contrary, in 0 percent of the questions posed by anti-immigrant parties. Emancipation occurs together with left-wing parties in 19 percent of the newspaper articles, compared to 15 percent for anti-immigrant parties. Parliamentary questions show a similar difference: 49 percent for left-wing parties and 36 percent for anti-immigrant parties. Based on these differences I construct a ‘favorable framing towards the issue variable’, subtracting Islam-as-threat framing from multicultural and emancipation framing, while regarding restriction and victimization as being neither favorable nor non-favorable towards the issue. This is done for both official parliamentary documents and newspaper articles.

Table 7.1 Political orientation-frame combinations in Dutch newspapers

Party	N	Frame				
		<i>Multicultural</i>	<i>Restriction</i>	<i>Victimization</i>	<i>Islam-as-Threat</i>	<i>Emancipation</i>
Total	14850	28%	5%	15%	55%	5%
Total party	3089	39%	11%	22%	33%	16%
Left	1912	43%+++	11%	23%	28%---	19%+++
Center	1336	42%+++	15%+++	20%--	27%---	17%
Right	1600	35%---	13%+++	22%	34%	18%+++
Anti-immigrant	740	35%	10%	20%-	40%+++	15%

Note: N is weighted number of articles (front page = 2; other = 1), ‘total’ indicates total number of articles in which any of the frames is used, ‘total party’ indicates the number of articles that also include the name of one of the political parties. The percentages indicate for each cluster of parties the percentage of articles in which they co-occur with the frames (percentages sum up to over 100% since an article can contain more than one frame); +/+++/+++ significantly higher ($p < .10$; $p < .05$; $p < .01$ respectively), -/-/--- significantly lower ($p < .10$; $p < .05$; $p < .01$ respectively) than average based upon results of logistic regression with occurrence of frame as dependent variable and occurrence of parties as independent variables. Left: PvdA, GL, SP; Center: CDA, D66, LN; Right: VVD, CU, SGP; Anti-immigrant: CD, LPF, Groep Wilders

Table 7.2 Political orientation-frame combinations in Dutch parliament

Party	N	Frame				
		<i>Multicultural</i>	<i>Restriction</i>	<i>Victimization</i>	<i>Islam-as-Threat</i>	<i>Emancipation</i>
Total	295	34 (12%)	37 (13%)	24 (8%)	99 (34%)	101 (34%)
Left	127	22 (17%)	20 (16%)	6 (5%)	20 (16%)	59 (49%)
Center	68	9 (13%)	14 (21%)	7 (10%)	16 (24%)	22 (32%)
Right	78	3 (4%)	2 (3%)	8 (10%)	53 (68%)	12 (15%)
Anti-immigrant	22	0 (0%)	1 (5%)	3 (14%)	10 (45%)	8 (36%)

Note: N is number of parliamentary questions posed. Left: PvdA, GL, SP; Center: CDA, D66, LN; Right: VVD, CU, SGP; Anti-immigrant: CD, LPF, Groep Wilders

Real world cues

As *real world development* I use the monthly number of asylum applications as reported by the Dutch Statistical Office (CBS). Chapters 4 and 6 have shown that three *key-events* that are related to ‘the war on terrorism’ are relevant within the research period. I use dummy-variables to capture the effects of these events, where 9/11 and the assassination of Van Gogh are modeled as having a permanent impact, while the impact of the bombings in Madrid is presumed to be temporary (see also Chapter 4).

Anti-immigrant party support

The level of support for anti-immigrant populist parties is derived from weekly and bi-weekly surveys conducted by TNS/NIPO (from 1995 until the end of 2002) and Peil.nl (September 2002 until the end of 2004) among representative samples of the Dutch population. Used are monthly aggregated scores of the percentage of people that reported intending to vote for one of the anti-immigrant parties when asked for their voting preference if parliamentary elections were held the next Sunday (TNS/NIPO) or the same day (Peil.nl). In the period that both polls were conducted, Peil.nl consistently reported higher levels of anti-immigrant party support. I use the TNS/NIPO data for the overlapping period and correct the Peil.nl data for the following period based on the values of both series during the overlapping months. Five anti-immigrant parties are included in the research. The first four, *Centrumdemocraten* (CD) and *Centrumpartij* (CP), the *Lijst Pim Fortuyn* (LPF) and *Leefbaar Nederland* (LN) during the months of Fortuyn's leadership are described in Chapter 6. Additionally, *Groep Wilders* is included. Groep Wilders was founded by former liberal member of parliament Geert Wilders in September 2004 and has a clear anti-Islamic rhetoric and anti-Islamic stance. Since LN, LPF and Groep Wilders were yet to be founded and hence non-existent during parts of the research period, the parties included in the anti-immigrant party support measure and therefore the dependent variable changes over time. Therefore, in the various models I use dummy-variables as independent variables to capture the inclusion of new parties in the measurement of anti-immigrant party support.

7.5 Analysis

I conduct a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) analysis (see Chapter 2) to analyze the causal relationships between real world cues, parliamentary documents, media coverage and anti-immigrant party support. In this paper, two models, each including four series, are tested. The first model (*attention-model*) includes the number of asylum seekers, issue attention in official parliamentary documents, issue attention in newspapers and anti-immigrant party support. In an additional phase, I control whether the results of the analysis change when I substitute the scores for official parliamentary documents with those of transcripts of parliamentary debates. The second model (*framing-model*) includes the number of asylum applications, framing in official parliamentary documents, framing in newspapers and anti-immigrant party support. In both analyses, dummy-variables for the key-events and the changes in the parties that are regarded as anti-immigrant are included as independent variables. Furthermore, to account for the possible seasonal autocorrelation for each variable the value of twelve months earlier is added to the models.

The number of lags to be included in the equations can be determined using various test-statistics. Here, a Likelihood Test for Dropping Lags is used (Enders, 1996). It is assumed that influences between both variables do not occur over a longer period in time than six months, which is in line with outcomes of classical agenda setting research

indicating causality up to a couple of months (Dearing and Rogers, 1996). Using this test, I start with a model including six lags, and then lags are dropped one by one until the Likelihood Test indicates loss of significant explanatory power of the model.

Following Freeman et al. (1989), the following will be reported (see Chapter 2 for a more extensive explanation):

(1) F-tests for the whole blocks of lags of each variable, which indicate whether – overall – any significant causal relationship between the independent variables and dependent variable exists (Granger-causality, see Chapter 2), supplemented with the coefficients of the dummy-variables and the explained variance.

(2) A presentation of the decomposition of the Forecast Error Variance, indicating for each variable over-time what portion of the change in a series can be attributed to dynamics in its own history and to changes in the other variables. I report the percentages after 24 months, which is a long enough time span to capture the long-term effects of changes in each variable on the other variables.

(3) An impulse response analysis of the moving average representation of the variables in the system, which demonstrates how an increase in one of the series affect the values of the other series through time.ⁱⁱ

7.6 Results

Before discussing the outcomes of the VAR-analyses, some attention is paid to the over-time development of each of the variables. In Chapter 3 the attention for the immigration and integration issue is discussed (see Figure 3.1). Figure 7.1 presents the framing-favorability of the issue in both parliament and media. Overall, framing is moderately unfavorable towards immigrants, with a clear dip in September 2001, due to 9/11. Also in September 2002, probably in hindsight of 9/11, there is a dip in favorability. In March 2004 (bombings in Madrid) and November 2004 (assassination of Van Gogh) non-favorable framing again clearly dominates. Parliamentary framing is more favorable towards immigrants than media framing and does not show a clear decrease after 9/11. Figure 7.2 presents the number of asylum applications and anti-immigrant party support through time. The number of monthly asylum applications rises until 1999-2000 and shows a downward trend from then on. Anti-immigrant party support is under 2 percent until 2001, but peaks during the turbulent year 2002 and shows another peak with the success of Geert Wilders at the end of 2004.

Figure 7.1 Framing favorability in parliament and media





Figure 7.2 Anti-immigrant party support and number of asylum applications



Attention-model

Table 7.3 and Figure 7.3 together present the results of the attention-model, for which Likelihood statistics suggest the inclusion of 5 lags for each of the variables. The general pattern that is revealed by the analysis is as follows. First, the number of asylum applications does not depend on any of the other factors. Second, parliamentary attention for the issue depends on media attention, anti-immigrant party support and on the occurrence of 9/11. More media attention and more anti-immigrant party support both lead to less parliamentary attention. After 9/11 the attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in parliament has increased. Additionally, parliament shows a long-term responsiveness to the number of asylum applications: the higher that number the more parliamentary attention one year later. Third, media attention depends on anti-immigrant party support and key-events. Initially, increasing levels of anti-immigrant party support result in less media attention, but in the long run they increase media attention. After key-events that are related to the international war on terrorism media attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities increases. Fourth, anti-immigrant parties profit heavily from media attention for the immigration issue: more attention leads to more support for these parties. Below, I will look into these results in more detail. The subsequent part is organized by discussing for each of the variables how it is influenced by the other variables.

Number of asylum applications. None of the other factors influences the number of asylum applications (Table 7.3 under asylum seekers). This also becomes apparent when looking at the changes in the number of asylum applications that in the long run can be attributed to changes in the other series: they only account for between 2.0 (anti-immigrant party support) and 3.3 percent (parliament) of the variation in the number of asylum applications (see Table 7.3). These results confirm the notion that the number of asylum applications is largely determined by developments that fall outside the national, Dutch realm. Neither do the key-events that are related to the war on terrorism alter the level of asylum applications: none of their coefficients is significant.

Parliamentary attention is influenced by both media and party support. In the long run 11.9 percent of the changes in parliamentary attention for the issue can be attributed to shocks in media attention and 9.9 percent to shocks in party support. In Figure 7.3a, c and d the effects of the number of asylum applications, media attention and anti-immigrant party support on parliamentary attention are displayed. The last two are significant. First, Figure 7.3c shows the consequence of a one standard deviation increase in media attention on (among others) the attention in parliament, demonstrating how an increase in media attention changes the subsequent values of parliamentary attention over time. The figure shows that increased media attention leads to a decrease in parliamentary attention for almost all points in time. Though the attention for the issue in media and parliament follow a somewhat similar pattern (Figure 3.1), looking at the actual influence of media on parliament thus reveals a different outcome. This confirms the findings of Chapter 4, where an overall slightly negative effect from media on parliament was found. Furthermore, it is

in line with the negative effect found by Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg (1995) in their study on media and parliamentary attention for the economy in the Netherlands. They argue that this might be explained by the media's perceived irrelevance for politicians making them reluctant to follow trends in media attention for issues. Though their explanation seems somewhat far-fetched, the results indicate that politicians are hardly guided by what they read in the newspapers when it comes to formulating laws and policy proposals. The effect of party support on parliamentary attention takes a similar form: an increase in party support leads to decreases in parliamentary attention for the issue during the subsequent months (Figure 7.3d). Also more anti-immigrant party support one year earlier results in less parliamentary attention (Table 7.3 under parliament). Apparently, politicians respond to increased support for these parties by keeping quiet about the immigration issue, rather than actually starting to discuss it more elaborately. For the number of asylum applications, the value one year earlier is marginally significant ($p=.06$): more asylum applications result in more parliamentary attention for the issue. Some weak, long-term responsiveness towards real world cues is present in parliament. This responsiveness is also reflected by increased debate after 9/11, though the other key events do not alter parliamentary attention significantly.

The *media agenda* is mainly influenced by anti-immigrant party support. Its F-statistic is highly significant and after 24 months, it accounts for 11.4 percent of the changes in the media agenda (Table 7.3 under media). This is contrary to the expectation that media are hardly guided by the public. Figure 7.3d shows that party support initially leads to less media attention, but in the longer run and overall to more attention. This suggests that journalists first tend to react like politicians, by hushing up the issue, while later they acknowledge the importance of this change in political preferences among the public. Furthermore, parliamentary attention marginally influences media attention as well ($p=.11$). In the long run, it accounts for 9.9 percent of the change in media attention (Table 7.3 under media). Figure 7.3b shows that an increase in parliamentary attention results in lower media attention during the first three months, but leads to more media attention afterwards. Remarkably enough, the media attention's own past values do not seem to affect its current value, which could lead to the idea that the media have a short collective memory.ⁱⁱⁱ

Concerning the influence of real world developments the number of asylum seekers does not influence the media agenda. However, 9/11, the bombings in Madrid and the murder on Van Gogh are all affecting this agenda in a highly significant way. This confirms the findings of Chapter 5, where the importance of key-events has already been established. Finally, the model suggests that the coming into being of the LPF has a negative effect on media attention, but this is more likely to be a statistical artifact than a substantial outcome. It is a consequence of declining attention several months after 9/11 rather than the actual influence of Fortuyn. Comparing the period before and after the coming into being of the LPF reveals significant more media attention in the latter period ($t=5.35$, $p < .01$).


Framing Integration and Immigration

Table 7.3 Vector Autoregressive Analysis for the attention-model (five lags, period 1995-2004)

Block of coefficients/variables	Asylum seekers				Parliament				Media				Party support			
	F-value/ coefficients	Sig	Forecast Error	F-value/ coefficients	Sig	Forecast Error	F-value/ coefficients	Sig	Forecast Error	F-value/ coefficients	Sig	Forecast Error	F-value/ coefficients	Sig	Forecast Error	
Asylum seekers	20.08	.00	91.6%	.93	.47	9.4%	.21	.96	1.9%	.46	.80	3.1%				
Parliament	.51	.77	3.3%	3.82	.00	68.8%	1.85	.11	12.9%	1.21	.31	8.6%				
Media	1.00	.42	3.0%	2.48	.04	11.9%	.79	.56	73.8%	8.22	.00	28.3%				
Party support	.47	.80	2.1%	2.45	.04	9.9%	4.93	.00	9.9%	59.46	.00	59.9%				
Asylum seekers (t-12)	.09	.28		.26	.06		.10	.37		-.00	.93					
Parliament (t-12)	.05	.39		.38	.00		.10	.21		-.01	.10					
Media (t-12)	-.05	.47		.14	.18		.20	.02		-.01	.74					
Party support (t-12)	-.05	.51		-.29	.04		-.16	.14		-.10	.04					
LN	-.21	.63		-.62	.40		-.23	.69		.58	.03					
LPF	-.34	.54		-.14	.88		-2.12	.00		.68	.55					
Wilders	.22	.56		-.84	.19		-.53	.28		.87	.00					
9/11	.27	.59		1.71	.05		2.75	.00		-.10	.73					
Madrid	.19	.68		.51	.51		1.95	.00		-.31	.24					
Van Gogh	-.14	.77		1.21	.14		2.52	.00		.10	.73					
Constant	-.00	.98		-.44	.04		-.27	.11		-.07	.35					
Centered R-squared	.89			.65			.80			.96						

Note: N=112 months. Significant F-values indicate that the variable in the first column is Granger-caused by the variable in the second column. Significance is two-tailed, Forecast Error indicates for each dependent variable what portion of the movement in a series can be attributed to its own shocks versus shocks from the other variables after 24 months.

Figure 7.3 Simulation of the Response to a One Standard Deviation Change in Various Variables (Attention-model)



Note: For example a one standard deviation change in asylum seekers (see Figure a) has an initial positive effect on parliamentary attention for the issue, but becomes negative after three months. The maximum change in this one standard deviation change in asylum seekers causes is a 0.10 standard deviation increase in parliamentary attention after 2 and again 14 months.

Anti-immigrant party support is strongly affected by media attention for the immigration issue. The F-test is highly significant. In the long run, media attention accounts for almost 28.3 percent of the change in the party support variable (Table 7.3 under party support).

Figure 7.3c confirms earlier findings by Walgrave and De Swert (2004) and Chapter 6: more media attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities leads to more anti-immigrant party support, though this effect sets in only after a month. The party support series is not affected by the parliamentary agenda, the number of asylum seekers or the key-events. It is influenced by the rise of new political parties, though the coefficient of the LPF is insignificant. This is probably due to the fact that Pim Fortuyn changed party and brought with him the LN supporters, rather than that the creation of this new party led to new support for anti-immigrant parties in general.

The additional analysis (not reported here) reveals largely similar results when using the parliamentary transcripts instead of the official documents, though in this case parliament and media do not influence each other at all. This might be because this mutual influence between the two realms when considering actual parliamentary debates has a more short-term nature and takes place within a month. This assumption will be further investigated later on in this chapter. Also in this analysis, anti-immigrant party support exerts an influence on parliament (F-value= 2.61, $p=.03$ for a model including five lags) that is again largely negative and accounts for 14.5 percent of the changes in attention for the issue in parliamentary debates after 24 months.

Framing-model

The framing-model concerns the framing favorability towards immigrants instead of the issue attention for parliament and media. Table 7.4 and Figure 7.4 present the results of this analysis. Again, Likelihood statistics suggest that the inclusion of five lags results in the best-fitting model. The main results are as follows. First, for asylum applications, the results are very similar to those for the attention-model: the number of applications is a completely endogenous process not influenced by any other variable or key-event. Second, also parliamentary framing is remarkably enough a largely independent process being only influenced by the number of asylum applications one year earlier. Third, media framing is much more sensitive to its environment: more anti-immigrant party support results in less favorable coverage of the immigration issue in the media. Parliamentary framing does not alter media framing, while after key events related to the war on terrorism media framing is less favorable towards immigration and immigrants. Finally, anti-immigrant party support is strongly following media coverage: the more media framing is in line with the framing of those parties, the more support they gain. Also more asylum seekers one year earlier increase anti-immigrant party support. I will now discuss these results in more detail.

As in the attention-model the *number of asylum applications* is a largely autonomous factor. None of the F-statistics is even approaching significance and changes in framing in official parliamentary documents, framing in media coverage and anti-immigrant party support hardly account for changes in the number of asylum seekers: in the long run

parliamentary framing explains 2.8 percent of the variation, media framing and anti-immigrant party support below 1 percent. These results reconfirm the earlier notion that the number of asylum applications fall outside the scope of national politics. Furthermore, again none of the key-events is altering the number of asylum applications (Table 7.4 under asylum seekers).

While issue attention in parliament appeared to be somewhat influenced by media and party support, *parliamentary framing* is not. The F-statistics in Table 7.4 indicate no significant influence from media framing, anti-immigrant party support or from the number of asylum applications. Furthermore, parliamentary framing was not influenced by any of the key-events. This is remarkable, since even 9/11 did not lead (directly) to more negative parliamentary framing. This result might be explained by the strategy of many Dutch politicians to ‘keep peace’ after 9/11, instead of using a more confrontational strategy towards Islamic immigrants. In Chapter 4, when looking at separate frames, some effects of media framing on parliamentary framing were found. Apparently, these effects cancel each other out when a more general measure of framing (favorability) is employed. The only significant effect on parliamentary framing is the number of asylum seekers lagged one year: the more asylum applications, the more favorable coverage of immigration in parliament. This is contrary to the expectations and shows that increasing numbers of asylum applications do not lead per se to less favorable policies towards immigrants.

Media framing is influenced by anti-immigration party support, which in the long run accounts for 13.3 percent of the variance in media framing (Table 7.4 under media), demonstrating again a bottom-up effect from public to media. Figure 7.4d shows that this effect fluctuates somewhat over-time, but initially and in the long run more anti-immigration support leads to less favorable framing. Parliamentary framing does not influence media framing, confirming the image of the two being to a considerable extent separate realms. Media framing, as media attention, is highly sensitive to key-events: 9/11, the bombings in Madrid and the murder on Van Gogh all lead to less favorable coverage of immigration and immigrants, most likely resulting in a presentation of the issue in terms of the Islam as a threat for Western societies (see also Chapter 4). The same goes for the rise of Groep Wilders, which has probably created a platform for Wilders to express his anti-Islam attitudes that to some extent resonate in the media. Similar to the attention-model, the coming into existence of the LPF has a counterintuitive effect, resulting in more favorable coverage of the issue. This probably indicates a decline in the overwhelmingly Islam-as-threat framing directly after 9/11, rather than presenting a substantial effect of the new political party (see also Chapter 4).


Anti-immigrant party support is strongly influenced by media framing: its F-statistic is highly significant and considerably larger than in the attention-model. Table 7.4 shows that in the long run, changes in media framing account for 28.9 percent of the forecast error variance in the party support series. This effect is negative throughout the first 12 months (see Figure 7.4c).

Table 7.4 Vector Autoregressive Analysis for the Framing-Model (five lags, period 1995-2004)

Block of coefficients/variables	Asylum seekers			Parliament			Media			Party support		
	<i>F-value/</i>	<i>Sig</i>	Forecast	<i>F-value/</i>	<i>Sig</i>	Forecast	<i>F-value/</i>	<i>Sig</i>	Forecast	<i>F-value/</i>	<i>Sig</i>	Forecast
	coefficients		Error	coefficients		Error	coefficients		Error	coefficients		Error
Asylum seekers	20.08	.00	96.0%	.93	.47	15.8%	.21	.96	5.5%	.46	.80	2.6%
Parliament	.51	.77	2.8%	3.82	.00	75.6%	1.85	.11	4.6%	1.21	.31	4.3%
Media	1.00	.42	.8%	2.48	.04	6.2%	.79	.56	76.6%	8.22	.00	28.9%
Party support	.47	.80	.3%	2.45	.04	2.4%	4.93	.00	13.3%	59.46	.00	64.3%
Asylum seekers (t-12)	.09	.28		.26	.06		.10	.37		-.00	.93	
Parliament (t-12)	.05	.39		.38	.00		.10	.21		-.01	.10	
Media (t-12)	-.05	.47		.14	.18		.20	.02		-.01	.74	
Party support (t-12)	-0.5	.51		-.29	.04		-.16	.14		-.10	.04	
LN	-.21	.63		-.62	.40		-.23	.69		.58	.03	
LPF	-.34	.54		-.14	.88		-2.12	.00		.68	.55	
Wilders	.22	.56		-.84	.19		-.53	.28		.87	.00	
9/11	.27	.59		1.71	.05		2.75	.00		-.10	.73	
Madrid	.19	.68		.51	.51		1.95	.00		-.31	.24	
Van Gogh	-.14	.77		1.21	.14		2.52	.00		.10	.73	
Constant	-.00	.98		-.44	.04		-.27	.11		-.07	.35	
Centered R-squared	.88			.57			.84			.97		

Note: N=112. Significant F-values indicate that the variable in the first column is Granger-caused by the variable in the second column. Significance is two-tailed. Forecast Error indicates for each dependent variable what portion of the movement in a series can be attributed to its own shocks versus shocks from the other variables after 24 months.

Figure 7.4 Simulation of the Response to a One Standard Deviation Shock in Various Variables (Framing-Model)



Overall, this result clearly supports the expectation that negative framing towards immigration in the media increases anti-immigrant party support. Furthermore, of the key-events only the murder on Van Gogh leads to increased anti-immigrant party support. Also increases in the number of asylum applications one year earlier increase this party support. Parliamentary framing does not affect anti-immigrant party support, while the entrance of new anti-immigrant parties does increase the overall support for anti-immigrant parties.

Short-term influences

The analyses presented in this chapter focus on monthly level data and use lagged values to explain current values of the dependent variables. One might argue that the various factors (also) exert a more short-term influence on each other, an influence that occurs within a shorter time span the time span of one month and thus cannot be captured with the earlier-presented data. In that case, the unexplained part of each of the variables after the monthly-level analyses can be accounted for by changes of the other variables that take place within a single month. If this is the case than this should show up in the form of a significant correlation between the residuals of the variables from the monthly level VAR-analyses. Effects of events and the entrance of new anti-immigrant parties are largely similar to the monthly level analyses. However, F-tests for Granger-causality suggest that media influence parliament ($F = 6.330, p < .01$), but not the other way around ($F = 0.355, p = .79$).

The moving average representation suggests that the media's influence on parliamentary debates is largely positive (see Figure 7.5), and over-time, it explains 3.7 percent of the changes in parliamentary attention. Apparently, despite the fact that media attention does not get translated in official proposals and law, it exerts a short-term influence on the attention parliamentarians pay to the issue in a more symbolic way. Table 7.5 Effects of events and the entrance of new anti-immigrant parties are largely similar to the monthly level analyses. However, F-tests for Granger-causality suggest that media influence parliament ($F = 6.330, p < .01$), but not the other way around ($F = 0.355, p = .79$).

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Table 7.5 presents the correlations between the residuals of the various variables for both the agenda setting and framing-model. Only in the attention-model, a significant correlation is found between media and party support. This correlation ($r = -.60$) is in line with the initial, short-term negative relationship between the two as reported above: in the short run more media attention results in less anti-immigrant party support and vice-versa (Figure 7.3c and d), while in the longer run they reinforce each other.

When using the transcripts of parliamentary debates instead of the official documents, a significant, positive correlation between the residuals for parliamentary debates and newspaper attention exists ($r=.16, p<.05$). The possible positive short-term relation between these two is not surprising: debates are directly visible for journalists and for parliamentarians, it offers a more direct and prompt way to react on what they have just read in the newspapers.

Since the data for both variables are available at a day-to-day basis, I conducted an additional VAR-analysis, only including transcripts and newspaper coverage and using weekly data. Similar to the previous analyses, I included dummies for the events and anti-immigrant parties, but excluded asylum applications and anti-immigrant party support, since these are not available at a weekly level. Effects of events and the entrance of new anti-immigrant parties are largely similar to the monthly level analyses. However, F-tests for Granger-causality suggest that media influence parliament ($F = 6.330, p<.01$), but not the other way around ($F = 0.355, p=.79$).


The moving average representation suggests that the media's influence on parliamentary debates is largely positive (see Figure 7.5), and over-time, it explains 3.7 percent of the changes in parliamentary attention. Apparently, despite the fact that media attention does not get translated in official proposals and law, it exerts a short-term influence on the attention parliamentarians pay to the issue in a more symbolic way.

Table 7.5 Correlation between residuals for both attention- and framing-model

	Attention-model			Framing-model		
	Parliament	Media	Party support	Parliament	Media	Party support
Asylum applications	.05	-.03	-.01	.05	-.11	-.06
Parliament		.02	-.24		.08	-.36
Media			-.60***			.33

Note: *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed test)

Figure 7.5 Simulation of the Response to a One Standard Deviation Shock in Parliament and Media (weekly level)



These results confirm the assertion that the media's influence on politics is substantial when it comes to more oral debates, but is limited when more institutional elements are taken into account (Walgrave *et al.*, 2007; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). These influences are more short-term, drawing a picture of politicians using newspaper coverage directly as input for parliamentary debates.

7.7 Conclusion

This study presents a picture of the relationships between real world cues, parliamentary and media attention and framing of the immigration issue, and anti-immigrant party support. It gives an extensive, yet nuanced overview of relationships between the four, from which a clear pattern arises. Several things stand out. First, interaction between politics, media and public takes place independent of general real world developments like that of the number of asylum applications. Apparently, this kind of developments is too abstract to be of any substantial influence. Key-events that are more concrete and therefore easier to present and to use as examples in a debate do play a role. They do so mainly via media coverage. Since the media-arena is less institutionalized and routinized than the political one, it is not surprising that the effects of these unanticipated effects are largest in the media realm (see also Chapter 4).

Second, the relationship between parliament and newspapers is limited. In the long run journalists pay some attention to the content of official parliamentary documents. Politicians pay attention to media coverage as input for parliamentary debates. Apparently, politicians regard this coverage as relevant for profiling in the short run. However, when it comes to actual policy-making, more media attention for the issue does not increase parliamentary attention and even results in slightly less parliamentary attention. The results indicate a discrepancy between the way politicians behave in more visible debates and in the less accessible policy making process. In the latter case, politicians are not taking into account debates that are afoot in the media. In more visible parliamentary debates, however, they are ready – and willing – to deliver speech-acts in line with what they recently read in the newspapers. Moreover, the framing of the issue in official parliamentary documents and newspaper coverage is even more autonomous. Though in previous work some relationships are found when measuring the framing in a more subtle way (see Chapter 4), one would expect that there would be more congruence in the direction this framing takes in both realms.

Third, the relationship between official parliamentary documents and anti-immigrant party support is interesting to consider. Again, official policymaking works differently than one intuitively would expect: instead of more activity when anti-immigrant party support increases, less official documents are discussed in parliament. Though this is never presented as a deliberate strategy as is for example the case in the Flemish 'cordon

sanitaire', it indirectly indicates the unease of many political actors with the challenges anti-immigrant parties pose.

Finally, the strong bi-directional relationship between media and public stands out: both when it comes to issue attention and framing, media effects on anti-immigrant party support are clear: more and less favorable attention for the immigration issue in the media clearly triggers anti-immigrant party support. The reverse causal relationship is less consistent and is fluctuating in the long run. However, overall, increasing party support leads to more attention for the issue and this attention tends to be less favorable towards immigration and integration of minorities.ⁱ

Chapter 8. Conclusion and Discussion

8.1 Summary

This dissertation focused on real world cues, parliamentary documents and media coverage regarding the issue of immigration and integration of minorities, and anti-immigrant party support in the Netherlands during the period 1990-2004 and on how these four factors are interrelated. First, the question how the issue features in both parliamentary debates and media coverage is addressed. Second, it looked into the causal relationships between the four. In that way, it tries to describe and explain the changes in parliamentary and media attention and parliamentary and media framing. It assesses to what extent these changes are driven by levels of immigration and number of asylum seekers or rather by key-events, like 9/11. Furthermore, it seeks to account for the dramatic increases of anti-immigrant party support.

Attention and framing in parliament and media


The issue of immigration and integration of minorities has been heavily debated in both media and parliament during the period under study. Especially during the later years and mainly after 9/11 the issue received a lot of attention in both realms. Framing in media and parliament can be described using five issue-specific frames: multicultural, emancipation, restriction, victimization and Islam-as-threat. The analysis revealed incongruence in framing between the two arenas. Although the Islam-as-threat frame has dominated the media debate throughout most of the research period, this frame was rather marginal in the political realm before the events of 9/11. In the political realm, there is a larger diversity in the frames used, and different frames dominated over-time. Throughout the research period, the issue was largely framed in terms of emancipation and multiculturalism. Furthermore, not only absolute levels of framing use differed between media and parliament, there was also relatively little correlation over time, indicating the integration between the two realms. Only after 9/11, however, the framing in which Islam is perceived as a threat to Western society becomes dominant in both arenas. Media framing is far more selective, resulting in hegemonic rather than pluralist framing, though quality newspapers are slightly more pluriform than popular newspapers.

How real world cues, parliament, media and party support interact

Figure 8.1 presents an overview of the nature of the relationships that were assessed in the various studies. The next paragraphs will discuss the relationships in more detail. For each possible relation it displays (a) whether the relationship is found consistently or whether it depends on the elements of the two realms that are considered (e.g. attention or framing,

which real world development, which time-period) and (b) whether the influence can be regarded as relatively strong or weak.

Figure 8.1 Summary of results



REAL WORLD AND PARLIAMENT

The results on the impact of key-events on attention and framing in parliament confirm the notion of the parliamentary realm being more institutionalized than the media realm: it is less sensitive to events in the outside world. Changed composition of the parliament due to elections has little consequences for the use of various frames in this arena. High-impact international events like 9/11 and the war in Iraq, however, increase overall attention for the issue and result in more Islam-as-threat-framing. Additionally, the number of asylum applications has a limited and delayed impact on attention and framing in parliament. Regarding the latter, this impact is positive: the more asylum seekers, the more favorable the communication about immigrants is.

REAL WORLD AND MEDIA

Real world developments like monthly number of immigrants and asylum applications have limited or no direct influence on media attention while key-events significantly alter the media attention for the issue. International events like wars have a direct, but often temporarily effect, while most institutional, national events (e.g. parliamentary elections) influence media attention permanently, resulting in enduring higher or lower levels of issue

attention. The effects of deliberative events, where prominent (political) actors try to gain media attention for their controversial claims, are ambiguous and differ from time to time. Furthermore, events that are related to the ‘international war on terrorism’ (like 9/11 and the assassination of Theo van Gogh) can shift media content permanently towards an Islam-as-threat framing. These results are in line with previous studies that have argued for large impacts of key-events in general (Brosius and Eps, 1995; Vasterman, 2005) and changes in the public debate due to 9/11 and related developments more specifically (Koopmans et al., 2005; Norris et al., 2003), but also give insight in the nature of the changes (size, delay, duration) caused by these events.

REAL WORLD AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUPPORT

In the literature on explanations of aggregate level anti-immigrant party support variables like immigration, unemployment and their interaction are deemed important (Golder, 2003b, 2003a). The analyses confirm recent findings that immigration increases anti-immigrant party support (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2001), while higher levels of unemployment result in decreases in this support (Knigge, 1998). High levels of immigration combined with high unemployment rates also result in more anti-immigrant party support (Golder, 2003b, 2003a). The number of asylum applicants, however, does not affect anti-immigrant party support. Key-events have no direct effect either, though they indirectly make a difference by strongly influencing media coverage that on its turn fosters anti-immigrant party support. This finding is contrary to the immediate “rally around the flag effect” that 9/11 and similar events had in the United States. These events led to considerable direct changes in support for the various political parties: presidential approval and support for the incumbent Republican party went up considerably, while the oppositional Democratic party lost support (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003).

PARLIAMENT AND MEDIA

Though the descriptive results revealed only limited overlap between media and parliamentary framing, this does not rule out any causal relationships between the two arenas. When looking at the attention for the issue, the results show that bi-directional causal relationships between media and parliament exist, though these relationships are weak. In the case of attention these relationships are mainly long-term and positive: increases in one arena result eventually in increases in the other arena. Some short-term influences are established as well. The results offer some support for the claim that in official policy documents politicians are more reluctant to follow media. When looking at more symbolic elements of the parliamentary realm, i.e. transcripts of parliamentary debates, results are different: here, short-term consequences from media attention on attention for the issue in parliamentary debates are established and the claim that politics follow media can be sustained.

Regarding framing in official policy documents and parliamentary questions on the one hand and newspapers on the other hand, an interesting pattern is found: increases in the

use of a certain frame in one arena leads to increases in the other arena, but almost exclusively for those frames that have already been used frequently in the latter arena. The press is reluctant to adopt parliamentary frames that have not previously been popular in the media and vice versa. When a less nuanced classification of frames is used based upon a distinction between favorable/non-favorable towards immigrants, these relationships disappear altogether.

These results are in line with previous research and confirm the ambiguous nature of the agenda setting relationship found in previous studies (see overview of agenda-building, Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006) and confirms media-effects on parliament when transcripts of parliamentary debates are considered. Van Noije (2007) finds similar results for several issues in the Netherlands, among which immigration. This dissertation distinguishes itself from previous research in that it moves beyond agenda building processes by looking at frame-building processes as well. The usefulness of this approach is demonstrated by the nuanced causal relationships found when regarding the frames separately.

PARLIAMENT AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUPPORT

Previous research has shown the direct impact of public opinion on politicians and policy makers, while little empirical evidence exists for the reversed relationship (Behr and Iyengar, 1985; Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg, 1995; Monroe, 1998). In this study, no impact from parliament on party support is found, but an interesting backlash effect from party support on issue attention in parliament is established: more anti-immigrant party support leads to less parliamentary attention for the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. Apparently, politicians prefer to respond to increased anti-immigrant party support by keeping quiet about the issue, rather than to start discussing it in a more elaborate manner. However, the way they discuss the issue, in terms of framing, remains unaffected.

MEDIA AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUPPORT

When trying to explain anti-immigrant party support, media coverage has until recently been a largely neglected factor. The impact of media attention on this party support is convincingly demonstrated. The analyses show that both the newspapers' attention for immigration and integration of minorities and attention for economic news in an immigration frame during the period 1990-2002 have a significant and positive influence on party support even when controlling for other commonly offered explanations. More media attention leads to more party support. Also for the period between 1995 and 2004 a positive impact is found from attention for the immigration and integration issue on anti-immigrant party support. The size of this effect is considerable: in the long run media attention accounts for almost 30 percent of the variation in anti-immigrant support. These results provide evidence for the issue-voting hypothesis, as formulated by Walgrave and De Swert (2004). This effect is even stronger when considering the framing of the issue. More favorable coverage of immigrants leads to less support for these parties. Additionally, the

analyses reveal that the reverse relationship – though less strong and consistent - also exists: more anti-immigrant party support results in more attention for the issue and this attention tends to be less favorable for immigrants. Following the classical agenda setting hypothesis (McCombs and Shaw, 1972) the overwhelming majority of studies focuses on the effects from media on public opinion. This study demonstrates that the reversed relationship is worth taking into account as well. It seems to suggest that journalists are guided by the polls and regard the issues and framing of anti-immigration parties to be more relevant as soon as more people express an intention to vote for them. This way, the interaction between public support and media attention can lead to an upward spiral for anti-immigrant parties: more media attention leads to more support, while this support in turn reinforces media attention. This bandwagon effect is even stronger when it concerns coverage that is framed congruent with the parties' frame use. Its presence is contingent upon the size of anti-immigrant party support: if it surpasses a certain threshold, journalists start to pay considerable more attention to the issue and thereby contribute to the successes of these parties.


8.2 Implications: where do we take it from here?

Enhancing our understanding of the political process


The findings of this dissertation can be interpreted in the larger context of how a democratic system in a polity works. As Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg (1995) suggest, the relationship between real world cues, politics, media and public can take several forms. First, the *bottom-up* democratic model is based on the notion that politicians respond to citizens' preferences to maximize their electoral support (e.g. Schumpeter, 1954). Here, the public directly and indirectly via the media influences politics. Figure 8.2a presents the main relationships in this model. Second, the *top-down* model attributes a central role to the political realm ('primacy of politics') that is determining to a large extent the media agenda. The media on their turn exert a strong influence on the public (see Figure 8.2b). Kleinnijenhuis (2003) finds evidence for this model and claims that in the Netherlands: 'the public follows the media that follow politics'. Third, in a *mediacracy* the media are central and assert influence on both politics and public and are in that way most powerful in shaping political decision-making processes and public opinion (Figure 8.2c).

Figure 8.2 Prototypes of the democratic process


a. Bottom-up agenda setting



b. Top-down agenda setting



c. Mediocracy



The results from our studies do not completely fit any of these three ideal-type models. Rather, the relationships between the four realms are complex and nuanced. However, the results most strongly resonate with a mediocratic conception of democracy.

First, the media arena is most strongly influenced by real world developments and especially events. Second, it strongly and consistently influences public's support for anti-immigrant parties. Third, it exerts an influence on the parliamentary realm, especially on the attention for the issue in parliamentary debates and on the use of certain frames. Since this dissertation also provides some evidence for the reverse relation between parliament and media and between media and anti-immigrant party support, the top-down and bottom-up models cannot be completely refuted. What stands out, however, is the dominant role of the media. They largely mediate the relationships between parliament and the public and between real world and the public. Compared to Kleinnijenhuis' (2003) recent findings for the more general study in the relations between politics, media and the public the results presented in this dissertation differ for at least two reasons. First, Kleinnijenhuis only takes into account times of election campaigns, when media tend to be more sensitive to what politicians do and claim (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). Second, the political arena is not directly measured, but only indirectly by looking at the media coverage of political actors. It is likely that politicians claim different things when dealing with journalists than when acting in parliament, like they differ in their framing of the immigration issue in oral debates compared to more substantial policy proposals.

In chapter 1, this dissertation was placed within the larger context of the intensified debate around the immigration and integration of minorities in the Netherlands during the past decade. Three explanations for this intensification were mentioned. First, 9/11 and subsequent events caused a change in level and intensity of the debate. Second, political entrepreneurs, mainly Pim Fortuyn, were successful in mediating feelings of discontent among the population and altered the debate. These feelings had already been present and were mainly caused by the alleged failure of multicultural policies. Third, the changes in the debate on the issue of immigration and integration and minorities have to be seen as a media-phenomenon that is constructed in this realm and imitated by politics and the public. The results of the analyses presented in this dissertation show that all three explanations hold some validity and that it is indeed the interplay of various factors that can account for the changes during the past few years. It demonstrates that single explanations can only partly account for the dramatic developments that took place in the Netherlands over recent years. Overall, however, this study offers strongest evidence for the third explanation.

Regarding the first explanation, the results show indeed that especially 9/11, but also the bombings in Madrid and the assassination of Van Gogh changed the attention and framing of the issue. It is especially the media realm that is heavily influenced by these events, though 9/11 also leads to an increase in attention for the issue in parliament combined with an increase in Islam-as-threat framing. There is no evidence for a direct impact of these events on anti-immigrant party support. However, an indirect influence, with a mediating role of the media has been clearly assessed. In this respect it is worth noting that this is not an outcome that is particular for the events related to the 'international war against terrorism'. Previous events, like a speech of Bolkestein as early as 1991 or the international conflict in former Yugoslavia, yielded increases in media

attention as well. And also for this period in time, the positive influence of media attention on anti-immigrant party support is established. However, 9/11 did set a landmark: after its occurrence the framing of the issue – especially in the media, but also in parliament – changed and attention for the issue went up considerably. In that respect, it was far more influential than any other event and had a strong ‘exemplifying’ function (Zillmann and Brosius, 2000): it was the first in its type – taking place in and against the Western world with considerable casualties. The way the event was interpreted – mainly as an act of terror that had to be combated with an international war – has been very influential in the framing of the public debate and events that took place afterwards.

Within the scope of this dissertation, the second explanation – hypothesizing the crucial role of mainly Pim Fortuyn – could only be tested partly. A thorough evaluation of multicultural policies or a panel survey on attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policies are not part of the research. What can be established, however, is that the prominence of multicultural framing in both parliament and media waned from 2001 onwards, while it already got contested more and more in the preceding years. There is little doubt that with the debut of Fortuyn in the political arena anti-immigrant party support increased enormously. It is highly likely that Fortuyn gained this support mainly by presenting himself as an alternative to the establishment that governed the Netherlands during the previous eight years and by heavily criticizing its immigration policies (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003). The media framing of the issue during the presence of Fortuyn in the 2002 election campaign, however, was not that different from the period before 9/11. So, one should be careful not to overestimate the direct influence of Fortuyn on the media framing of this issue. On the other hand, it was after his appearance that an influence from anti-immigrant parties on media coverage emerged and in that way he indirectly and decisively altered the relationships between these two factors and contributed to heightened attention and less favorable coverage of immigration.

The third explanation attributing a crucial role to the media is in line with the mediocratic conception of democracy largely confirmed in this dissertation. Media coverage strongly influences anti-immigrant party support and to some extent the political realm. Additionally, results show that media coverage is highly sensitive to the external environment and records all kind of changes, while this is only to a very limited extent the case for parliament and for the public. While the political realm can be criticized for being too introvert, thereby confirming the image of an ivory tower, journalists tend to be oversensitive to specific elements of this outside world in two respects. First, events are regarded as more newsworthy than factual real world developments. Thereby journalists run the risk of creating hypes which exaggerate real world cues that might otherwise, without media attention, would have only limited consequences (see also Vasterman, 2005). Second, while developments within the political realm do determine media attention and framing of the issue only to some extent, anti-immigrant party support clearly increases media attention for the issue and contributes to framing that is less favorable towards immigrants. Especially during the latter period of the research, the two reinforce each other

and journalists – consciously or unconsciously – contribute to the electoral successes of these parties. Research that tries to explain the recent changes in the Dutch debate on immigration and integration of minorities without taking the media factor into account is incomplete – at best.

Theoretically: a framing perspective

The frame concept has been used by social scientists for several decades. It was originally introduced into the social sciences by Gregory Bateson in 1955 and elaborated nearly two decades later by Erving Goffman in *Frame Analysis* (1974). But the concept did not stimulate theorizing or research until the late 80s and early 90s when it formed the basis for a framing perspective on social movements (Gamson *et al.*, 1992; Snow *et al.*, 1986) and was found to be of conceptual utility in research on political communication (Iyengar, 1991; Entman, 1993). Ever since, numerous sociologists, political scientists and communication scientists have used the concept to analyze the communication by social movements, politicians, journalists and other actors and to understand the implications of these framing acts for the formation of collective and individual understandings. However, the theoretical and empirical use of the concept is often inconsistent and vague. In both the fields of social movements and political communication, several attempts have been made to review recent research (Benford and Snow, 2000; De Vreese, 2005; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007) and to come to an overarching framework to analyze framing processes (Scheufele, 1999). What becomes clear from these overviews are two things that are highly relevant within the context of this dissertation. First, some questions receive considerable attention and in some cases framing is almost solely conceptualized as being about media effects (Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). Other questions remain largely unaddressed. In this dissertation one of the main questions answered is on the relations between framing in media and politics. This question had been largely neglected until now. The results enhance our understanding of the interaction between the two realms by uncovering nuanced relationships between the two. A specific measurement of frames leads to results that indicate that in both realms self-confirmatory processes are present: an increase in the use of a frame in one realm only increases the use of this frame in the other realm if it is already dominant in the latter. More broadly, a framing perspective provides a useful tool to understand differences and similarities between the two realms. Results clearly demonstrate that the media need to be conceptualized as offering fewer opportunities for deviating frames but rather as a realm that has hegemonic characteristics.

Second, one of the most pressing problems with framing is the operationalization of frames. As De Vreese (2005: 53) puts it: ‘Previous research on frames in the news shares little conceptual ground and most studies draw on tentative working definitions or operational definitions of frames designed for the purpose of the specific study’. This dissertation proposed a conceptual grounding of the operationalization for frames that is rooted in the work of Snow and Benford (1988) on social movements’ framing processes. The classification in *diagnostic*, *prognostic* and *motivational* framing elements turns out to

be useful to systematically identify issue-specific frames (Snow et al., 2007), as in the case of immigration and integration of minorities multicultural, restriction, victimization, Islam-as-threat and emancipation framing. This approach differs from one that is used in much of the recent research in political communication, where generic (news) frames are distinguished that can be used across issues (e.g. Valkenburg et al., 1999). The use of generic frames offers several advantages to provide answers to specific questions, mainly on individual level framing-effects, that have a more general validity. However, to analyze the content of other communicating texts, such as parliamentary documents, and systematically compare them, the use of generic news frames might not be the most appropriate approach. If then one wants to be able to establish frames in a systematic and theoretically grounded way, Snow and Benford's conceptualization offers ample opportunity to do so.

Methodologically: an integral perspective and using proper techniques

I have set out to discuss the relations between real world cues, media, politics and public in an integral perspective, i.e. testing all possible causal relationships between the four. The various chapters discuss separate relations within this larger framework, while chapter 7 tests the overall model. This encompassing approach offers several advantages. First, it helps to get an overall picture of the relationships between the various factors and furthers our understanding of direct and indirect causal mechanisms (e.g. the mediating role of media between key events and anti-immigrant party support). Second, by integrating the relations between the various variables in a single model, the validity of the findings increases. One decreases the risk that the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable is spurious and is caused by the exclusion of a third variable that influences both the independent and dependent variable (the so-called omitted variable bias). Third, the statistical approach chosen is largely unrestricted, i.e. it does not exclude certain causal relations in advance and does not pre-determine the nature (i.e. delay, duration) of the relations. Such an open approach offers the opportunity to uncover interesting relationships that one might not have expected (e.g. the feedback mechanism from anti-immigrant party support on media, but only when a certain level of party support is reached) or to better understand the nature of the relations between variables (e.g. the diverging consequences different events have for the media attention for a larger issue). Furthermore, it helps to define indirect effects and sequences of causal relationships: as for example becomes clear from Figure 8.1 the pathway from events via media coverage to anti-immigrant party support is one of the pivotal outcomes of this research.

Assessing the relationships between the various variables in a reliable manner requires the use of advanced statistical methods. Social scientists are increasingly aware of problems that are related to the use of traditional techniques such as OLS regression when dealing with data that have specific characteristics, such as time series. Still, too often and too readily problems with autocorrelation and stationarity are neglected. In a similar vein, techniques are chosen that are simply not suitable for answering the research questions

posed or assumptions are made about the data and the relations between the variables that are not valid for the data at hand. By employing econometric time series techniques that are designed to correctly model the dynamic nature of the data and the relationships, I have dealt with the most urgent matters in this respect. However, this is just a small step in the right direction. As the work of Abbott (2001) shows, there are many more issues concerning the fascinating phenomenon of temporality that deserve the attention of social scientists but these fall without the scope of this dissertation.

The use of computer-assisted content analysis has offered the opportunity to analyze large amounts of texts in a convenient and consistent manner. In the context of this dissertation, manual coding of thousands of parliamentary documents and newspaper articles would have been enormously costly and time consuming. Computer-assisted coding has proven a powerful tool to systematically analyze general characteristics of written texts, to compare the content of parliamentary documents with newspaper articles and to relate the aggregate-level outcomes of these analyses to real world cues and anti-immigrant party support. This dissertation is a clear example of how techniques developed within the realm of information sciences can be used to answer questions that bear a large social(-scientific) relevance. The nearby future is likely to witness a large increase in possibilities offered by this type of techniques that provide social scientists with increasing possibilities to make their research more efficient and to delve deeper in the meaning of texts. Additionally, the use of information technologies offers opportunities to create a research environment in which exchange of data and software is facilitated and replication of results is more easily achieved. In the long run, this may contribute to a less fragmented research field and a more elaborate use of previous research to build upon.

Practically: how to react to anti-immigrant parties?

One of the most urgent questions that is occupying Dutch politicians and journalists is how to react to anti-immigrant parties that have gained ground in the Dutch political landscape during the recent years. In 2001 and 2002, the traditional political parties were criticized for not knowing how to deal with Pim Fortuyn. During the most recent elections parliamentary elections in November 2006 the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* (PVV), headed by Geert Wilders gained nine seats in parliament and actively challenges what it calls the 'Islamization of the Dutch society'. Again, politicians of other political parties wonder how to react: by staying quiet about the issue or by heavily criticizing the PVV and attacking its points of view. The results of this dissertation indicate what strategies have been used in the past and might give a hunch about what is the most appropriate reaction. In short, it can be argued that the reluctance of the parliament to react substantially on increasing support anti-immigrant parties combined with the media's unwillingness to more closely follow changes in the parliamentary realm creates a fertile ground for anti-immigrant parties to prosper. It requires a different approach from both politicians and journalists to change this situation.

This dissertation demonstrates that increasing anti-immigrant party support directly influences attention for the issue in official parliamentary documents. More anti-immigrant

party support actually decreases this attention. Apparently, rather than actively reacting on the challenge that increased anti-immigrant party support poses by intensifying efforts to solve problems related to immigrants, parliamentarians and members of government choose to keep quiet about the issue and to avoid a confrontation. This approach has – at least during recent years – not turned out to be very successful and has not resulted in a decrease in anti-immigrant party support. The results suggest that such a strategy is only successful when it is also adopted by the media, as has been the case during the nineties, when media and parliament largely neglected the Centrumdemocraten (CD). Especially after 2001, anti-immigrant party support also influences the parliamentary realm indirectly, via media coverage. Here, more party support results in more media attention and less favorable coverage of immigration. This media coverage drives politicians, but especially when it comes to symbolic politics. Parliamentarians are indeed sensitive to the external environment, but this does not get translated into actual policies. Second, parliament only influences media coverage to a limited extent: there is only a limited effect from issue attention in parliament on media attention and politicians are not able to get frames that dominate in parliament out in the media.

This situation, where politics often does not have a substantive reaction to the public's concerns and when such a reaction is available, it is not communicated effectively to this public by the media, gives anti-immigrant parties the opportunity to easily gain the ownership of the issue of immigration and integration of minorities. After all, they might well be the only party with a clear and understandable solution for immigration-related problems and are able to get the parties' connection to the issue out in the media effectively, as suggested by increased media attention and Islam-as-threat framing as soon as anti-immigrant party support rises. As has been demonstrated in this dissertation, this issue ownership clearly contributes to furthering anti-immigrant party support.

Efforts to limit anti-immigrant party support are then most likely to be successful when they are directed towards taking away the issue ownership from these parties. According to Walgrave and De Swert (2007), issue ownership is indeed both rooted in the party's communication as well as in media coverage of the issue. From politicians this requires a different reaction than now often given: it requires not to keep quiet about the issue but debating anti-immigrant parties' points of view and bringing forward a convincing alternative story (diagnosis and especially prognosis) about the issue than these parties. Furthermore, this alternative story should be more than a 'speech act' and be backed with substantive policy proposals in parliament. This is a long-term strategy that has to be carried out at the right time. First, issue ownership is usually a stable characteristic of a party (Budge and Farlie, 1983) and hard to overtake (but see Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2003 for an example of short-term issue-ownership change). Second, especially during election campaigns a strategy of putting emphasis on an issue that is owned by another party can result in electoral gains for this other party. As Kleinnijenhuis (2007: 112) and colleagues put it: 'In general, a party plays a dangerous game when it tries to gain voters with issues that are owned by other parties'. It seems more sensible to start taking up the issue during

routine time politics and building a solid reputation, instead of taking a chance on a last-minute strategy. Trying to overtake anti-immigrant parties by suggesting even more restrictive measures is most likely to be regarded implausible by voters and probably not very successful.

Journalists might want to evaluate their impact on the public and think about their journalistic role in the democratic process as well. Should their role not rather be to keep the public about relevant political developments and decision-making processes than to report in line with developments in anti-immigrant party support? Developments they contribute to by the considerable impact of their coverage.

8.3 Possible limitations and directions for further research

In this final paragraph, I will look at three possible limitations of the research conducted and will point to possibilities for further research.

The aggregate level

In chapter 2, I discussed the advantages of taking an aggregate level approach in trying to give reliable answers to the research questions posed. This approach offers opportunities to sort out time order more adequately and to assess long-term influences on larger social systems. I think that I have demonstrated in this dissertation how to exploit the potential advantages of this approach.

The main criticism on aggregate-level analyses deals with ecological fallacy: the problematic nature of making inferences about individual level behavior from aggregate level data. In this dissertation, this criticism has only limited validity: most results are described and discussed on this aggregate level and only to a limited extent and with the highest caution claims about the individual level (politicians, journalists and citizens) are made.

This does not rule out, however, that from a substantive point of view, some of the results found in this dissertation might call for additional research. For example, to fully comprehend some of the processes present in the relation between real world cues, parliament, media and anti-immigrant party support, it might be useful to move to the micro-level and consider individuals' attitudes and behavior. To open the 'black box' on the how and why of the results and to answer questions like how certain framing influences individuals with specific characteristics and to what extent politicians' and journalists' behavioral routines contribute to explaining the limited overlap in parliamentary and media framing it is necessary to look at the individual.

It is my conviction that individual and macro-level approaches are complimentary. Future research should combine analyses at the two levels and thereby complete the picture. Gamson (1992: 67) for example notes the importance of examining 'the interplay between two levels – between individuals who operate actively in the construction of meaning and socio-cultural processes that offer meanings that are frequently contested'. Such a

multilevel perspective will also have the potential to link the insights on framing processes acquired through the studies included in this dissertation, with more individual-level perspectives, where individual frames and processes at this level are emphasized (De Vreese, 2003; Klandermans, 1997; Scheufele, 1999; Valkenburg et al., 1999).

Computer-assisted content analysis

Above, the advantages of the use of computer-assisted content analysis are summarized. However, also some of its limitations are worth mentioning. A first limitation deals with the object of analysis. It does not allow for the analysis of visuals and especially television coverage that is often deemed important in shaping audience's attitudes and opinions (De Vreese, 2003). Still, as Kleinnijenhuis' (2003) analyses of Dutch newspapers and television news during election times demonstrate, differences between the content of newspapers and television news are not that large. From a substantive point of view, newspapers might actually function more as a forum of political debate than television does. However, this does not rule out that framing on television differs from framing in the newspapers (it might for example be less diverse and simpler frames might be dominant). To get a complete picture of attention and framing of the issue in the media additional research in this different type of outlet is required.

A second limitation of the use of computer-assisted coding is that it is limited in its ability to retrieve detailed information from texts. While it does a good job in establishing the presence of clearly defined frames, moving to more specific elements of a communicating text decreases its accuracy. Consequently, it is difficult for example to establish which actor actively uses the frame that is found in the text or to determine more precise relationships between actors and issues. Within the context of this dissertation, in some instances this additional information would have been useful, as with the active frame use by different political parties in parliament and media (chapter 7).

In general, techniques are quickly evolving in this area and possibilities to extract information from texts are rapidly growing (Johnston, 2002). Still, grasping the precise semantic meaning might remain a problem. Depending upon the research questions posed, researchers might in the future more often choose a strategy in which computer-assisted coding techniques are combined with manual coding. The former can be used to retrieve more 'basic' information from large amounts of texts (attention, article-level framing) and can be used to identify articles that are interesting to code manually to obtain more detailed information.

One case

This dissertation has investigated the relationships between real world cues, parliament, media and anti-immigrant party support in the Netherlands during the period 1990-2004. The study has profited from focusing on this one issue within one country during a limited time frame by employing the opportunity to thoroughly sort out these relationships. The

results are interesting in their own right, but, by taking this focus, questions arise around generalizability of the results, across time, context and issues.

The context (the Netherlands) and issue (immigration and integration of minorities) have some particularities that might have colored the results. On the one hand, the dramatic upsurge in anti-immigrant party support, the abandonment of multicultural policy and the murder on Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh have been specific domestic particularities that have surely influenced some of the outcomes. Furthermore, the specific issue has been a heavily contested one, which might have led to for example more dramatic fluctuations in framing and stronger effects of issue-voting than for other issues. On the other hand, many of the results are in line with previous research on for example agenda building and media-effects in other contexts and focusing on other issues. Furthermore, the overall context of the Netherlands regarding the issue is in many respects similar to other Western countries: immigration and integration of minorities has been a contested issue all over Europe, has attracted considerable more attention after 9/11 and subsequent events and changed the framing of the issue in similar directions (Ruigrok and Van Atteveldt, 2007), while anti-immigrant parties have gained considerable electoral support in many Western countries (Eatwell and Mudde, 2004). Finally, this dissertation focuses upon long periods in time, with the various factors taking different values and levels of fluctuation. The results, however, are remarkably consistent over time and explicit cross-time comparisons, such as for example those made in chapter 6, reveal large similarities in outcomes, with relatively few exceptions (see footnote i, chapter 7). Furthermore, despite different procedures for data gathering and analyses they are in line with Van Noije's (Van Noije, 2007) recent study into the same issue.

Still, one should certainly not rule out the possibilities that either the general structure of the country or the issue-specific characteristics of the country matter for the results. As Koopmans et al. (2005) have demonstrated, both general and issue-specific opportunity structures have their impact on claims-making on the issue of immigration and integration of minorities in the public sphere, while Arzheimer and Carter (2006) reveal the importance of political opportunities for electoral successes of anti-immigration parties. Whether they also moderate relationships between the variables central in this study remains an empirical question that needs to be answered in a *comparative* design, both *cross-nationally* as well as *across issues*.

ANNEXES

Annex 1. List of sensitizing questions to code frames

Full title

Issue (main issue, detail if necessary)

Date

Type/status of document

Event/reason/occasion of appearance

Audience

Voice/standing

Voice(s) speaking

Perspective

References: words/concepts (and where they come from)

References: actors

References: documents

Other references: events, etc.

Form (argumentation/style/conviction techniques/dichotomies/metaphors/contrasts)

Diagnosis

What is represented as the problem? Why is it seen as a problem?

Causality (what is seen as a cause of what?)

Who is seen as responsible for causing the problem?

Problem holders (whose problem is it seen to be? Active/passive roles, perpetrators/victims, etc.?)

Normativity (what is a norm group if there is a problem group?)

Legitimization of non-problem(s)

Prognosis

What to do? Which action is deemed necessary and why?

Hierarchy/priority in goals.

How to achieve goals (strategy/means/instruments)?

Attribution of roles in prognosis

Call for action

Call for action or non-action

Who is acted upon? (target groups)

Boundaries set to action and legitimization of non-action

Annex 2. Parliamentary documents used in qualitative analysis

Plan	No.
Act Integration Newcomers, April 9, 1998	25114, no. 1
Minority Policy 1998. Annual Report.	25601, no. 2
Integration Policy 1999-2002	26333, no. 2
Report on the Integration Policy of Ethnic Minorities 1999.	26815, no. 2
The Legal Position of Women in Immigration Policy. Letter of the State Secretary of Justice (April 2000)	27111, no. 1
Report of Parliamentary Debate About the Legal Position of Women in Immigration Policy (June 2000)	27111, no. 8
Report on the Integration Policy of Ethnic Minorities 2003.	29203, no. 1
Integration Policy New Style	
Plan for the Emancipation and Integration of Women and Girls from Ethnic Minorities.	29203, no. 3
Parliamentary Debates on Plan for the Emancipation and Integration of Women and Girls from Ethnic Minorities	29203, no. 9, 18, 22
Parliamentary Debate on Religious Manifestations of Civil Servants (March 17, 2004)	
Report Ethnic Minorities 2005	28345, no. 38

Annex 3. Framing in questions of political parties in parliament

	SP	GL	PvdA	D66	CDA	VVD	CU	LPF	SGP
Emancipation	15	13	31	5	17	7	3	8	2
Restriction	1	8	11	2	12	2	-	1	-
Islam-as-threat	2	8	10	2	13	48	3	8	2
Multicultural	3	9	10	6	3	1	1	-	1
Victimization	1	-	5	1	6	5	3	3	-

Note: Period 1995-2004, GL is GroenLinks, LPF is since 2002.

Annex 4. Search strings for chapters 3, 4 and 7

Multicultural frame

(multiculture*) AND (diversiteit or respect or verschil* or particip* or dialoog or gesprek)

Emancipation

(allochto* or vreemdeling* or immigrant* or asielzoeker* or minderheden) AND emancip*
AND (integr* or particip*)

Restriction

(importbruid* or nieuwkomer* of instroombeperking* or ((voorwaard* or eis*) w/5
immigratie) or (wetgeving w/5 immigratie) AND inburgering)

Victimization

(hoofddoek* or ongelijkheid or eerwraak) AND ((allochto* or vreemdeling* or immigrant*
or asielzoeker* or minderheden))

Anti-Islam

(islam* AND (bedreiging* or terrorisme))

Annex 5. Search string for chapters 5 and 6

Search string to collect articles for analysis in chapters 5 and 6:

Discrim* OR (haat w/5 aanzet) OR inburgering* OR (scholing or (cursus* OR les* OR onderwijs) w/10 (immi* OR alloch* OR asiel* OR buitenl*)) OR taalcur* OR taalles* OR taalonderw* OR gezinsherenig* OR schijnhuw* OR nephuw* OR uithuw* OR immig* OR alloch* OR multicult* OR (verpaup* AND (buurt* or wijk*)) OR moslim* OR islam* OR asiel* OR uitgeproc* OR verblijfs* OR (grondwet w/10 artikel 7) OR importbruid OR (bruid* AND buitenland) OR (inkomenseis w/20 trouw*) OR pluriform* OR asielzoeker* OR vluchteling* OR (generaal pardon) OR pardonregeling.

The search string for identifying economic news (chapter 6) was:
economi! OR werk! OR arbeid!

Annex 6. Search strings and conditions for Chapters 5 and 6

List of search terms

- 111|integratie#integra* or integrer*
- 211|scholing immigranten#(schol* or school or onderwij* or leren or leert)
- 311|basiskennis Nederlandse taal en samenleving#(*kennis or beheers* or spre* or pra*)
- 411|maatschappijleer verplicht#maatschappijleer
- 511|taalachterstand (-)#(taal or nederlands)
- 611|taalcursus#(taalcursus)
- 711|taallessen combineren met zoeken naar werk#(taal or nederlands)
- 811|inburgering#inburger*
- 911|verplichte inburgering#inburger*
- 1011|inburgeringstoets#inburger*
- 1111|eigen verantwoordelijkheid voor inburgering#inburger*
- 1211|rechten en plichten immigranten#(rechten or plichten)
- 1311|gelijke rechten homo's#(gelijk* or recht*)
- 1411|gelijke rechten op grond ras#(gelijk* or recht*)
- 1511|gelijke rechten op grond geloof#(gelijk* or recht*)
- 1611|discriminatie (-)#discrimin* or racis*
- 1711|aanzetting tot haat (-)#(aanzett* or aanspor*)
- 1811|vrijheid van meningsuiting#vrijheid or (7 or zeven)
- 1911|persvrijheid#vrijheid
- 2011|omvang huwelijksmigratie#(omvang or grootte or hoeveelhe* or aantal* or cijfer*)
- 2111|huwelijksmigratie#(trouw* or huwelijk*)
- 2211|gezinshereniging#(*herenig*)
- 2311|regels voor trouwen partner uit buitenland#(regel* or richtlijn* or wet* or bepaling*)
- 2411|lithuwelijken#lithuwelijk* or lithuwelijkt*
- 2511|gearrangeerd huwelijk#(gearrangeerd* or arrange*)
- 2611|schijnhuwelijk#((huwelijk* or trouw*)
- 2711|inburgeringstoets in land van herkomst#inburger*
- 2811|inburgeringscursus in Nederland#inburgeringscursus
- 2911|mrvv-aanvraag (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf) (-)#(mrvv-aanvraag or (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf)
- 3011|leges visum (-)#leges
- 3111|spreiding immigranten#spread*
- 3211|wonen van kansarmen in bepaalde wijken (-)#(*wijk* or buurt* or stadsde*)
- 3311|belastingvoordeel ondernemers achterstandswijken#belasting*
- 3411|identiteit#identiteit*
- 3511|eigen identiteit herkomstland#identiteit*
- 3611|traditionele cultuur#traditione*
- 3711|segregatie (-)#segreg*
- 3811|achterstandswijken, probleemwijken#(achterstand* or proble*)
- 3911|gettovorming#getto
- 4011|verpaupering#verpauper*
- 4111|zwarte scholen#zwarte

4211|zwerfvuil, stankoverlast#zwerfvuil or stankoverlast
 4311|(buren-)overlast#(stank or lawaai or *last)
 4411|huisjesmelkers #huisjesmelker*
 4511|tweedeling, polarisatie#tweedeling or polarisatie
 4611|multiculturele samenleving#samenleving
 4711|eigen cultuur herkomstland#cultu*
 4811|eigen identiteit herkomst#identiteit*
 4911|Nederland immigratieland#nederland
 5011|werkloosheid onder allochtonen#werkloos*
 5111|werkloosheid allochtone jongeren #werkloos*
 5211|gelijke rechten vrouw#(gelijk* or recht*)
 5311|moslima's @ia#moslima*
 5411|chador, hoofddoekje#chador* or hoofddoek*
 5511|nikab, gezichtssluier#nikab* or gezichtssluier*
 5611|sharia, islamitisch recht#sharia* or recht
 5711|leerwraak#eerwraak or wraak or wreck*
 5811|land van herkomst#land
 5911|schoolgaande kinderen van asielzoekers @ia#(kind* or jongere* or jeugd*)
 6011|asielprocedure #asielprocedure or (procedure or traject or aanvraag)
 6111|aantal asielaanvragen#asielaanvra* or aanvra*
 6211|aantal verblijfsvergunningen#(asiel* or verblijfsvergunning* or status)
 6311|asielzoekerscentrum#asielzoekerscentr* or azc
 6411|uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers @Ia#uitgeprocedeed*
 6511|ontzegging sociale voorzieningen aan nieuwkomers (-) #ontzeg*
 6611|ontzegging 5 jaar of langer#ontzeg*
 6711|ontzegging 8 jaar of langer#ontzeg*
 6811|Europees asielbeleid#europ*
 6911|Akkoord van Schengen#schengen
 7011|Opvang in eigen regio#opvang
 7111|instroombeperking#instroombeperk* or (*perking)
 7211|Verkorten procedure#*procedure or asielaanvra* or aanvra*
 7311|uitzetting immigranten (-)#(uitzett* or deport* or terugzend* or terugstu*)
 7411|snelheid procedure #*procedure or asielaanvra* or aanvra*
 7511|zorgvuldigheid procedure#*procedure or asielaanvra* or aanvra*
 7611|noodopvang#noodopvang
 7711|terugkeer(beleid)#terugke*
 7811|vertrekcentrum#vertrekcentr*
 7911|uitzetcentrum#uitzetcentr*
 8011|detentie uitgeprocedeerden#(detentie or gevangen* or vastgehoud*)
 8111|heenwenden, terugwenden, uitzetten uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers#(heenwend* or terugzend* or uitzett*)
 8211|pardonregeling (-)#pardonregeling*
 8311|(generaal) pardon#pardon
 8411|Ruimer pardon "schrijnende gevallen" #pardon
 8511|Instelling onafhankelijke commissie#onafhankelijk*
 8611|Gescheiden uitzetting gezinnen#uitzett*
 8711|Protest tegen uitzetting (-) #(protest* or demonstratie*)
 8811|A long walk to freedom#long
 8911|hongerstaking#hongerstaking

9011londerduiking #onderduik*
 9111lKerkasiel#kerkasiel
 9211lZelfkastijding#zelfkastijding
 9311lHongerstaking#hongerstaking
 9411ldichtnaaien mond#(*naaien or dichtnaai* or dichtgenaaid*)
 2111limmigranten @ia#immigranten
 2121lbuitenlanders @ia#buitenlanders
 2131lallochtonen @ia#allochtonen
 2141leerste generatie, gastarbeiders @ia#gastarbeiders or immigranten
 2151ltweede generatie @ia#gastarbeiders or immigranten
 2161letnische minderheden @ia#etnische
 2171lillegalen @ia#illegalen
 2181lmarokkanen @ia#marokkanen
 2191lmarokkaanse jongeren @ia #jongeren
 2201lturken @ia #turken
 2211lturkse jongeren @ia#jongeren
 2221lantillianen @ia #antillianen
 2231lantilliaanse jongeren @ia#jongeren
 2241lsurinamers @ia #surinamers
 2251lsurinaamse jongeren @ia#jongeren
 2261lasielzoekers#asielzoekers
 2271lpolitieke vluchtelingen @ia#vluchtelingen
 2281leconomische vluchtelingen @ia#vluchtelingen
 2291linkomenseis#(inkomenseis* or (eis*))
 2301lleeftijdseis (21 jaar en hoger) #(*eis*)
 2311limportbruid#importbruid* or huwelijk* or trouw*
 2321linburgeringscursus#inburger*
 2331lassimilatie (-)#assimil*
 2341lgrondrechten#grondrech*
 2351lgelijke behandeling#gelijk*
 2361lartikel 1 Grondwet (anti-discriminatie) #artikel
 2371ltolerantie#tolerantie
 2381lprivacy#privacy*
 2391lpluriformiteit#pluriform*
 2401lartikel 7 Grondwet#artikel
 2411lverschoningsrecht#verschoningsrecht
 2421lvrijheid van onderwijs#vrijheid
 2431lartikel 23 Grondwet#vrijheid or artikel
 2441londerwijsinspectie#onderwijsinspectie
 2451linspectie godsdienstlessen (-)#(inspect* or controle*)
 2461lverbod Islam-scholen (-)#verb*
 2471lislam#islam* or moslim*
 2481lmoslim(s) @ia #arbier* or moslim* or islam*
 2491limam @ia#imam*
 2501lbouwen/inrichten moskee#(bouw* or inricht* or ontwerp*)
 2511lradicale islam, orthodoxe islam, moslimfundamentalisme#(moslim* or islam*)
 2521lfatwah, vogelvrijbanvloek#fatwah* or vogelvrijbanvloek*
 2531lmoslimterrorisme#(islam* or moslim*)
 2541limmigratiebeleid#beleid*

255|1|zelfmoord#zelfmoord*
 256|1|zelfmoordaanslag#zelfmoordaanslag*
 257|1|beeldvorming alloctonen#(beeldvorm* or pers* or media or journalist*)
 258|1|werkloosheid#werkloos*
 259|1|werkloosheid onder jongeren#werkloos*
 260|1|integratiedebat#(debat* or discuss*)
 261|1|islamdebat#(debat* or discuss*)
 262|1|secularisatie#secularis*
 263|1|emancipatie#emancip*
 267|1|Gümüş#gümüş
 269|1|filter#film* or acteur* or actrice* or roman* or (boek* and not (in de boeken or te boek)) or sport* or voetbal* or stadion* or tennis* or wielren* or Formule 1

List of conditional search terms

1|1|integratie#
 2|1|scholing immigranten#(immigrant* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoek* or vluchteling* or allochto* or vreemdeling* or turk* or marokk* or buitenland* or suriname*)
 3|1|basiskennis Nederlandse taal en samenleving#(nederland* or samenleving or (normen and waarden)) AND (allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer* or turk* or marokk* or buitenland* or suriname*)
 4|1|maatschappijleer verplicht#(verplicht or moet*)
 5|1|taalachterstand (-)#(achterstand or beperkt) and (allochto* or vreemdeling* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname* or nieuwkomer*)
 6|1|taalcursus#(allochto* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname*)
 7|1|taallessen combineren met zoeken naar werk#(werk* or arbeid* or baan or banen) and (allochto* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname* or vreemdeling*)
 8|1|inburgering#
 9|1|verplichte inburgering#verplicht*
 10|1|inburgeringstoets#(*toets* or *test* or *examen*)
 11|1|eigen verantwoordelijkheid voor inburgering#(zelf or eigen) and verantwoordelijk*
 12|1|rechten en plichten immigranten#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or buitenland* or vreemdeling*)
 13|1|gelijke rechten homo's#homo* and not rechter* and not rechtbank* and not rechts* and not geloofwaardig* and not gelofte* and not rechtvaardig* and not rechte and not rechtenstud*
 14|1|gelijke rechten op grond ras#(ras*) and not rechter* and not rechtbank* and not rechts* and not geloofwaardig* and not gelofte* and not rechtvaardig* and not rechte and not rechtenstud*
 15|1|gelijke rechten op grond geloof#(gelo* or religie* or christen* or islam* or moslim* or joden* or jood*) and not rechter* and not rechtbank* and not rechts* and not geloofwaardig* and not gelofte* and not rechtvaardig* and not rechte and not rechtenstud*
 16|1|discriminatie (-)#
 17|1|aanzetting tot haat (-)#(haat or hat*)
 18|1|vrijheid van meningsuiting#meningsuit* or artikel

1911|persvrijheid#(journalist* or media or krant* or tv* or radio* or televisie* or pers*) and not personeel* and not persoon*

2011|lomvang huwelijksmigratie#(trouw* or huwelijk*) and (immigra* or migra* or asielzoek* or allochto* or vluchteling* or asielzoek* or marokk* or turk* or suriname*) and not trouw

2111|huwelijksmigratie#(immigra* or migra* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoek* or allochto* or vluchteling* or asielzoek* or marokk* or turk* or suriname*) and not trouw

2211|gezinshereniging#(familie* or gezin*)

2311|regels voor trouwen partner uit buitenland#((trouwen or huwelijk) and (immigra* or nieuwkomer* or migra* or asielzoek* or allochto* or vluchteling* or asielzoek* or marokk* or turk* or suriname*)) and not regelmatig*

2411|luithuwelijken#

2511|gearrangeerd huwelijk#(huwelijk* or trouw*)

2611|schijnhuwelijk#(schijn or nep or onecht)) or schijnhuwelijk

2711|inburgeringstoets in land van herkomst#(toets* or test* or examen*) and (herkomst or marokko or turkije)

2811|inburgeringscursus in Nederland#(hier or nederland)

2911|mvv-aanvraag (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf) (-)#aanvraag

3011|leges visum (-)#vis*

3111|spreiding immigranten#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname*)

3211|weten van kansarmen in bepaalde wijken (-)#(arm* or kansarm*) and (weten or geweerd or weer* or tegenhoud* or voorkom* or stop*)

3311|belastingvoordeel ondernemers achterstandswijken#*voordeel and (ondernem* or winkeleigena* or zelfstandig*) and (*wijk or wijk* or *wijken)

3411|identiteit#(allochto* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname*) and not identiteitsbewij* and not (geheim)

3511|eigen identiteit herkomstland#eigen and (allochto* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname* or herkomst) and not identiteitsbewij* and not (identiteit and geheim)

3611|traditionele cultuur#cultu* and (allochto* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname* or herkomst)

3711|segregatie (-)#

3811|achterstandswijken, probleemwijken#(*wijk* or buurt* or stadsde*)) or probleemwijk* or achterstandbuurt*

3911|gettovorming#

4011|verpaupering#

4111|zwarte scholen#scho*

4211|zwerfvuil, stankoverlast#

4311|(buren-)overlast#(buur* or buren*)

4411|huisjesmelkers #

4511|tweedeling, polarisatie#

4611|multiculturele samenleving#multicul*

4711|eigen cultuur herkomstland#eigen and (allochto* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname* or herkomst)

4811|eigen identiteit herkomst#eigen and (allochto* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname* or herkomst)

4911|Nederland immigratieland#(immigra* or asielzoeker* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer* or vluchteling*) and land*

5011|werkloosheid onder allochtonen#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname*)

5111|werkloosheid allochtone jongeren #(allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname*) and (jeugd* or jonger*)

5211|gelijke rechten vrouw#(vrouw* or meisje*) and not rechter* and not rechtbank* and not rechts* and not geloofwaardig* and not gelofte* and not rechtvaardig* and not rechte and not rechtenstud*

5311|moslima's @ia#

5411|chador, hoofddoekje#

5511|nikab, gezichtssluier#

5611|sharia, islamitisch recht#(moslim* or islam*) and not rechts* and not rechtvaardig* and not rechte and not rechtenstud*

5711|leerwraak#eer*

5811|land van herkomst#herkomst

5911|schoolgaande kinderen van asielzoekers @ia#(school* or onderwijs*) and (allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling*)

6011|asielprocedure #(asiel* or verblijfsvergunning* or status)

6111|aantal asielaanvragen#(asiel* or verblijfsvergunning* or status) and (aantal* or hoeveelheid* or cijfer* or omvang*)

6211|aantal verblijfsvergunningen#(aantal* or hoeveelheid* or cijfer* or omvang*)

6311|asielzoekerscentrum#

6411|luitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers @Ia#(asielzoeker* or vreemdeling* or immigrant*) or illega*

6511|ontzegging sociale voorzieningen aan nieuwkomers (-) #gebruik*) and (allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer*) and ((socialevoorziening*) or onderwijs* or scho* or uitkering*)

6611|ontzegging 5 jaar of langer#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer*) and ((sociale en voorziening*) or onderwijs* or scho* or uitkering*) and (5 or vijf)

6711|ontzegging 8 jaar of langer#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer*) and ((sociale en voorziening*) or onderwijs* or scho* or uitkering*) and (8 or acht)

6811|Europees asielbeleid#beleid* and asiel*

6911|Akkoord van Schengen#

7011|Opvang in eigen regio#(regio or herkomst or (eigen and land)) and (allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer*)

7111|instroombeperking#(instroom or allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or buitenland*)

7211|Verkorten procedure#(asiel* or verblijfsvergunning* or status) and (verkort* or korte*)

7311|luitzetting immigranten (-)#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or buitenland*)

7411|snelheid procedure #(asiel* or verblijfsvergunning* or status) and snel*
 7511|zorgvuldigheid procedure#(asiel* or verblijfsvergunning* or status) and zorgvuldig*
 7611|noodopvang#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or buitenland*)
 7711|terugkeer(beleid)#*beleid
 7811|vertrekcentrum#
 7911|lultzetcentrum#
 8011|detentie uitgeprocedeerden#(uitgeprocedeerde* or asielzoeker* or illega*)
 8111|heenzzenden, terugzzenden, uitzetten uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers#(uitgeprocedeerde* or asielzoeker* or illega*)
 8211|pardonregeling (-)#
 8311|(generaal) pardon# generaal
 8411|Ruimer pardon "schrijnende gevallen" #(ruim* or verruim*) and (geval* or schrijnend*)
 8511|Instelling onafhankelijke commissie#commissie* and (allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or buitenland*)
 8611|Gescheiden uitzetting gezinnen#(apart or gescheiden or scheid*) and (gezin* or familie*)
 8711|Protest tegen uitzetting (-) #(uitzett* or terugstur* or terugzend* or deport*)
 8811|A long walk to freedom#walk and freedom
 8911|hongerstaking#
 9011|londerduiking #(allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or buitenland*)
 9111|Kerkasiel#
 9211|Zelfkastijding #
 9311|Hongerstaking #
 9411|dichtnaaien mond#(mond* or oog or ogen)
 2111|immigranten @ia#
 2121|buitenlanders @ia#
 2131|allochtonen @ia#
 2141|eerste generatie, gastarbeiders @ia#eerste generatie*
 2151|tweede generatie @ia#tweede generatie
 2161|etnische minderheden @ia#minderhe*
 2171|illegalen @ia#
 2181|marokkanen @ia#
 2191|marokkaanse jongeren @ia #marrokaanse
 2201|turken @ia #
 2211|turkse jongeren @ia#turkse
 2221|antillianen @ia #
 2231|antilliaanse jongeren @ia#antilliaanse
 2241|surinamers @ia #
 2251|surinaamse jongeren @ia#surinaamse
 2261|asielzoekers#
 2271|politieke vluchtelingen @ia#politieke
 2281|economische vluchtelingen @ia#economische
 2291|inkomenseis#(inkomen* or salaris*) and (allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer* or turk* or marokk* or buitenland* or suriname*)

230|1|leeftijdseis (21 jaar en hoger) #(leeftijd or 21)) and allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer* or turk* or marokk* or buitenland* or suriname*
 231|1|importbruid#allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer* or turk* or marokk* or buitenland* or suriname*)
 232|1|inburgeringscursus#
 233|1|assimilatie (-)#
 234|1|grondrechten#
 235|1|gelijke behandeling#behandel*
 236|1|artikel 1 Grondwet (anti-discriminatie) #(1 or ÈÈn) or (discrimin*)
 237|1|tolerantie#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or nieuwkomer* or turk* or marokk* or buitenland* or suriname* and nederland*)
 238|1|privacy#
 239|1|pluriformiteit#
 240|1|artikel 7 Grondwet#(7 or zeven)) or (vrijheid and meningsuiting)
 241|1|verschoningsrecht#
 242|1|vrijheid van onderwijs#onderwijs
 243|1|artikel 23 Grondwet#onderwijs or 23
 244|1|onderwijsinspectie#
 245|1|inspectie godsdienstlessen (-)#((godsdienst* or religie*) and onderwijs* or les* or scho*)
 246|1|verbod Islam-scholen (-)#(moslim* or islam*) and (onderwijs* or scho*)
 247|1|islam#
 248|1|moslim(s) @ia #
 249|1|imam @ia#
 250|1|bouwen/inrichten moskee#moskee*
 251|1|radicale islam, orthodoxe islam, moslimfundamentalisme#(fundamentalis* or extre* or orthodox*)
 252|1|fatwah, vogelvrijbanvloek#
 253|1|moslimterrorisme#(terreur* or terroris* or bom* or aanslag*)
 254|1|immigratiebeleid#(immigra* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoek* or vluchteling* or allochto* or vreemdeling* or turk* or marokk* or buitenland* or suriname*)
 255|1|zelfmoord#
 256|1|zelfmoordaanslag#
 257|1|beeldvorming allochtonen#(immigrant* or nieuwkomer* or asielzoek* or vluchteling* or allochto* or vreemdeling* or turk* or marokk* or buitenland* or suriname*) and not personeel* and not persoon*
 258|1|werkloosheid#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname*)
 259|1|werkloosheid onder jongeren#(allochto* or asielzoeker* or nieuwkomer* or immigrant* or vluchteling* or vreemdeling* or marokka* or turk* or buitenland* or suriname*) and (jeugd* or jonger*)
 260|1|integratiedebat#integr*
 261|1|islamdebat#(islam* or moslim*)
 262|1|secularisatie#
 263|1|emancipatie#
 267|1|Gümüs#

Annex 7. Additional analyses chapter 6

For each variable in the analysis, Table A1 shows with which ARIMA(p,d,q)-model they are best represented. All variables have to be differenced once, except unemployment, which has to be differenced twice. The most common unit-root test (Augmented Dickey-Fuller test) suggests no unit root after this transformation and Ljung-Box Q indicates the absence of correlation in the residuals.

Table A1. ARIMA-models of the various variables, period 1990-2002

Variable	ARIMA Model	Ljung-Box Q (20)	Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
Populist party support	(0,1,1), MA(1)	18.50*	-17.75‡
News on immigration	(0,1,2) MA(1,2)	22.41*	-11.42‡
News on economy	(0,0,2) (1,0,0) ₁₂ , MA(1,2)	16.68*	-4.99‡
Immigration	(1,1,3)(1,0,0) ₁₂ , MA(2,3,7)	23.77*	-3.80‡
Unemployment	(0,2,3), MA(1,2,3)	25.47*	-7.52‡
Unemployment * Immigration†	(0,1,3), MA(1,2,3)	25.57*	-7.48‡
Asylum seekers	(0,1,1)(1,0,0) ₁₂ , MA(1)	19.09*	-5.31‡

Note: * indicates no correlation in residuals; ‡ indicates absence of unit-root; † created with the number of immigration and the first difference of the level of unemployment

Table A2 again indicates for each of the variables in our first analysis with which ARIMA(p,d,q)-model they are best represented. The results are very similar to the first analysis (table A1). Again the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test suggests after the applied transformation no unit root and Ljung-Box Q indicates the absence of correlation in the residuals.

Table A2. ARIMA-models of the various variables, period 1990- June 2001

Variable	ARIMA Model	Ljung-Box Q (20)	Augmented Dickey-Fuller test
Populist party support	(0,1,1), MA(1)	14.84*	-7.39‡
News on immigration	(0,1,0)	25.23*	-10.76‡
News on economy	(0,1,2) (1,0,0) ₁₂ , MA(1,3)	22.29*	-5.32‡
Immigration	(1,1,2)(1,0,0) ₁₂ , MA(2,3)	21.20*	-4.14‡
Unemployment	(0,1,1), MA(2)	16.90*	-7.99‡
Unemployment * Immigration †	(0,1,1)(1,0,0) ₁₂ , MA(2)	16.94*	-7.98‡
Asylum seekers	(0,1,1)(1,0,0) ₁₂ , MA(1)	18.77*	-11.99‡

Note: * indicates no correlation in residuals; ‡ indicates absence of unit-root; † created with the number of immigration and the first difference of the level of unemployment.

NOTES

Chapter 1

ⁱ I am indebted to Ruud Koopmans who suggested this term to me.

ⁱⁱ This discussion, of course, has not been unique for the Netherlands. The worldwide commotion around the Danish cartoons in the fall of 2005, portraying the prophet Mohammed in little flattering ways, shows the international character of this debate.

Chapter 2

ⁱ Officially, stationarity also requires that the variance of the series does not show an upward or downward trend (ever increasing or decreasing; variance-stationarity). Since for the type of data used in this dissertation's analyses, it is highly unlikely that the variance is ever increasing or decreasing, I assume variance-stationarity and limit the discussion to the stationarity of the mean (mean-stationarity).

Chapter 3

ⁱ In the field of politics the country has traditionally been divided into several socio-cultural milieus. The segmentation of the country into these milieus has been called *pillarisation*.

ⁱⁱ We decided to include all articles that appeared in the newspapers and do not make a distinction between various sections, because that was technically difficult and it turned out that news on immigration and minorities' integration appeared highly spread over the newspapers. Inevitably, this means that our analysis also includes coverage from outside the Dutch context. In many cases, this is not directly problematic. For example, the international debate on 'the war against international terrorism' can be argued to have a direct impact on the Dutch debate on immigration and integration. To get an idea to what extent we get a distorted picture due to inclusion of foreign news, we conducted an additional analysis in which we excluded news that appeared in the international news sections. This left us with 12,378 articles with a mean of 1.10 frame per article. There are some differences in the use of the various frames: Islam-as-a-threat is occurring less often (48.0% compared to 55.0%), while especially multiculturalism (32.3% compared to 27.9%) and victimization (17.5% compared to 15.3%) occur more often. However, in all instances the monthly scores for the proportional use of each frame and for attention correlate above .95, indicating no different trends when excluding international news.

ⁱⁱⁱ Our left-right division is based on the coding of party manifestos (MRG project, see Budge *et al.*, 2001). For the specific Dutch data see Pennings and Keman (2003) and Pennings (2005). In Annex 3 we present the frames used by each individual political party.

^{iv} Although Fortuyn became party leader of the new party, Leefbaar Nederland, in November 2001, he started to receive considerable media attention from both politicians and media after an interview with *de Volkskrant* on February 9, 2002, when he called Islam 'a backward culture' (Kleinnijenhuis *et al.*, 2003: 41).

Chapter 4

ⁱ Parliamentary documents include all the official documents handled in parliament, including official questions by parliamentarians to government, proposals for legislation by government etc. The integral reports of parliamentary debates are not included in the analyses, since the main interest in this dissertation lies in substantial middle- and long-term relationships between the two arenas, that are better captured using more official documents. Transcripts of parliamentary debates fall under what Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) label as the most 'symbolic' elements of the political agenda, where a short-term influence from media on politics is to be expected (see Chapter 7 for an additional analysis). From a practical point of view, the employed method (computer-assisted content analysis) makes a reliable frame-analysis of transcripts more problematic. These transcripts include (chains of) statements of several actors, making it difficult to establish which actor is precisely using which frame. The salience of the issue in this type of documents, however, correlates moderately with the salience in the other types of parliamentary documents ($r=.51$) and additional analyses reveal no substantial differences in the relationships between media and parliament, at least on a monthly level (see also Chapter 7).

ⁱⁱ The dummy capturing the campaign in the weeks before the 2002 parliamentary election did not change any of the framings significantly and is not included in further analyses. The absence of any further change during the weeks preceding this election is not so surprising: debate on the issues has already changed since 9/11 and the entrance of Fortuyn in the political arena several months before and was already in the centre of attention in the end of 2001 and the first months of 2002 (Kleinnijenhuis *et al.*, 2003).

ⁱⁱⁱ To obtain a Vector Moving Average representation, it is necessary to order the variables in the most likely causal order. Following the results of Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg (1995) we ordered them as follows: parliament-media. Additional analyses suggest that results do not alter substantively if an alternative ordering is chosen.

^{iv} It is also possible for events to have an effect that has a period of decline, which spans more than one month. Our empirical analyses, however, show that in this case all events included are most appropriately modelled as either permanent or temporarily and abruptly declining, resulting in no significant effects in the following month. Chapter 5 demonstrates with a different operationalization of the attention-variable how a gradually declining influence needs to be interpreted.

Chapter 5

ⁱ This selection process is even more pronounced for television news compared to newspapers, since time and space for reporting are much more limited in the former than in the latter. Also, the demand for visuals is higher on television.

ⁱⁱ Some scholars claim that comparing news coverage and factual reality is unjustified and impossible. Schulz (1976) for example argues that every account of a factual reality is an already filtered and constructed one, for instance by agencies that also apply certain factors (that may differ from news values) to decide how to present the real world. Therefore, there is no inter-subjectively reliable picture of reality. Accordingly, the entire research design of investigations of relations between extra- and intramedia data is discarded. This claim, however, is countered by many others, who argue that real world events, such as disasters, elections, and others, are not constructed but real, but that they get reconstructed by the media (cf. Bentele, 1992).

ⁱⁱⁱ Galtung and Ruge identify frequency, intensity, unambiguity, meaningfulness/cultural closeness, consonance, continuity, composition, negativity, some reference to elite-nations or elite-persons and personalization as important factors.

^{iv} The relevance of these different indicators depends on the issue at stake.

^v For the most part, however, their escalation model and empirical findings point to an influence of coverage of violent acts against foreigners on subsequent attacks.

^{vi} The term media agenda setting refers to the question of what factors put an issue on the media agenda.

^{vii} Ideally, one would include the parliamentary agenda to control for its influence on media coverage (e.g. Shah *et al.*, 1999). One could even argue that the parliamentary agenda consists of all political deliberative events. See for a discussion of the (limited) effect of the parliamentary agenda on the media agenda for immigration and integration in the Netherlands in a slightly different time-period, see Chapter 3, 4 and 7.

^{viii} Theoretically, one can even think of the publication of data on immigration and asylum seekers becoming some kind of event itself that receives considerable media attention. From a preliminary analysis of our data, we do not find much evidence for this: there is little coverage on the exact immigration and asylum figures.

^{ix} Brosius and Eps do use the media-content to select crucial key-events, but since their research question is different, this is less problematic, though they acknowledge that 'It is difficult, however, to identify – aside from coverage – objective criteria for classifying such events as key-events' (p. 407).

^x The interpretation of the effect of a dummy-variable on a differenced series differs from the effect on the original series. Take for example the original key-event dummies indicating a permanent effect (resembling 0,0,1,1,1). A significant positive impact on the differenced series would lead to the conclusion that after the occurrence of the event there is a positive change at *any* time-point after the event is taking place. Translated to the original series this would mean an upward trend leading ultimately to infinity. If the dummy has a positive effect on the original series, this would lead to a one-time increase, after which the series remains at this higher level, but does not increase further. The same result is reached when indeed using the differenced dummy series (0,0,1,0,0) on the

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differenced dependent variable: it leads to a one-time positive change score. For the original series, this means a one-time increase after which it remains at the same level.

^{xi} Theoretically, one can also think of an effect that occurs abrupt and continuously increases. It is, however, hard to imagine such an effect in social sciences.

^{xii} The calculation in this case is as follows: percentage change = $(e^{.77} - 1) * 100$ (Clarke *et al.*, 1990: 75).

Chapter 6

ⁱ Fennema (1997) suggest differentiating between protest, racist and extreme right parties. It could be argued that for the Dutch case the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) and to a lesser extent Leefbaar Nederland (LN) were able to book success also due to peoples' discontent with politics and protest voting against traditional parties. However, we contend that it is especially the anti-immigrant issue that fuelled support (see Kleinnijenhuis *et al.*, 2003). Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) show that even though the ideology of anti-immigrant populist parties may differ across countries, the motivations of voters to vote for these parties are largely the same. In our empirical part we conduct two analyses: one for the whole period and one excluding the last one and a half year, when LN and LPF entered the political arena and see whether the results differ.

ⁱⁱ As mentioned above, Pim Fortuyn set out his political career as the leader of LN. This party would not be validly classified as an anti-immigration party, since their main issue stances concern direct democracy and transparent government. It can be argued, however, that during the months of Fortuyn's leadership, he directed the party towards an anti-immigrant issue party and also attracted voters supporting mainly because of anti-immigrant sentiment (Kleinnijenhuis *et al.*, 2003). For these reasons, we add vote intention for LN during the months of Fortuyn's leadership to our dependent variable.

ⁱⁱⁱ A number of studies look at the impact of news media content or exposure on related dependent variables, such as racial policy attitudes (Kellstedt, 2003) or anti-foreigner violence (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). In the present review we focus only on those investigations that relate news media specifically to successes of anti-immigration parties.

^{iv} Different newspapers do promote different values and ideas. We, however, consider the full range of national newspapers in our study, which means that even if some of them are more inclined to report on immigration and integration issues, the differences should cancel each other out.

^v Due to data unavailability, monthly measures of the number of foreigners living in the Netherlands are not included.

^{vi} This number differs from the number in Chapter 5, since a longer research period, starting January 1990 instead of May 1991 is included here.

^{vii} Though these two dummy-variables are not suitable to investigate precisely what the effect of 'leadership' or 'charisma' is, they do point to the difference the leadership of Fortuyn allegedly made.

^{viii} For their regularly conducted public opinion polls, TNS Nipo uses a representative sample of the Dutch population. The data have been the basis for previous studies (e.g. Kleinnijenhuis and Fan, 1999; Kleinnijenhuis and Ridder, 1998).

^{ix} Accordingly the independent variables in all further analysis are also logged.

^x As the dependent variable is logged, the effect of a dummy-variable with a coefficient of w sorts a proportional increase of $(e^w - 1 * 100) \%$.

^{xi} We also assessed the impact of the monthly number of asylum applications. Including this variable in an additional model for the period for which these data were available (1991-2002), we found no effect on anti-immigrant party support.

^{xii} These additional analyses are available from the authors upon request.

^{xiii} Although the authors argue that different ethnic groups are covered differently in the newspapers under analysis, we contend that for our purpose the differentiation between ethnic groups is not important. Lubbers et al. (1998) show that coverage was negative most often in relation to asylum-seekers and immigrants from Morocco, Turkey, and the former Dutch colonies. Furthermore, they demonstrate that the bulk of the coverage was about just these groups of ethnic minorities. Therefore, we can assume that immigration coverage is in general negative part in tone.

^{xiv} These main effects in presence of the interaction term need to be interpreted with some caution, since they only occur when the other variable included in the interaction term is zero. However, the negative effect of unemployment confirms the tendency shown in previous research. Knigge (1998) explains the negative relationship between unemployment and radical right support relying on a picture of a rather rational voter, who, in times of bad economic developments turns to established parties with 'a solid program and record on economic issues' (Knigge, 1998: 270; see also Givens, 2002; Golder, 2003b).

Chapter 7

ⁱ The employed method (computer-assisted content analysis) makes a reliable frame-analysis of transcripts more problematic. These transcripts include (chains of) statements of several actors, making it more difficult to establish which actor is precisely using which frame. Therefore, I refrain from further analyses of framing in transcripts of parliamentary debates.

ⁱⁱ To obtain a Moving Average Representation, it is necessary to order the variables in the most likely causal order. Following the results of Kleinnijenhuis and Rietberg (1995) I ordered them as follows: asylum seekers-parliament-media-party support. Additional analyses suggest that results do not alter substantively if an alternative ordering is chosen.

ⁱⁱⁱ Additional analyses show that the residuals of this series indicate the presence of some autocorrelation. Brandt and Williams (2007) suggest that this problem can be solved by adding additional lags for all variables. These analyses show that this indeed removes

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autocorrelation, makes media attention Granger-causing itself, but furthermore does not change the results. However, it does consume a large number of degrees of freedom. Therefore, the initial analysis is reported. Adding one or two (negative) moving averages would also remove autocorrelation. Substantively, this indicates that rather than being a complete autoregressive process, media attention is more shock-wise and that after a shock, it is bound to move back – at least partly - towards initial values.

ⁱ Additional analyses show that this effect is especially present from the end of 2001 onwards. Apparently, with the entrance of Fortuyn in the political arena and probably after 9/11, the relevance of support for anti-immigrant parties is increasing. This is in line with previous findings of Koopmans (1996a), who demonstrates that violent acts against asylum seekers in Germany trigger the level of debate about integration of minorities in German newspapers only after the occurrence of several serious violent events within a short time period. The effect of media on anti-immigrant party support is stable over-time.

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Nederlandstalige samenvatting

Framing Immigratie en Integratie

Relaties tussen Maatschappelijke Ontwikkelingen, Parlement, Media en Steun voor Anti-Immigratiepartijen in Nederland

In dit proefschrift staan twee vragen centraal. Ten eerste wordt onderzocht hoe het immigratie- en integratieonderwerp bediscussieerd is in het parlement (de Tweede Kamer) en in de landelijke dagbladen gedurende de periode 1990-2004. Ten tweede wordt onderzocht welke causale relaties bestaan tussen maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen, parlementaire documenten en mediaberichtgeving over het immigratie- en integratieonderwerp en steun voor anti-immigratiepartijen in Nederland. De analyse wordt gedaan met behulp van computergestuurde inhoudsanalyse en econometrische tijdreeksstechnieken worden toegepast om causale relaties vast te stellen.

Het immigratie- en integratieonderwerp wordt gedurende de gehele onderzoeksperiode heftig bediscussieerd, zowel in het parlement als in de media. Vooral gedurende de laatste jaren en dan met name na de terroristische aanslagen van 11 september 2001 in New York (9/11) kreeg het onderwerp veel aandacht in beide arena's. Om een precies beeld te krijgen van hoe het onderwerp wordt besproken worden vijf frames onderscheiden: multiculturalisme, emancipatie, restrictie, slachtofferrol en Islam-als-bedreiging. Inhoudsanalyse laat zien dat er duidelijke verschillen bestaan tussen beide arena's. Berichtgeving waarin de Islam wordt afgeschilderd als een bedreiging voor de westerse samenleving domineert bijna gedurende de hele onderzoeksperiode in de dagbladen, maar wordt slechts beperkt gebruikt in parlementaire debatten. Daar wordt het onderwerp vooral besproken in termen van multiculturalisme en emancipatie van minderheden. Verder zijn ook de trends door de tijd heen verschillend voor beide arena's, met één duidelijke uitzondering: na 9/11 is de aandacht voor Islam als bedreiging voor beiden duidelijk toegenomen.

Met betrekking tot de invloedsrelaties tussen maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen, parlement, media en steun voor anti-immigratiepartijen laat het onderzoek een genuanceerd beeld zien. Een aantal zaken vallen op. Ten eerste vindt de interactie tussen parlement, media en steun voor anti-immigratiepartijen grotendeels plaats buiten de grotere maatschappelijke context zoals deze naar voren komt in abstracte cijfers als het aantal asielaanvragen. Alleen steun voor anti-immigratiepartijen wordt duidelijk beïnvloedt door werkloosheids- en immigratiecijfers. Incidenten, zoals 9/11 en de moord op Theo van Gogh, oefenen wel invloed uit, voornamelijk via stijgende media-aandacht.

Ten tweede bestaat er een wederzijdse invloedsrelatie tussen parlement en dagbladen. Met betrekking tot de aandacht voor het onderwerp blijkt deze relatie afhankelijk van het

soort parlementaire documenten dat bestudeerd wordt. In het geval van kamerdebatten is er een duidelijke invloed van dagblad op politiek: meer aandacht in de krant resulteert op korte termijn in meer aandacht in kamerdebatten. Voor officiële parlementaire stukken, zoals wetsvoorstellen, worden met betrekking tot aandacht slechts wederzijdse positieve lange termijn effecten gevonden. In het geval van framing leidt in dit geval een toename van het gebruik van een frame in één arena tot een toename in de andere arena, maar alleen voor die frames die in de andere arena al veelvuldig gebruikt werden. In het bijzonder dagbladen zijn terughoudend veranderingen in parlementaire framing over te nemen als het gaat om frames die in het parlement daarvoor reeds veelvuldig gebruikt worden. Kennelijk bestaat er zowel binnen politiek als journalistiek een 'zelfbevestigend' mechanisme, waarbij beiden alleen die veranderingen oppikken die in overeenstemming zijn met wat zij daarvoor reeds als belangrijk beschouwden.

Ten derde is de wederzijdse invloedsrelatie tussen media en steun voor anti-immigratiepartijen opvallend. Terwijl parlement en steun voor anti-immigratiepartijen slechts een beperkte directe relatie hebben, leidt meer media-aandacht tot meer steun voor deze partijen en omgekeerd. Deze relaties zijn nog sterker als het gaat om berichtgeving die kritisch is over immigratie en immigranten.

In algemene zin bevestigen deze resultaten het bestaan van een mediacratische vorm van democratie, waarin media een sterke invloed uitoefenen op het publiek en – in iets mindere mate – op de politiek. Voor zowel journalisten als politici bevatten de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek een waardevolle les. Het lijkt erop dat het gebrek aan een reactie van politici op groeiende steun voor anti-immigratiepartijen, gecombineerd met de onwil van journalisten om meer precies de veranderingen in het parlementaire debat te volgen resulteert in een situatie waarin anti-immigratiepartijen kunnen floreren. Voor politici zou het raadzaam kunnen zijn hun strategie ten opzichte van anti-immigratiepartijen te heroverwegen, terwijl journalisten zich meer bewust zouden kunnen tonen van hun invloed op het publiek en van hun rol in het democratische proces.

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